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ABSTRACT 
Th1s study attempts to rev1ew and analyse central bank1ng 1n 
Pak1stan It has four obJect1ves (1) to d1scuss the role of the 
State Bank 1n the growth of commerc1al banks and the money market, 
(11) to descr1be and analyse the operat1on of the commerc1al banks, 
(111) to d1scuss the control of the money supply by the State Bank, 
Bnd (1v) to exam1ne the part played by the Bank 1n the sett1ng up 
and operat1on of spec1al1sed f1nanc1al 1nst1tut1ons created to 
promote the development of agr1culture and 1ndustry 
We beg1n w1th an account of the sal1ent features of the Pak1stan 
economy to enable readers not fam1l1ar w1th the country to see the 
bank1ng system 1n 1ts econom1c sett1ng We then go on to exam1ne 
var1ous facets of the organ1zat1on, funct1ons and operat1on of the 
State Bank, 1ts relat1onsh1p w1th the commerc1al banks and the 
reasons why 1t has fa1led to establ1sh a money market One of the 
funct1ons of the State Bank 1s to control the money supply and 1n 
Chapter 5 we show why 1t has fa1led to do so and argue that, contrary 
to the Bank's own v1ew, the absence of a money market 1s not the 
real explanat1on We shall show why 1t 1s that 1n Pak1stan the con-
vent1onal mechan1sms for curta1l1ng the money supply appear to have 
had an oppos1te effect In the f1nal chapter th1s analys1s 1s 
extended to show how the publ1c's des1re to hold cash balances has 
been 1nfluenced by changes 1n the rate of 1nterest payable on depos1ts 
In th1s chapter we also argue that the agr1cultural and 1ndustr1al 
development banks' concern to prov1de cheap cred1t has restr1cted 
the1r ab1l1ty to mob1l1se resources and made them unnecessar1ly 
dependent on Government and State Bank f1nance We conclude by 
show1ng that the commerc1al banks could eas1ly prov1de more f1nance 
for development w1thout endanger1ng the1r l1qu1d1ty 
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Chapter 1. 
THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND. 
The obJect of th1s study 1s to exam1ne the role of the 
State Bank of Pak1stan 1n the develop1ng economy of the country. 
For th1s purpose, an understand1ng of the econom1c background, 
aga1nst wh1ch the Bank 1s funct1on1ng, 1s necessary. Th1s 1s 
because the monetary and bank1ng system of any country 1s the 
product of the pol1t1cal~ econom1c and even soc1al structure of that 
country. The monetary and f1nanc1al system 1n each country 1s 
un1que 1n th1s sense that 1t has to operate 1n a part1cular econom1c 
m1l1eu and has to adapt not merely 1ts techn1ques but also the 
scope of 1ts funct1ons accord1ngly. It 1s therefore necessary to 
g1ve a br1ef sketch of the economy for the proper understand1ng of 
the funct1on1ng of the monetary and bank1ng system. It 1s the obJect 
of th1s chapter to descr1be br1efly some aspects of the econom1c 
structure of Pak1stan. We shall l1m1t ourselves to only those 
character1st1cs of the economy wh1ch appear to have a d1rect 1mpact 
upon the monetary and f1nanc1al system. 
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Area and Populat~on. 
Pak1stan came 1nto ex1stence as an 1ndependent state 
on August 14 1 1947 1 as R result of the part~t1on of the Indo-Pak 
sub-cont~nent. It has a total area of 365,529 square m1les, of 
wh1ch West Pak1stan accounts for 310,403 square m1les or 84.9 per 
cent of the total area. East Pak1stan, wh1ch 1s separated from 
West Pak1stan by about one thousand m1les of Ind1an terr1tory, has 
an area of 55,126 square m1les, or about 15.1 percent of the total 
area. Th1s geograph1cal separat1on of the two prov1nces of Pak~stan 
has ser1ous econom1c 1IDpl1cat1ons. 
Pak1stan has a total populat1on of 118.4 m1ll1on, w1th 
an average dens1ty of 324 persons per square m1le. West Pak1stan, w1th 
a populat1on of 54.1 ID1ll1on, has a dens1ty of 174 persons per square 
m1le and East Pak1stan, w1th a populat~on of 64.3 m1ll1on, has a 
dens1ty of 1,166 persons per square m1le, wh~ch 1s nearly seven t1mes 
1 
that of West Pak~stan. 
For the purpose of future econom1c development, 1t 1s the 
rate of growth of populat~on wh1ch 1s of bas1c 1mportance. A h~gher growth 
rate 1mpl1es a larger development effort even to ma1nta~n the current low 
level of standard of l1v~ng, and 1t affects the key econom1c factors, 
1. Plann1ng Comm1ss1on, Govt.of Pak1stan, Est1mates of Populat~on for 
1966-67 quoted by the World Bank M1ss1on 1n the1r "Report on the 
Current Econom1c Pos1t1on and Prospects of Pak1stan", Apr~! 1967, 
(m1meographed). 
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1nclud1ng aggregate and per cap1ta 1ncome, sav1ngs and consumpt1on, 
the compos1t1on of output and employment by maJor product1on 
sectors and the degree of dependence on 1mport of cap1tal The 
1 
est1mates of the rate of growth of populat1on have var1ed w1dely 
The recent est1mates of the Plann1ng Comm1ss1on mod1f1ed on the bas1s 
of 1961 census are annual compound rate of growth of 2 3 per cent 
for the decade end1ng June 1960, 2 6 per cent annual compound rate 
of 1ncrease for the Second Plan per1od (1960-65) and 2 7 per cent for 
2 
the Th1rd Plan per1od (1965-70) Even these est1mates are not 
3 
cons1dered f1rm. The World Bank M1ss1on 1n the1r recent report have 
1nd1cated the rate of growth of populat1on at 2.6 - 3 per cent per 
annum The d1fference 1n annual 1ncrease 1n populat1on at the lower 
and h1gher l1m1ts comes to half a m1ll1on people at the base f1gure 
of 118.6 m1ll1on people 1n 1966. For the purpose of development 
plann1ng 1t seems better to err on the h1gher s1de than on the lower 
s1de. 
1. Government of Pak1stan. The Second F1ve Year Plan (1960-65), 
p. 331 
2. Worked out from populat1on f1gures of Plann1ng Comm1sS10n as 
g1ven 1n Table 1, Gross Nat1onal Product, 1n Pak1stan Econom1c 
Survey, 1966-67, Government of Pak1stan. 
3. " ••• a rate of populat1on growth of 3 per cent for West Pak1stan 
and somewhat over 3 per cent for East Pak1stan must from now on 
be reckoned w1th as a clear poss1b1l1ty". K.J. Krotk1 and Naz1r 
Ahmad. "V1tal Rates 1n East and West Pak1stan - Tentat1ve Results 
from the PGE Exper1ment", The Pak1stan Development Rev1ew, 
Vol. IV, W1nter 1964, p. 756. 
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About e1ghty-f1ve per cent of the total populat1on 
l1ves 1n the rural areas. It 1s est1mated that urban populat1on 
has been 1ncreas1ng s1nce 1960 at an annual compound rate of 5.5 
per cent or more than double the rate of growth of total 
populat1on. The rat1o of urban populat1on to total populat1on 1s 
est1mated to have 1ncreased from 12.8 per cent 1n 1960 to 14.7 per 
cent 1n 1965 and 1s expected to 1ncrease to 17 per cent 1n 1970. 1 
The rap1d urban1sat1on has not been matched by an equally rap1d 
1ncrease 1n hous1ng and other urban serv1ces and consequently there 
has been a growth of slums. 
Unemployment and Employment Pol1cy. 
There 1s a good deal of unemployment 1n the rural as 
well as urban areas The unemployment 1s est1mated at about 20 per 
cent of the total ava1lable labour force. In fact, the pos1t1on 1s 
more ser1ous 1n rural areas where the ent1re labour force rema1ns 
1dle part1cularly between the harvest1ng and sow1ng seasons. The 
unemployment 1ncreased stead1ly dur1ng the f1ft1es Its r1s1ng trend 
seems to have been checked 1n recent years as 1s ev1dent from the 
2 
table below. 
1. Government of Pak1stan. The Th1rd Flve-Year Plan, p 366. 
2. For labour force and employment see also Th1rd Flve-Year 
Plan, Government of Pak1stan, p.l5l. 
TABLE l-1. 
F1scal (l) (2) 
Year Total Agr1-
Labour cult-
Force ure 
1950 24 0 13.8 
1955 26.5 14.2 
1960 29.2 14.6 
1965 32.5 16.0 
Total Labour Force and Its D1str1but1on 
(numbers 1n m1ll1ons) 
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)= 
(2) as Indu- (4) as Serv- (6) as (2) + 
perce- stry. perce- 1ces perce- (4) + 
ntage ntage ntage (6) 
of (l) of (l) of (l) Total 
Emp-
loyed 
58 1.3 5 5.2 22 20.,3 
54 1.7 6 5.8 22 21.,7 
50 2.1 7 6.2 21 22.,9 
49 2.6 8 6.9 21 25.5 
(9)= (10) 
(8) - (9) as 
(l) percentage 
Total of 
Unem- (l) 
played 
3.7 15 
4.8 18 
6.3 22 
7.0 22 
Source Mahboob-ul-Huq. The Strategy of Econom1c Plann1ng A Case Study of Pak1stan, 
Oxford Un1versLty Press, 1963. 
- -
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The Government, although aware of the grav~ty of the 
unemployment problem, had no spec~f~c employment pol~cy or targets 
unt~l 1961. The government was more concerned about a spec~f~c 
~ncrease ~n nat~onal ~ncome than ~n employment. It d~d not th~nk 
~t adv~sable to d~gress from the usual cap~tal-~ntens~ve product~on 
techn~ques. Its development pol~cy was or~ented to ach~eve the 
max~mum ~ncrease ~n product~on and to ~mprove the balance of 
payments pos~t~on. "Thus the employment effects of the econom~c 
growth generated through the success~ve Plans were more a by-product 
than a target. The same appl~es, to a degree, to the Th~rd Plan. 
In all these cases employment effects were assessed after the Plan 
1 
was made". The Government, however, could not ~gnore th~s problem 
altogether ~ndef~n~tely. The real~sat~on grew that the ~nvestment 
effort ~n the Second Plan would not be able to create suff~c~ent 
employment opportun~t~es to absorb the ~ncrease ~n the labour force, 
not to speak of absorb~ng the ex~st~ng unemployed labour force. 
It was further real~sed that the ex~st~ng backlog of unemployment 
could not be reduced even w~th a sh~ft to more labour-~ntens~ve 
techn~ques. So, ~n 1961, the Government ~ntroduced a Rural Works 
Programme, outs~de the Plan framework, to prov~de JOb opportun~t~es 
1. Plann1ng Comm1Ss1on, Government of Pak1stan, The Th1rd Flve-Year 
Plan (1965-70), page 149. 
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nearer home to the under-employed labour force 1n rural areas, 
and at the same t1me 1nfra-structure to the agr1cultural sector 
by labour-1ntens1ve methods. It w1ll also have the s1de effect 
of reduc1ng the flow of surplus rural populat1on to the urban 
centres - where not many of them could be ga1nfully employed to 
a manageable magn1tude. The government has also started an 
Urban Works Programme~ wh1ch w1ll concentrate on low cost hous1ng 1 
commun1ty centres, recreat1onal fac1l1t~es, etc. 1 and thus prov1de 
JObs for the unemployed 1n urban areas. 
The lack of a cons1stent employment pol1cy on the 
part of the government of Pak1stan, wh~le 22 per cent of the 
populat~on 1s unemployed, may seem surpr1s1ng. It looks all the 
more surpr1s~ng when one sees that the ach1evement of 'full employment' 
has been accepted as one of the most 1mportant obJect1ves of 
government's pol1c1es 1n every advanced country. The ma1n reason for 
th1s 1s the marked d1fference between the econom1c and soc1al 
structure of Pak1stan and the advanced countr1es. The concept of 
'unemployment', as 1t 1s understood 1n the Western countr1es, 1s 
mean1ngless 1n the cond1t1ons of Pak1stan The unemployment 1n 
advanced econom1es 1s generally the result of an ~nadequate effect1ve 
demand and "s~nce effect1ve demand 1s def~c1ent, the unemployment of 
labour goes together w1th unemployment of other complementary factors 
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l 
of product~on". The unemployment or under-employment 1n Pak1stan, 
on the other hand, 1s due to "an 1nsuff1c1ency of cooperant factors 
2 
of product1on to set them (labour force) to work". In rural areas, 
where about 90 per cent of the populat1on l1ves, the unemployment 
man~fests 1tself 1n the form of over-crowd1ng of land. Th1s 1s the 
result of the pauc1ty of land relat1ve to the manpower employed 1n 
agr1culture. In urban areas, the under-employment 1s ev1dent from 
the large numbers engaged 1n petty trades and serv1ces. Th~s 1s due 
to lack of opportun1t1es for product1ve employment. As Reddaway 
po1nts out, 1n an under-developed country l1ke Pak1stan there 1s "an 
appall1ng problem of 1nadequate open1ngs for product1ve work, but the 
problem 1s 1n 'the product1v1ty d1mens1on' rather than the 'number' 
d1mens1on •• The 1mportant magn1tude seems to be the 1ncome or the 
3 
output, rather than the number employed". 
Income Levels. 
Pak~stan 1s one of the poorest countr1es 1n the world 
w1th an average per cap1ta ~ncome of about Rs. 372 per annum. The 
Gross Nat1onal Product 1n real terms, 1.e. at the constant factor 
1. Bauer,P.T. and Yamey, B.S. The Econom1cs of Under-developed 
Countr1es, Cambr1dge Un1vers1ty Press, 1963, p.75. 
2. Bauer and Yamey, 1b1d. p.74. 
3. Reddaway, W.B. The Development of the Ind1an Economy, George 
Allen and Unw1n, 1963, pp. 24-25. 
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cost of 1959-60, 1ncreased at a modest annual rate of 2.5 per cent 
dur1ng the decade end1ng 1959-60. S1nce populat1on 1ncreased at 
the same t1me by an est1mated 2.3 per cent per annum, the 1ncrease 
1n per cap1ta real product was 1ns1gn1f1cant. The economy made 
1mpress1ve progress 1n the subsequent s1x years. The Gross Nat1onal 
Product 1ncreased at an annual compound rate of 5.5 per cent dur1ng 
1960-65. Th1s was more than double the rate of growth of populat1on 
at 2.6 per cent. As a result, the per cap1ta real product 1ncreased 
at an annual rate of 2.5 per cent. Th1s 1ncreas1ng trend slowed 
down dur1ng 1965-66. 
The data 1n Table 1-2 regard1ng d1str1but1on of 1ncome 
reveals that the average rural 1ncome 1s less than one-s1xth of the 
average urban 1ncome. The per cap1ta rural 1ncome 1n 1965-66 was 
below the level preva1l1ng 1n 1949-50, 1n sp1te of the fact that the 
gross nat1onal product per cap1ta 1ncreased by 20 per cent over th1s 
per1od. Th1s shows that the growth of the l1v1ng standard of the 
rural masses, compared to that of the urban populat1on, has been more 
effect1vely restra1ned. The Th1rd Plan has acknowledged that "there 
was a cons1derable transfer of sav1ngs from the agr1cultural to the 
1 1ndustr1al sector". Accord1ng to one est1mate, "agr1culture 
annually transfers about Rs. 3,600 m1ll1on of resources to the urban 
1. Plann1ng Comm1ss1on, Government of Pak1stan, The Th1rd 
F1ve-Year Plan, page 7 
Year 
1949-50 
1950-51 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954-55 
1955-56 
1956-57 
1957 ... 58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961-62 
1962-63 
1963-64 
1964-65 
1965-66 
TABLE 1-2. 
G.N.P. at Factor Cost 
Rs. in 
million. 
24,466 
25,373 
25,395 
26,139 
27' 776 
27,908 
27,834 
29,497 
29' 719 
30,144 
31,439 
33,086 
35,043 
36,284 
39,284 
41,058 
42,968 
Index 
1949-50 = 
100 
104 
104 
107 
114 
114 
114 
121 
121 
123 
129 
135 
143 
148 
161 
168 
176 
Gross National 
Value Added in 
All other 
Agriculture Sectors 
14,669 
15' 112 
14,549 
14,917 
16,053 
15,654 
15,135 
16,266 
16,089 
15,923 
16,753 
17,285 
18,183 
18,272 
19,411 
19,761 
20,075 
9,797 
10,261 
10,846 
11,222 
11,723 
12,254 
12,699 
13,231 
13,630 
14,221 
14,686 
15,801 
16,860 
18,012 
19,873 
21,297 
22,893 
Total 
78.8 
80.6 
82.4 
84.3 
86.3 
88.3 
90.3 
92.4 
94.5 
96.7 
98.9 
101.5 
104.1 
106.8 
109.6 
112.4 
115.4 
Sources: (1) For Columns (2),(4),(5) and (6): Ministry of Finance, 
(2) For Column (7): Keith B. Griffin, 'Financing 
(3) Columns (3),(8) to (13) calculated. 
Income, 1949/50 - 1965/66. 
millions). Per Capita Income 
Total 
Population 
Rural Population 
311 
315 
308 
310 
322 
316 
308 
319 
315 
312 
318 
326 
337 
340 
359 
365 
372 
Rs. 
10 
207 
209 
197 
198 
210 
201 
190 
200 
194 
188 
194 
196 
202 
199 
206 
206 
196 
3-year moving 
average 
11 
204 
201 
202 
203 
200 
197 
195 
194 
192 
193 
197 
199 
202 
204 
203 
Urban Population 
Rs. 
12 
1,256 
1,251 
1,261 
1,233 
1,208 
1,190 
1,198 
1,192 
1,185 
1,175 
1,165 
1,188 
1,204 
1,217 
1,274 
1,291 
1,308 
3-year moving 
average 
1,256 
1,248 
1,234 
1,210 
1,199 
1,193 
1,192 
1,184 
1,175 
1,176 
1,186 
1,203 
1,232 
1,261 
1,291 
·tan, Pakistan Economic Survey, 1966-67, Karachi, S,tatistical Section, pp.2-3. 
w,,,~~~""~ ·-···~,~··istan' in The Pakistan Development Review, Volum~ V, No.4, Winter 1965, p.628. 
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sector Th~s represents over 15 per cent of the value of ~ts 
gross output at least 63 to 85 per cent of the sav~ngs 
transferred from agr~culture are d~ss~pated ~n h~gher consumpt~on 
1 ~n urban areas" Th~s transfer of resources from agr~cultural 
to urban sector was ach~eved by del~berate government pol~c~es 
such as compulsory government procurement of foodgra~ns at low 
pr~ces to subs~d~se the cost of l~v~ng of the urban populat~on, 
export taxes on JUte and cotton, and ~ncent~ves to ~ndustr~al 
sector l~ke tar~ff protect~on, tax concess~ons, and the prov~s~on 
of fore~gn exchange earned by the agr~cultural sector at cheaper 
rates to the ~ndustr~al sector. The d~spar~ty ~n the lowest and 
h~ghest ~ncome groups ~n the urban areas ~s all the more great. 
There ~s ev~dence that people ~n the bottom 50 per cent of the ~ncome 
scale ~n Karach~ - the largest urban centre ~n Pak~stan have a 
lower standard of l~v~ng than those ~n the bottom half of rural 
2 ~ncome scale. 
Structure of Economy 
1. Agr~cultural Sector. 
The low level of ~ncome ~s the result of the structure 
of the economy and ~n turn ~s respons~ble for perpetuat~ng that 
1. Ke~th B Gr~ff~n, op.c~t pp 612-613 
2 Plann~ng Comm~ss~on, Government of Pak~stan, The Th~rd F~ve-Year 
Plan, p.29. 
~Y(< < ·: ·:>.: ~tit::• I TABLE l-3. Structural Change in '".i-:"-:{~':'):,,,··.;:.~ Product at Constant Factor Cost. ro :~ (Rs. in million) 
1949 
-
50 1954 ... 55 
-
60 1964 
-
65 1965 66 Average Annual Rate of Gromh - (%) 
SECTOR Absolute Percentage Absolute Percentage A~solute Percentage Absolute Percentage 1949 ... 1954- 1959- 1965-
of of of of 51 to 55 to 60 to 66 over 
Total Total Total Total 1954- 1959- 1964- 1964-
55. 60. 65. 65. 
l) Agriculture 14,669 60.0 15,654 56.1 53.3 19,761 48.1 20,075 46.,7 1.,3 1.4 3.6 1 .. 6 
2) Manufacturing 1,433 5.8 2,220 8.0 9.3 4,711 11.,5 4,949 11.5 11.0 6.4 12.2 5.1 
a) Large ... Scale 346 1.4 1,002 3.,6 5.,0 3,156 7.7 3,354 7.8 38.0 11.0 20.,3 6.3 
b) Small ... Scale 1,087 4.4 1,218 4.4 4.3 1~555 3.8 1,595 3.7 2.,4 2.4 2.8 2.,6 
3) Construction 238 loO 4.5 1.,5 2.1 1,921 4.7 1,825 4.,3 14.9 ll.4 39.0 -5.0 
4) Transport, Storage 
and Communications 1~239 5.,1 1,588 5.7 5.,9 -';2 424 , 5.,9 2,761 6.4 5.6 3.4 6.1 13.,9 
5) Public Administr-
at ion and 
Defence ,1,063 4.,3 1,243 4.4 .4.2 1,790 4.4 2,429 5.7 3.4 1.4 6.9 35.7 
6) All others ·5,824 23.8 6,788 24.3 25.2 10,451 25.4 10,929 25.4 3.3 3.3 6.4 4.6 
7) Total 24,466 100 27,908 100 100 41,058 100 421968 100 2.8 2.5 6.1 4.,7 
-------·- ----------------------~------- ---------
Source: Government of Pakistan- Economic Survey, 1966-67. 
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structure The largest sector of the economy ~s agr~culture, wh~ch 
~s carr~ed on on a subs~stence bas~s. By 'subs~stence bas~s' we 
mean that the bulk of the foodgra~n product~on, wh~ch accounts for 
more than 80 percent of the total cult~vated area, ~s consumed by the 
producers Accord~ng to one study, the marketed surplus of 
foodgra~ns ~s about 10 per cent ~n East Pak~stan and 17 per cent ~n 
1 West Pak~stan 
The product~v~ty of labour employed ~n agr~culture and 
the y~eld per acre are among the lowest ~n the world due to 
pr~m~t~ve product~on methods, ~nsects and plant d~seases, and lack 
of fert~l~zers, good seed and f~nance. The growth of agr~cultural 
sector at a nom1nal rate of 1 3 per cent per annum unt~l 1959-60, 
was d1sappo~nt1ng The populat1on ~ncreasedat almost tw~ce th~s rate 
over th~s per~od. As a result, the country was faced w~th grow~ng 
2 food def1c~t, there was an ~ncrease 1n the subs~stence sector as 
most of the labour and resources were devoted by the farmers to ma1nta~n 
3 the~r own consumpt~on, and the ~mports of cap~tal goods suffered to 
the extent of a fall ~n fore~gn exchange earn~ngs and the expend~ture 
of fore~gn exchange on the 1mport of foodgra~ns. The shortfall of 30 
per cent 1n the ~mplementat~on of the F1rst F~ve-Year Plan (1955-60), 
1 Mohd Raqu~buzzaman, 'Marketed Surplus Funct~on of MaJor Agr~cultural 
Commod1t1es ~n Pak~stan', The Pak~stan Development Rev1ew, Vol. VI, 
No.3, Autumn 1966, Karach~, p.380. 
2. The 1mport of foodgra~ns 1ncreased from Rs 11 m1ll1on 1n 1951-52 to 
Rs 462 m1111on 1n 1960~61 See Parvez Hasan, 'Balance of Payments 
Problems of Pak1stan', The Pak1stan Development Rev1ew, Autumn 1961, 
p.48 
3 The area under wheat and r1ce 1ncreased from an average of 32,855 
thousand acres dur1ng 1950-53 to 35,064 thousand acres dur~ng 
1957-60. There was a correspond1ng dec11ne 1n areas under JUte 
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Ln terms of 1955-56 pr1ces, LS attrLbuted to the slow growth of the 
agr~cultural sector Ln general and to the lack of fore~gn exchange 
1 
resources ~n part~cular. FLnally, the decl~ne ~n agr~cultural 
~ncomes depressed the demand for manufactured goods and thus 
affected adversely the growth of the ~ndustr~al sector. 
The product~on ~n the agr~cultural sector ~ncreased at an 
annual rate of 3.6 per cent dur1ng 1960-65~ Th~s hLgher rate of 
growth ~s s1gn~f1cant both because of the s~ze of the agrLculture 
sector Ln the economy and because of the dependence of cruc1al 
2 
targets of exports, sav~ngs and prLces on agr~cultural development. 
The ~ncrease 1n agr1cultural product1on 1s attr1butable to favourable 
weather, ~mproved 1ncent~ves prov1ded to farmers by the removal of 
3 foodgra1n pr1ce controls, decrease 1n export dutLes etc , and the 
change ~n the terms of trade between agr1cultural and 1ndustr1al 
4 
sectors 1n favour of agr1culture. 
1. Mahboob-ul-Huq, The Strategy of Econom1c Plann1ng A Case Study 
of Pak1stan, Oxford Un1vers1ty Press, 1963, pp.l4l-2. 
2 Plann1ng CommLssLon, Government of Pak1stan, F~nal Evaluat1on 
of the Second FLve-Year Plan, 1966, page 43 
3 Falcon, W.P. and C.H. Gotsch, Agr~cultural Development 1n Pak1stan 
Lessons from the Second Plan Per1od. Mult1l1th (Cambr~dge Centre 
for Internat1onal Affa~rs, Harvard Un1vers1ty), June 1966. 
4. Lew~s, S.R. and S.M. Hussa~n, 
Industr~al1sat~on 1n Pak1stan 
Rev1ew, Autumn 1966, p.424 
'Relat1ve Pr1ce Changes and 
1951-1964', The Pak1stan Development 
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2 Industr~al Sector 
The ~ndustr~al sector was a small segment of the economy 
~n the early years. It grew rap~dly under the foster~ng care of the 
government. The contr~but~on of large-scale ~ndustr~al product~on 
to gross nat~onal product 1ncreased from 1.4 per cent 1n 1949-50 to 
7 8 per cent 1n 1965-66, wh1le that of small-scale 1ndustr1es decl1ned 
from 4 4 to 3 7 per cent over th1s per1od The large-scale 1ndustr1al 
product1on 1ncreased rap1dly up to 1956. It suffered a setback 
dur1ng 1957 and 1958, as due to the shortage of fore~gn exchange, the 
supply of 1ndustr~al raw mater1als was severely curta1led The 
fore1gn exchange pos~t~on eased 1n 1959 and 1960 and w1th the 1ncrease 
1n the supply of raw mater1als the growth rate 1n the 1ndustr1al 
sector p~cked up. Thus, on the whole, the large-scale 1ndustr1al 
product1on 1ncreased by about 55 per cent dur1ng 1955-60. The growth 
rate of 1ndustr1al sector accelerated to 20.3 per cent per annum 1n 
the subsequent f1ve years. The follow~ng factors contr1buted to ~t 
(a) The ava1lab1l1ty of fore1gn exchange rema1ned adequate throughout 
th1s per1od. Th1s was due to substantlal expans1on 1n exports as well 
as 1ncrease 1n fore~gn a1d and loans Th1s allowed the 1mport of 
cap1tal equ1pment for new 1ndustr1al un1ts and the 1mport of 
1ndustr~al raw mater1als for the fuller ut1l1zat~on of 1nstalled 
capac1ty (b) The commerc1al and fore1gn exchange pol1c1es were 
des1gned to allocate an 1ncreas1ng share of fore1gn exchange resources 
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to the ~mport of cap~tal goods and ~ndustr~al raw mater1als. 
(c) The f~scal pol~cy was or~ented to prov~de every ~ncent~ve to the 
growth of the ~ndustr~al sector by prov~d~ng tax hol~days, etc. 
(d) The strengthen~ng of ~nst~tut~onal cred~t fac~l~t~es through the 
Industr~al Development Bank, the Pak~stan Industr~al Cred~t and 
Investment Corporat~on, and Nat~onal Investment Trust also made an 
~mportant contr~but~on to the growth of the ~ndustr~al sector. On 
the demand s~de, (e) the home market was reserved for domest~c 
~ndustr~es by protect~ve tar~ffs. (f) The home market for manufactured 
goods expanded due to ~ncrease ~n ~ncome and purchas~ng power of the 
rural masses as a result of ~ncrease ~n agr~cultural product~on 
(g) The ~ntroduct~on of Export Bonus Scheme encouraged the export of 
the~r products. 
The Industr~al sector, no doubt, has made s~gn~f~cant 
progress over the last s~xteen years. However, the ~ndustr~al pol~cy 
has come under ser~ous cr~t~c~sm over the last few years on the 
follow~ng counts. (1) The emphas~s on ~mport-subst~tut~on ~n consumer 
goods ~ndustr~es has led to "domest~c pressure for h~gher consumpt~on 
levels wh~ch emerge when the capac~ty of consumer goods ~ndustr~es ~s 
1 
expanded". In order to restr~ct th~s "unplanned ~ncrease" ~n 
1 Plann~ng Comm~ss~on, Government of Pak~stan, The Th~rd F~ve-Year 
Plan, p.34. Also see (~) Khan, A.R., "Import Subst~tut~on, Export 
Promot~on and Consumpt~on L~beral~sat~on A Prel~m~nary Report", 
Pak~stan Development Rev~ew, Summer 1963, pp.208-231, and 
<~~) Power, J.H 1 "Industr~al~sat~on ~n Pak~stan• A Case of 
Frustrated Take-off", Pak~stan Development Rev~ew, Summer 1963, 
pp.l91-207. 
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consumpt1on, the Th1rd Plan advocates more emphas1s on the 1mport-
1 
subst1tut1on of 1ntermed1ate and cap1tal goods. (2) The 
1ndustr1al1sat1on has not helped 1n remov1ng the follow1ng three 
d1sequ1l1br1a 1n the economy. F1rstly, 1t has not helped 1n clos1ng 
the gap between average product1v1ty 1n agr1culture and 1ndustry by 
absorb1ng the surplus labour from the agr1cultural sector Secondly, 
1n sp1te of large-scale transfer of resources from agr1cultural 
sector to the 1ndustr1al sector and the rap1d progress of the latter, 
the rate of sav1ngs rema1ned well below the rate of populat1on growth. 
The low rate of sav1ng made 1t d1ff1cult to transfer labour from low-
product1ve employment 1n agr1culture to more product1ve employment 1n 
2 
the 1ndustr1al sector. Th1rdly, the d1sequ1l1br1um between exports 
and 1mports has 1ncreased In the process of 1ndustr1al1sat1on, the 
1mport requ1rements have 1ncreased more than the exports. 
Fore1gn Trade 
Fore1gn trade plays a v1tal role 1n the economy of 
Pak1stan. Its 1mportance does not l1e 1n the fact that a large 
proport1on of country's product 1s exported or 1mports form a bulk of 
1 Th1s suggest1on came earl1er from Sol1go, R and J J Stren, 
"Tar1ff Protect1on, Import Subst1tut1on, and Investment Eff1c1ency", 
Pak1stan ~evelopment Rev1ew, Summer, 1965, pp 
2 Power, J H , op c1t 
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total consumpt1on It 1s 1mportant 1n th1s sense that the development 
effort 1s constra1ned by the ava1lab1l1ty of fore1gn exchange Th1S 
1s because at 1ts present stage of econom1c development, Pak1stan has 
to 1mport almost all the requ1red cap1tal goods and 1ndustr1al raw 
mater1als. The stepp1ng up of 1nvestment effort means an 1ncrease 1n 
the requ1rement of 1mported cap1tal goods. Thus both export and 
1mport pol1c1es have all along been or1ented to allow the 1mport of an 
1ncreas1ng amount of development goods. 
Exports 
The ma1n obJect1ve of the export pol1cy 1n Pak1stan has 
been to 1ncrease the volume and value of exports 1n absolute amount 
and 1n relat1on to total output Th1s 1s because 1ncreased exports 
mean 1ncreased sav1ngs, wh1ch can be translated 1nto 1ncreased 
product1ve 1nvestment by 1mport1ng more cap1tal goods The second 
obJect1ve of the export pol1cy has been to reduce the dependence on 
trad1t1onal 1mports, v1z. Jute and cotton, by encourag1ng the product1on 
and export of manufactured goods. 
The reasons to transform the compos1t1on of exports are 
(1) to 1ncrease the stab1l1ty of earn1ngs, (11) to sh1ft from the 
sale of cornrnod1t1es for wh1ch the world has low 1ncome elast1c1ty of 
demand to those w1th h1gh elast1c1ty, and (111) to ra1se the growth 
rate of earn1ngs. 
TABLE 1-4. Average and Marginal Ratios 
1949 ... 50 1954-55 
Imports of Goods (M) 1,853 1,575 
Export of Goods (E) 1,706 1,747 
G.,N.,P., at Current Factor Cost 19,893 21,147 
M/G.,N.P. 9.3 7.,4 
E/G.N.P. 8.6 8.3 
M/ G.N.P. -22.2 
E/ G.N.,P. 3.3 
E/M 92.1 110.9 
1) The figures of imports and imports up to June 1955 have been 
adjusted for devaluation of the Pakistan rupee in 1955 to 
make the figures comparable to the subsequent years. 
Imports to G.,N.P. (at current factor cost) 
(In million Rs.,; current prices) 
1964-65 1965-66 Pre-Plan First Plan Second Plan Period (July 1955 (July 1960 
(July ... June 1960) ... June 1965) 
1949 - (Annual Average) 
June 1955 
5,3~4 4,208 2,085 1,950 3,984 
2,408 2,718 2,328 1,59(:1 2,119 
t: 
45,535i 49,685 21,320 27,423 39,346 
11.8 ' 8.,5 9.8 7.1 10.,1 
5.3 5.5 10.9 5.8 5.4 
20.,7 -28.1 -2.2 17. 
4.0 7.5 -12.0 4. 
44.8 64.6 111.7 81.,~ 53.2 
source: Govt.of Pakistan - Economic Survey, 1966-67. 
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The range of manufactured goods, wh1ch Pak1stan can hope 
to produce for export, 1s necessar1ly l1m1ted to 'l1ght manufactured 
goods' of s1mple k1nds. Here aga1n a spectacular r1se 1n exports 
does not seem to be feas1ble. Most of these products have a market 
at home The 1ncraase 1n exports would depend on appropr1ate pol1cy 
1nstruments, v1z. f1scal,monetary and commerc1al pol1c1es to create a 
structure of 1ncent1ves that would (a) encourage sav1ngs and 
d1scourage consumpt1on, and (b) encourage product1on for export rather 
than for domest1c market Secondly, the expans1on of exports to 
advanced countr1es has to surmount the measure of protect1on they offer 
to the1r own manufacturers. Th1rdly, the long-run prospects of eKports 
to under-developed countr1es are also not very br1ght as each country 
would l1ke to develop the product1on of these l1ght manufactures 
1tself. 
The exports of Pak1stan showed cons1derable var1at1ons 1n 
the early years wh1ch are attr1butable mostly to the changes 1n world 
demand The exports more than doubled dur1ng 1950-51 due to the Korean 
war boom 1n the world commod1ty markets The export proceeds decl1ned 
cont1nuously 1n the follow1ng four years. In 1954-55, they stood at 
Rs 1 1223 m1ll1on. At th1s level, they were 48 per cent of the export 
earn1ngs 1n 1950-51 and only 2.4 per cent h1gher than 1n 1949-50. 
1. These f1gures d1ffer from those g1ven 1n the table 1-4 below 
because the f1gures 1n the tabla are adJusted for the devaluat1on 
of rupee 1n 1955. 
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The decl1ne 1n the fore1gn exchange earn1ngs was attr1butable largely 
to the fall 1n the pr1ces of exports. The 1ndex of un1t value of 
exports (Apr11 1948 - March 1949 = 100) fell from 119.5 1n 1951 to 
72.8 1n 1955. 1 The volume of raw cotton exports also decl1ned over 
th1s per1od due to 1ncrease 1n consumpt1on at home follow1ng the 
expans1on of domest1c text1le 1ndustry. 
The Pak1stan rupee was devalued by 30 per cent 1n July 
1955. As a result, exports 1ncreased by about 46 per cent 1n 
1955-56, 2 but then once more decl1ned 1n the subsequent three years to 
touch the low level of Rs. 1325 m1ll1on 1n 1958-59. As a percentage 
of money nat1onal 1ncome, export rece1pts dropped from 7.9 per cent 1n 
1955-56 to 4.7 per cent 1n 1958-59. At the same t1me, the rat1o of 
exports to 1mports decl1ned from 134.6 per cent to 84.0 per cent. The 
follow1ng factors contr1buted to decl1ne 1n exports F1rstly, the 
output of agr1culture 1ncreased very l1ttle wh1lst the expans1on of 
cotton and JUte text1le 1ndustr1es was encroach1ng upon the exportable 
surplus of these f1bres Secondly, although the two maJor 1ndustr1es, 
Jute and cotton text1les, had developed large export potent1al, a 
buoyant home market and overvaluat1on of the rupee unt1l 1959 prevented 
the1r export potent1al from be1ng real1zed 
1. The State Bank of Pak1stan. The Report on Currency and F1nance, 
1959-60, pp 187-188. 
2 Th1s 1mprovement seems to be 1llusory 1f we look at the export 
rece1pts 1n terms of fore1gn currency earned dur1ng the year. The 
export earn1ngs 1n terms of pound sterl1ng 1ncrease only by £2 
m1ll1on from £132 m1ll1on 1n 1954-55 to £134 m1ll1on 1n 1955-56 
(See Government of Pak1stan, The F1rst F1ve-Year Plan (1955-60), 
Government of Pak1stan Press, Karach1, 1956, page 171). 
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Export earn~ngs ~ncreased substant~ally dur~ng the Second 
Plan per~od (1960-65). Annual average exports dur~ng th~s per~od 
were about 33 per cent h~gher than ~n the F~rst Plan per~od. The 
rat~o of exports to G.N.P. at the marg~n also showed substant~al 
~mprovement from 0.9 per cent over 1954/55 to 1959/60 to 4.0 per cent 
over 1959/60 to 1964/65 The accelerat~on ~n exports was largely due 
to, f~rst, a marked ~ncrease ~n the agr~cultural product~on, wh~ch led 
to sharp r~se ~n earn~ngs from the export of r~ce and cotton. 
Secondly, the Export Bonus Scheme strengthened the ~ncent~ve to export 
manufactured goods Table l-5 shows that the share of manufactured 
goods ~n total exports ~ncreased from 13 per cent ~n 1957 to 28.6 per 
cent ~n 1959-60 and stood at 43.0 per cent ~n 1965-66 Th~rdly, ~t 
~s cla~med ~n government reports that "f~scal pol~cy has also helped 
~n curb~ng consumpt~on and d~vert~ng a larger proport~on of ~ncreased 
l p1oduct~on to the export market. But ~f th1s were so 1t would be 
d1ff~cult to expla~n the decl1ne ~n the rat1o of exports to Gross 
Nat1onal Product regardless of whether one compares 1959/60 w~th 1964/65 
or the F~rst Plan w~th the Second Plan. Secondly, the rat1o of exports 
to ~mports also decl1ned from 74.9 per cent 1n 1959/60 to 44 8 per cent 
1n 1964-65 and from 81.8 per cent ~n the F1rst Plan to 53.2 per cent ~n 
the Second Plan per1od. 
l Plann1ng Comm1ss~on, Government of Pak1stan, F~nal Evaluat1on of 
The Second F~ve-Year Plan, 1966, p.22. 
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TABLE l-5 Exports by Commod1ty Groups 
(Rs 1n m1ll1on) 
--
Food Raw Mater1als 
Year Total Value Percen- Value 
tage 
Share 
1951 2,525 2 2 8 0 2,309 
1953 1,406 58 4 1 1,332 
1955 1~496 136 9.1 1~265 
1957 1~604 56 3.5 1,340 
1959-60 1,843 166 9.0 1,149 
1960-61 1,799 130 7.2 1,165 
1961-62 1,843 209 11.3 1,165 
1962-63 2,247 337 15.0 1,386 
1963-64 2,299 257 11.2 1,311 
1964-65 2,408 268 11.1 1,359 
1965-66 2,718 200 7.8 1,338 
Source Govt.of Pak1stan, Econom1c Surveys, 
Stat1st1ca1 Sect1on. 
Perc en-
tage 
Share 
91 4 
94.7 
84.6 
83.5 
62.3 
64.7 
63.2 
61.7 
57.0 
56.4 
49.2 
Manufactures 
Value Percen-
tage 
Share 
14 0 6 
16 1.1 
95 6.3 
208 13.0 
528 28.6 
505 28.0 
470 25.5 
525 23.4 
732 31.8 
781 32.4 
1,180 43.0 
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Imports 
Imports are restr1cted by exchange control, 1mport-
l1cens1ng and tar1ffs. Exchange control 1s adm1n1stered by the 
Fore1gn Exchange Comm1ttee wh1ch allocates the ava1lable fore1gn 
exchange between the publ1c and pr1vate sectors. Import-11cens1ng 
author1ty allocates fore1gn exchange earmarked for the pr1vate sector 
among var1ous uses and users Tar1ffs are lev1ed on both 1mports and 
exports. The exchange rate system does not a1m at establ1sh1ng 
equ1l1br1um 1n the balance of payments. Rather the balance of payments 
1s protected by quant1tat1ve restr1ct1ons on 1mports The 
restr1ct1ons on total 1mports and the1r compos1t1on are determ1ned 
every year to adJust 1mports to total ava1lab1l1ty of fore1gn exchange 
resources, 1nclud1ng fore1gn a1d The f1rst pr10r1ty 1s g1ven to 
government 1mports and the rema1n1ng fore1gn exchange 1s allocated to 
the pr1vate sector. The second obJect1ve of 1mport pol1cy throughout 
th1s per1od has been to curta1l the 1mport of 1nessent1al goods and 
1ncrease the share of development goods The l1m1ted fore1gn exchange 
resources are rat1oned w1th a preference for the uses deemed most 
1mportant for essent1al consumpt1on and 1nvestment. 
At the preva1l1ng rate of exchange the demand for 1mports 
1s far 1n excess of fore1gn exchange earn1ngs The excess demand for 
1mports 1s clearly revealed 1n a recent study wh1ch showed that the 
domest1c pr1ces of 1mported goods are, on average, about 60 per cent 
h1gher than the1r landed cost, 1.e. the c 1.f. cost plus 1mport duty 
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l 
and sales tax Another 1ndex of th1s excess demand 1s the 
ex1stence of a large prem1um on lmport-bonus vouchers On average, 
the market prem1um on lmport-bonus vouchers has been around 150 
2 per cent. The gap between earn1ngs and payments has 1ncreased 
ma1nly because 1ndustr1al development has depended heav1ly on 
cap1tal 1mports, but also because of the h1gh 1 albe1t suppressed, 
1ncome elast1c1ty of demand for 1mports. The dependence on cap1tal 
1mports 1s l1kely to 1ncrease further due to the change 1n the 
1ndustr1al strategy from consumpt1on good 1ndustr1es to more cap1tal-
3 1ntens1ve cap1tal good 1ndustr1es. 
Imports 1ncreased by 56 per cent from Rs. 1575 m1ll1on 
1n 1954-55 to Rs. 2461 m1ll1on 1n 1959-60. The rat1o of 1mports to 
the Gross Nat1onal Product, however, 1ncreased only from 7.4 per cent 
to 7.8 per cent. Imports more than doubled over the next f1ve years 
and the rat1o of 1mports to the Gross Nat1onal Product 1ncreased to 
11.8 per cent dur1ng 1964/65. The marg1nal 1mport rat1o over th1s 
per1od was as h1gh as 20 7 per cent. The same trend emerges 1f we look 
at the average f1gures dur1ng the F1rst and the Secom Plan per1ods. 
l Pal, Mat1 Lal "The Determ1nants of the Domest1c Pr1ces of Imports" 
The Pak1stan Development Rev1ew, Vol IV, No.4, W1nter 1964 
2. Econom1c Adv1ce, Government of Pak1stan, "Econom1c Survey, 
1966-67" Table 41, page 84. 
3. Plann1ng CommlSSl.on, Government of Pak1stan, "The Th1rd Flve-Year 
Plan 1965-70" page 
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The compos1t1on of 1mports has undergone a s1gn1f1cant 
change over the per1od under study. Th1s 1s ev1dent from Table l-6 
below. The rat1o of consumer goods to total 1mports decl1ned from 
44 per cent 1n 1951-52 to 21 per cent 1n 1965-66. The bundle of 
consumer goods 1mports 1tself has changed over t1me. The 1mport of 
food and food products, wh1ch on average represented 45 per cent of 
total consumer goods 1mports dur1ng 1951-55 1ncreased to 63 per cent 
over the Second Plan per1od. At the same t1me the 1mport of cotton 
\ 
text1les decl1ned from 28 3 per cent to 1.4 per cent The share of 
raw mater1als for consumer goods to total 1mports also came down from 
an average of 19 per cent dur1ng 1951/55 to 15 per cent dur1ng the 
F1rst Plan per1od and rema1ned at that level dur1ng the Second Plan 
per1od On the other hand, the annual average 1mports of cap1tal goods 
dur1ng the Second Plan at Rs. 1872 m1ll1on were f1ve t1mes h1gher than 
ln 1951/55 Thus the rat1o of cap1tal goods to total 1mports 1ncreased 
from 27 per cent dur1ng 1951/55 to 47 per cent over 1960/65. The 
annual average rat1o of raw mater1als for cap1tal goods to total 1mports 
1ncreased from 12 per cent 1n the pre-Plan per1od to 14 per cent over 
the ensu1ng decade. 
The quantum of 1mports has been subJect to w1de 
fluctuat1ons. Th1s 1s due to changes 1n the ava1lab1l1ty of fore1gn 
exchange, wh1ch depends on the export proceeds and loans and advances. 
It 1s ev1dent from Table No.7 below that the fluctuat1ons 1n 1mports 
"'i : .
. ~ I, 
' \:·~ .·... ·: ';' ,,. '', ·,, ._.; 
Growth and TABLE 1-6. ComposJJtipi,\ b£: :J:~~orts .. ~.·. ','' 1.':. \'':1 (Rs. in million) 
(( 1 
Total Imports Consumer Goods for Consumer Goods Capital Gqods 
Year Amount Percent of Amount Percent of Am ount Percent of 
total Impor!_s total total Imports_ 
-----
Total Imports 
. ' ,-:··.~ 
1951-52 2097.,9 100 926.3 44 . p~~!'l .. 6 24 
1952-53 1292.,5 100 661.9 51 .. 158.4 1 14 ' ':'):·.'••'. p 
1953-54 1082.9 100 425.1 39 .. A;~(; .. 3 18 
1954-55 1043.7 100 309.9 30 ,: l\6~3.3 16 
1955 ... 56 1220.3 100 398.2 33 ~~?.1 17 
1956 ... 57 2169.8 100 875.8 40 ... 3~1 6 16 )-'·.::\ . 
1957-58 1990.,8 100 831.3 42 . ;?.~'$ .. 5 12 
4.5 23 
7.0 23 
8.7 29 
9.5 40 
6.6 37 
4.5 33 
9.1 33 
1958 ... 59 .1523.1 100 520.6 34 ·~~~.4 13 
47 
29 
30 
41 
44 
70 
65 
54 
90 
0.4 36 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961 ... 62 
1962 ... 63 
1963-64 
1964-65 
1965-66* 
source: i) 
ii) 
2392.4 100 736.6 31 
·!ip 3151.2 100 935.5 30 if 
.... .~~. . 
3062.6 100 682.4 23 47 4 ",;,_ p 
3810.,2 100 804.5 21 e'~4 .. 7 
4429.,4 100 980.8 22 ~ii·2 
5368.,9 100 1367.,8 26 ?,Et .4 
4508.,0 100 938.,0 21 :Ef~~ 0 
·:>tr• 
17 
14 
15 
17 
14 
15 
15 
1,20 
1,45 
1,94 
2,15 
2,60 
2~31 
4.0 38 
6.5 38 
9.4 48 
1.1 51 
0 .. 4 49 
0.,5 48 
9.,0 51 
Nurul Islam, "Imports of Pakistan: Growth and Struot~~~~.JllA: $N~tistioal Study", P. I .D.E., Karachi, September 1967. 
~~:n~9~~;~~-7~~:n;!;g1~~~i;=~~n~5~~vt., of Pakista~~~~::1lly~ua·t#~n of the First Year (1965/66) of "The Third Five-Year-... 
Jl . '··,' 
,·1 
·.,'; 
Materials 
Amount 
--1-. 
182.5 
149.,6 
152 .. 7 
151.1 
163.4 
241.9 
256.9 
263.7 
343.7 
555.9 
444.,4 
419.,9 
676.,1 
602.7 
584.0 
for Capital Goods 
Percent of 
Total Imports 
9 
12 
14 
14. 
13 
11 
13 
17 
14 
18 
14 
11 
15 
11 
13 
-
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were h1ghest dur1ng the First Plan per1od. Th1s 1s because 1n the 
preced1ng pre-Plan per1od the shortfalls 1n the export earn1ngs were 
met by draw1ng on the fore1gn exchange reserves. In the Second Plan 
per1od 1 the fluctuat1ons were toned down due to generous supply of 
fore1gn a1d and loans. The fluctuat1ons 1n the four broad 
categor1es of 1mports show a pattern wh1ch 1s 1n l1ne w1th the 
government's pol1cy obJectlves. These are to g1ve pr1or1ty to 
cap1tal goods and to 1ndustr1al raw mater1als needed to prevent the 
underut1l1sat1on of 1nstalled capac1ty When cuts have had to be 
made 1 1t 1s the consumer goods wh1ch have borne the brunt. 
TABLE 1•7• 
Year 
Total 
Imports 
1951-55 19.4 
1955-60 36.7 
1960-65 19.3 
1961-65 26.0 
1965-66 16.0 
Average Annual Percentage Fluctuat1ons 
1n Imports of Pak1stan. 
Consumer Mater1als Mater1als 
Goods for I or 
Consumer Cap1tal 
Goods Goods 
30.5 29.2 7.1 
46.9 49.6 19.1 
26.7 16.7 31.8 
35.3 32.2 21.2 
31.4 16.2 108 
Source Calculat~ from Table 1-6. 
Cdpltal 
Goods 
25.7 
31.2 
23.8 
27.1 
3.1 
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Chapter 2. 
THE STATB BANK OF PAKISTAN. 
The obJect of th~s chapter ~s to descr~be ~n 
success~ve sect~ons, f~rst, the factors lead~ng to the establ~shment 
of the State Bank of Pak~stan, then 1ts organ1sat1on and funct1ons 
and, f1nally 1 1ts obJect~ves and relat1onsh1p w1th the government. 
I 
Pak1stan d1d not set up 1ts own central bank unt1l the 
end of June, 1948. Under the part1t1on arrangements 1t was dec1ded 
that 1n the 1nterests of smooth trans1t1on the Reserve Bank of 
Ind1a would rema1n common central bank both for Ind1a and Pak1stan 
1 
unt1l September 1948 The Government of Pak1stan, however, was 
expected to take over the management of publ1c debt and exchange 
0 
control earl1er. The agreement la1d down the bas1s for the d1v1s1on 
of Assets and L1ab1l1t1es of the Reserve Bank of Ind1a at the t1me 
of establ1shment of 1ts own central bank by Pak1stan 
1. Pak1stan (Monetary System and Reserve Bank) Order, 1947, 1ssued 
on 14th August, 1947, by the Governor-General of und1v1ded 
Ind1a 
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Th1s arrangement of J01nt central monetary author1ty, 
however, fell short of Pak1stan's requ1rements F1rstly, the 
government bus1ness suffered ow1ng to the closure of a large number 
of off1ces of the Imper1al Bank of Ind1a, wh1ch was act1ng as agent 
of the Reserve Bank of Ind1a for government treasury work. Secondly, 
the Reserve Bank of Ind1a was unw1ll1ng to accommodate the Government 
of Pak1stan w1th advances or ad-hoc secur1t1es 1n a per1od of 
unusual f1nanc1al d1ff1culty follow1ng the temporary w1thhold1ng by 
the Government of Ind1a of part of the cash balances to wh1ch 
l Pak1stan became ent1tled at the t1me of Part1t1on. Th1rdly, the 
pol1t1cal relat1ons of the two governments became ser1ously stra1ned 
and 1t was felt that the 1nfant state of Pak1stan was exposed to 
grave danger 1f 1t d1d not ach1eve f1nanc1al autonomy 1mmed1ately 
So the Government of Pak1stan felt compelled to seek premature 
term1nat1on of J01nt monetary arrangements and to establ1sh the1r own 
central bank 1n advance of the st1pulated date. After negot1at1ons 
1n March 1948, the governments of Ind1a and Pak1stan mutually agreed 
that Pak1stan should arrange to assume all central bank1ng 
respons1b1l1t1es 1n her terr1tory w1th effect from lst July, 1948. 2 
There were many d1ff1cult1es 1n the way of establ1sh1ng a 
central bank - the most ser1ous be1ng the acute shortage of tra1ned 
1 Zah1d Husa1n, 'Central Bank1ng 1n Pak1stan', Federal Econom1c 
Rev1ew, October, 1954, p 7 
2 Pak1stan Monetary System and Reserve Bank (Amendment) Order, 1948 
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bank1ng personnel The staff of the Reserve Bank of Ind1a had been 
g1ven the opt1on to elect for serv1ce 1n e1ther country, but only 
e1ght off1cers and th1rteen super1ntendants, of wh1ch seven were 
1 probat1onary ass1stants, opted for Pak1stan. The shortage on the 
cash department s1de was espec1ally acute 1n all grades. In sp1te 
of all these d1ff1cult1es the government was determ1ned to establ1sh 
a central bank. The facts that 1nter al1a 1nfluenced th1s dec1s1on 
were that the bank1ng system had pract1cally collapsed at the t1me of 
part1t1on and requ1red rev1val Secondly, most of the banks 1n the 
country were of fore1gn or1g1n and 1t was necessary to watch and when 
necessary to control the1r operat1ons 1n the 1nterest of the state. 
Th1s was not poss1ble w1thout a central bank. 
There were only three months left to organ1se a central 
bank. It was not a suff1c1ent t1me for deta1led expert 1nvest1gat1on 
1n th1s matter. Thus 1t was cons1dared exped1ent to model the 
proposed 1nst1tut1on on the Reserve Bank of Ind1a Draft leg1slat1on 
was 1ssued 1n the form of the State Bank of Pak1stan Order, 1948, on 
12th May, 1948 The funct1ons, dut1es and powers of the State Bank 
were to be broadly s1m1lar to those of the Reserve Bank of Ind1a As 
the Reserve Bank of Ind1a 1tself was patterned on the Bank of England, 
the State Bank was also 1nd1rectly modelled on 1t. Thus the 
const1tut1onal prov1s1ons 1ncorporated 1n the State Bank of Pak1stan 
1. The State Bank of Pak1stan, Annual Report 1948-49, p.4. 
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Order gave to the State Bank the shape of an orthodox central 
bank. The only maJor d~fference ~n the const~tut~onal prov~s~ons 
govern~ng the Reserve Bank of Ind~a and the State Bank of Pak~stan 
lay ~n the~r relat~onsh~ps w~th the Government. The Reserve Bank 
1 
of Ind~a was at that t~me a shareholders' bank, but ~twas dec~ded 
to have 51 per cent government part~c~pat~on ~n the share cap~tal 
of the State Bank of Pak~stan Th~s was ~n l~ne w~th the modern 
th~nk~ng on the subJect and w~th central bank~ng pract~ce ~n the 
post-war per~od, wh~ch w~tnessed the nat~onal~sat~on of a number of 
central banks and the establ~shment of several others w~th maJor~ty 
2 part~c~pat~on by the government 
The State Bank of Pak~stan came ~nto ex~stence on lst July, 
1948. Immed~ately after ~ts establ~shment, ~t became necessary 
1. The establ~shment of the Reserve Bank of Ind~a as a shareholders' 
bank represented a v~ctory for the exponents of shareholder 
pr~c~ple ~n the long drawn controversy of shareholder versus 
state-controlled bank. But several features were ~ntroduced ton~ng 
down the aspect of pr~vate ownersh~p to make ~t acceptable to those 
who wanted a State Bank. A token contr~but~on by the Government of 
Ind~a towards the share cap~tal of the Bank, government r~ght to 
f~x the rate of d~v~dend, accrual of surplus prof~ts to the 
government, the r~ght to nom~nate a certa~n number of D~rectors 
and the appo~ntment of Governor and Deputy Governors by the 
Government of Ind~a ~n the l~ght of recommendat~ons made ~n that 
behalf by the Central Board of D~rectors were some of these features 
Desp~te these sav~ng clauses ~t ~s, however, obv~ous that, ~n 
essence, the exponents of the shareholder pr~nc~ple got what they 
wanted, namely that the Bank should not be respons~ble for ~ts 
act~ons to the popular Leg~slatures who would otherw~se be free to 
mould ~ts pol~cy K.N.RaJ, The Monetary Pol~cy of the Reserve Bank 
of Ind~a, Bombay, 1948, pp.66-67 
2 Theodore Gregory, The Present Pos~t~on of Central Banks, The Stamp 
Memor~al Lecture, October 1965, The Athlene Press, page 7 
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to enforce the d1v1s1on of assets and l1ab1l1t1es of the Reserve 
Bank of Ind1a The State Bank rece1ved st1rl1ng assets worth 
about Rs 1 1 000 m1ll1on from the assets of the Bank1ng Department 
of the Reserve Bank 1 wh1ch were equ1valent to the outstand1ng 
amount of depos1ts of the government and banks 1n Pak1stan. The1r 
release for overseas expend1ture, however, was a matter for 
separate negot1at1on w1th the Br1t1sh government. Under the 
agreement Pak1stan was ent1tled to the assets of the Issue Department 
of the Reserve Bank of Ind1a equ1valent 1n value to Pak1stan 
1nscr1bed notes 1ssued by 1t unt1l June, 1948, and the amount of 
Ind1a notes of Rs 2 and above encashed by the Government of Pak1stan 
1n her terr1tor1es and del1vered to the Reserve Bank of Ind1a up to 
30th June, 1949 The var1ous types of relevant assets 1n the Issue 
Department of the Reserve Bank were to be transferred to the State 
Bank of Pak1stan 1n the same proport1on as were held by the Reserve 
Bank on 30th June, 1948. The assets fall1ng to the share of the 
State Bank of Pak1stan were 1n turn to form part of the assets of 1ts 
Issue Department. 
The State Bank w1thdrew from c1rculat1on and transferred 
to the Reserve Bank of Ind1a notes of the value of Rs 1 1 250 2 m1ll1on 
w1th1n the st1pulated t1me 1 wh1ch added to Rs 515.7 m1ll1on 
represent1ng the amount of Pak1stan 1nscr1bed notes 1n c1rculat1on on 
30th June, 1948 1 brought the total cla1m of Pak1stan on the assets 
of the Issue Department of the Reserve Bank of Ind1a to Rs 1,765.9 
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m1ll1on. Out of these total assets to wh1ch the Government of 
Pak1stan became ent1tledJ the State Bank of Pak1stan had rece1ved 
assets of the value of Rs. 1,276.7 m1ll1on by 23rd MarchJ 1949J 
when further transfer of assets was w1thheld by the Reserve 
Bank of Ind1a under the 1nstruct1ons of the Government of Ind1a. 
The reason advanced for the stoppage of further transfer of assets 
was that among the notes del1vered to the Reserve Bank of Ind1a 
there were some that had been 1ssued by the Reserve Bank after 30th 
June, 1948, aga1nst wh1ch Pak1stan was not ent1tled to rece1ve 
assets. The Government of Pak1stan d1d not accept th1s content1on 
on the ground that under the agreed arrangements there were no 
restr1ct1ons, on the movement of notes from one country to the other. 
Desp1te prolonged negot1at1ons conducted t1rne and aga1n by the two 
countr1es, the d1spute rema1ns unsettled to th1s day. 
The State Bank of Pak1stan has a pa1d-up cap1tal of 
Rs 30 m1ll1on, of wh1ch at least 51 per cent 1s to be held by the 
central government and the rest by the general publ1c. The central 
government may allow an 1ncrease 1n the cap1tal of the Bank at the 
request of the Central Board of D1rectors to any amountJ subJect to 
the cond1t1on that not less than 51 p~r cent of the add1t1onal 
cap1tal shall be 1ssued to the central government. The pr1vate 
shareholders of the Bank are d1v1ded 1nto three reg1onal groups, v1z 
Karach1 1 Dacca and Lahore, but there are no rules about the 
proport1on to be held by each. The shareholders are ent1tled to 
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d1v1dends at rates determ1ned every year by the central government 
subJect to a m1n1mum of 4 per cent After allow1ng for 
appropr1at1on to the reserve fund and Rural Cred1t Fund, surplus 
prof1t of the Bank 1s pa1d to the government The Rural Cred1t 
Fund was establ1shed 1n 1961 to prov1de med1um and long-term cred1t 
to the cooperat1ve banks and the Agr1cultural Development Bank 
At the end of June, 1966, reserve fund amounted to Rs. 120 m1ll1on 
and Rural Cred1t Fund to Rs. 50 m1ll1on 
The general super1ntendence and d1rect1on of the affa1rs 
and bus1ness of the Bank have been entrusted to the Central Board 
of D1rectors. The Central Board cons1sts of the Governor, one or 
more Deputy Governors, s1x D1rectors nom1nated by the central 
government and three elected D1rectors - one from each of the three 
reg1onal groups of shareholders ment1oned above Of the s1x 
D1rectors nom1nated by the central government, one 1s government 
off1c1al and the rest are non-off1c1als. Both Governor and Deputy 
Governors are appo1nted by the Government One of the Deputy 
Governors 1s stat1oned at Dacca 1n East Pak1stan A certa1n degree 
of decentral1sat1on of day-to-day adm1n1strat1on seems necessary 
as the country cons1sts of two w1dely separated w1ngs The elected 
D1rectors hold off1ce for a per1od of three years and are el1g1ble 
for re-e1ect1on Nom1nated D1rectors rema1n 1n off1ce at the 
pleasure of the central government In each of the three spec1f1ed 
reg1ons 1 a Local Board 1s const1tuted compr1s1ng of two elected 
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members and three members nom1nated by the central government. In 
nom1nat1ng the members, the central government endeavours to secure 
representat1on of terr1tor1al or econom1c 1nterests not already 
represented and 1n part1cular the representat1on of agr1cultural 
1nterests and the 1nterests of co-operat1ve Banks The funct1on of 
the Local Boards 1s to adv1se the Central Board on such matters as 
may be referred to them. 
II 
A central bank, accord1ng to Macm1llan Comm1ttee, "should 
possess four r1ghts the r1ght of note 1ssue, the r1ght to hold the 
reserves of the commerc1al banks, the r1ght to buy and sell 
1 
secur1t1es, and the r1ght to d1scount". The State Bank has been 
g1ven all four r1ghts It 1s entrusted w1th funct1ons generally 
performed by the central banks, namely the note 1ssue, the banker to 
the government, the adm1n1strator of fore1gn exchange and bankers' 
bank. 
Note Issue 
The State Bank has the sole r1ght to 1ssue notes 1n the 
country. For th1s purpose, the Bank has an Issue Department, wh1ch 
1 Report of the Comm1ttee on F1nance and Industry Cmd 3897, Her 
MaJesty's Stat1onery Off1ce, London, Repr1nt 1961, page 30. 
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1s kept separate and wholly d1st1nct from 1ts Bank1ng Department, 
and the assets of the Issue Department are not subJect to any 
l1ab1l1ty other than the l1ab1l1tv of the Issue Department v1z 
1 
total notes 1ssued Th1s d1st1nct1on between the Issue and Bank1ng 
Departments has been 1nher1ted from the Reserve Bank of Ind1a, 
wh1ch borrowed 1t from the Bank of England There the d1st1nct1on 
2 
was drawn 1n 1844 under the 1nfluence of the long defunct 
'currency pr1nc1ple' wh1ch held that 1n 'a sound and well regulated 
state of th1ngs', the amount of paper money 1n c1rculat1on should 
never exceed the value of prec1ous metals that would c1rculate 1f 
3 
no paper had ex1sted. S1nce depos1ts were not regarded as money, 
the1r regulat1on was not cons1dered necessary The Bank of England 
was cons1dered to un1te two operat1ons that were qu1te d1st1nct 
the 1ssue of a paper currency as a subst1tute for a metall1c one, and 
the mak1ng of loans to merchants and others The Issue and Bank1ng 
Departments were created to correspond to these two act1v1t1es. Now 
1 The State Bank of Pak1stan Act, 1956~ Sect1on 32. 
2. An 1nterest1ng summary of theor1es wh1ch led to the separat1on of 
Departments of the Bank of England 1s g1ven by J.K Horsef1eld, 
'The Or1g1ns of the Bank Charter Act, 1844', Econom1ca, November 
1944 For deta1led analys1s see E V.Morgan, 'The Theory and 
Pract1ce of Central Bank1ng 1797-1913', Frank Cass and Co Ltd., 
London, 1965 
3 Elmer Wood, 'Engl1sh Theor1es of Central Bank1ng Control 
1819-1858', 1939, page 110. 
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~t ~s recogn~sed that there ~s no reason why a central bank should 
treat ~ts obl~gat~ons towards the holders of ~ts notes d~fferently 
from those towards ~ts depos~tors or other cred~tors. Depos~ts are 
convert~ble ~nto notes and v~ce versa. The separat~on of Departments 
~n the case of the State Bank ~s, therefore, a borrowed trad~t~on 
w~th no econom~c JUSt~f~cat~on 
The note ~ssue ~n Pak~stan unt~l recently was based on the 
proport~onal reserve system. The ent~re l~ab~l~t~es of the Issue 
Department, represent~ng the notes ~ssued, had to be backed by an 
equ~valent amount of assets, of wh~ch not less than 30 per cent were 
requ~red to be ma~nta~ned ~n the form of gold co~n, gold and s~lver 
l bull~on and approved fore~gn exchange. Th~s ~ncludes the assets 
recoverable from the Reserve Bank of Ind~a under the Pak~stan 
(Monetary System and Reserve Bank) Order 1947, as amended ~n 1948, 
amount~ng to about Rs 489 2 m~ll~on The requ~rement perta~n~ng to 
ma~ntenance of 30 per cent of assets of ~ts Issue Department ~n the 
form of gold co~n, gold and s~lver bull~on and approved fore~gn 
exchange, could, however, be suspended by the Bank ~n except~onal 
1. The currency of any country can be declared by the central 
government, on the recommendat~on of the Central Board of the Bank, 
to be 'approved fore~gn exchange', wh~ch ~f held as an asset of the 
Issue Department, must be ~n the follow~ng forms (a) Balances 
stand~ng to the cred~t of the Bank w~th the central bank or any 
other bank of a country whose currency ~s ~n approved fore~gn 
exchange, (b) b~lls of exchange bear~ng two or more good s~gnatures, 
drawn and payable at any place ~n a country whose currency ~s 
approved fore~gn exchange, and hav~ng a matur~ty not exceed~ng one 
hundred and e~ghty days, and (c) secur~t~es of such governments 
w~th an unexp~red currency of not more than f~ve years 
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c1rcumstances w1th the pr1or sanct1on of the central government for 
per1ods not exceed1ng 30 days 1n the f1rst 1nstance wh1ch may w1th 
l1kew1se sanct1on of the central government be extended from t1me 
to t1me by per1ods not exceed1ng f1fteen days The rema1n1ng assets 
were to be held 1n the form of rupee co1ns, rupee secur1t1es of any 
matur1ty, and such b1lls of exchange and prom1ssory notes as were 
el1g1ble for purchase or d1scount by the Bank. 
Let us now look 1nto the rat1onale of the pr1nc1ple of 
reserve requ1rements. The ma1n pol1cy 1ssue 1n relat1on to the note 
1ssue 1s how far the central bank should be g1ven free d1scret1on and 
to what extent 1ts powers should be l1m1ted by reserve requ1rements. 
Or1g1nally1 the pr1nc1ple of reserve requ1rements was meant to serve 
three d1st1nct purposes F1rst, 1t was 1ntended to g1ve the publ1c 
conf1dence 1n a paper currency. Under the gold standard, the central 
bank was obv1ously 1n need of a gold reserve to ma1nta1n 
convert1b1l1ty. But even after the breakdown of the gold standard 
and the suspens1on of convert1b1l1ty of paper currency 1nto gold, 1t 
was cons1dered adv1sable for the central bank to be able to po1nt to a 
gold back1ng of the currency. It 1s doubtful whether th1s not1on has 
much mer1t even 1n the least developed monetary system It 1s now 
w1dely recogn1sed that the conf1dence of the publ1c in currency 
depends on the success of the central bank to ma1nta1n monetary 
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1 
stab1l1ty and not merely on reserve back1ng 
The second obJect1ve of reserve requ1rements was to 
11m1t the access of the Government to central bank f1nance. The 
1dea was strengthened by the post-war 1nflat1on 1n the twent1es 1n 
Western Europe, wh1ch was thought to have been caused by def1c1t 
However, exper1ence has shown that the statutory l1m1ts 
on the expans1on of note 1ssue are no safeguard, 1f a government 
2 
really wants to resort to central bank f1nance. A£ter all, these 
statutory l1m1ts are self-1mposed by the government and, 1f 
necessary, they can suspend or ra1se them. 
Th1rdly, under the gold or gold exchange standard, the 
currency reserve requ1rements l1nked the domest1c supply of money to 
the balance of payments and thus prov1ded a dev1ce for the 
automat1c ma1ntenance of external balance The pr1nc1ple st1ll 
surv1ves 1n the central bank1ng laws of many countr1es - 1n 1ts 
present form 1n the 100 per cent reserve system of the Br1t1sh 
colon1al currency boards and 1n the mod1f1ed form of proport1onal 
reserve requ1rements and f1xed f1duc1ary system 1n many other 
countr1es. The l1nk between the note 1ssue and the balance of payments 
1s gradually be1ng severed for the follow1ng reasons F1rstly, 1t 
1. By th1s we do not mean that the monetary pol1cy alone 1s suff1c1ent 
to ach1eve the obJect1ve of monetary stab1l1ty. 
2. Edward Nev1n, Cap1tal Funds 1n Underdeveloped Countr1es, Macm1llan 
and Co. Ltd., London, 1963, p.4o. 
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1s now recogn1sed that changes 1n domest1c money supply generally 
are not the best way of ma1nta1n1ng balance of payments equ1l1br1um. 
Secondly, as the depos1t money came to form the bulk of total money 
supply, the s1gn1f1cance of currency reserve requ1rements decl1ned. 
Th1rdly 7 1t 1s be1ng 1ncreas1ngly recogn1sed that the pr1mary role 
of fore1gn exchange reserves 1s to cush1on the economy 1n t1mes of 
temporary balance of payments d1ff1cult1es. Th1s supports the case 
aga1nst 1mmob1l1s1ng these reserves as back1ng of currency. 
The exper1ence of Pak1stan corroborates the remark of 
Keynes about the proport1onal reserve system of note 1ssue that th1s 
method possesses "no sound foundat1on 1n log1c or common sense. In 
sp1te of 1ts 1nclus1on 1n the qu1te modern Un1ted States Federal 
Reserve System and 1n most of the Currency Reforms 1n Europe 
assoc1ated w1th the restorat1on of the gold standard, I have never 
seen 1n pr1nt a reasoned defence of 1ts prov1s1ons. It appear8 to 
1 
comb1ne all the poss1ble defects of systems of note regulat1on". 
In Pak1stan as the actual back1ng of the note 1ssue by gold and 
approved fore1gn exchange was qu1te h1gh 1n the 1n1t1al years, the 
m1n1mum requ1rement of 30 per cent fa1led to funct1on as a check of 
any pract1cal value on the 1mprudent f1nanc1al pol1c1es of the 
government On the other hand, 1n recent years as the actual rat1o 
1. J M Keynes, A Treat1se on Money, Vol. 2, Macm1llan and Co., 
1930, p 268. 
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approached the requ~red m~n~mum, ~t made ~t d~ff~cult for the Bank 
even to meet the genu~ne currency requ~rements of the economy. 
Moreover, the requ~rements of currency ~n c~rculat~on were ~ncreas~ng 
at a cons~derable rate due to ~ncrease ~n nat~onal ~ncome and 
monet~sat~on of the subs~stence sector. Th~s ~s because the currency 
~n c~rculat~on st~ll looms large ~n the total money supply both as a 
med~um of exchange and store of value. W~th the ~ncrease ~n the 
outstand~ng volume of currency ~n c~rculat~on, ~t was necessary to 
block a large amount of fore~gn exchange as 'back~ng'. Th~s could 
not be made ava~lable for meet~ng the temporary def~c~t ~n the 
balance of payments for wh~ch ~t was actually needed. Th~s was an 
unnecessary luxury at a t~me when the country was borrow~ng at a 
large-scale to meet the fore~gn exchange requ~rements of the 
development programme. 
In the l~ght of the above d~scuss~on, we shall now 
descr~be br~efly the developments ~n the system of note regulat~on 
~n Pak~stan. We have noted above that, under the proport~onal reserve 
system, the State Bank was to ma~nta~n 30 per cent of ~ts assets ~n the 
form of gold and fore~gn exchange and the rema~n~ng 70 per cent of 
assets were to be held ~n the form of government secur~t~es and 
domest~c b~lls of exchange and prom~ssory notes. The Order st~pulated 
that only two k~nds of ~nternal b~lls could form part of the assets 
of the Issue Department. These were (~) the commerc~al and trade 
b~lls of exchange w~th a matur~ty of not more than 90 days, and 
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<~~) b~lls ~ssued for the purpose of f~nanc~ng seasonal agr~cultural 
operat~ons or the market~ng of crops and hav~ng matur~ty of not 
exceed~ng n~ne months 
The State Bank of Pak~stan Act, 1956, ~ncreased the l~st 
of assets wh~ch the Bank can keep aga~nst ~ts note ~ssue. F~rstly, 
the per~od of matur~ty ~n respect of b~lls perta~n~ng to the f~nance 
of seasonal agr~cultural operat~ons and market~ng of crops was 
~ncreased from 9 to 15 months Secondly, b~lls of exchange hav~ng 
matur~t~es not exceed~ng f~ve years and ~ssued for f~nanc~ng the 
development of agr~culture and ~ndustry were allowed to form part of 
the assets of the Issue Department. 
Recently, w~th the stepp~ng up of econom~c act~v~ty ~n the 
country and substant~al ~ncrease ~n nat~onal ~ncome, the currency 
requ~rements also ~ncreased apprec~ably. The Bank was feel~ng 
constra~ned to br~ng about des~red expans~on ~n currency due to 
~nadequacy of el~g~ble assets. The Bank could, of course, ~ncrease ~ts 
note ~ssue to any amount by acqu~r~ng rupee secur~t~es from the 
Government but that would have ser~ous ~nflat~onary consequences. So, 
f~rstly, the Bank s~nce December, 1964, for the f~rst t~me started 
re-d~scount~ng or purchas~ng b~lls of exchange as ~s ev~dent from 
table No. 2-1 below. Formerly, the Bank used to extend loans to banks 
aga~nst the collateral of these b~lls ~nstead of re-d~scount~ng them. 
Secondly, by a recent amendment to the Act, the l~st of perm~ss~ble 
assets to be held ~n the Issue Department has been further w~dened to 
TABLE 2-1 
Notes held in the Banking 
i Department 
Notes in Circulation 
Total Liabilities or Assets 
Gold Coin and Bullion and 
Silver Bullion 
Foreign Securities 
Assets Re~eivable from 
Reserve Bank of India 
Government of Pakistan 
Securities and Rupee Coins 
Internal Bills of Exchange 
and other ·commercial paper 
Ratio of gold and approved 
foreign exchange to total 
notes issued 
1949 
61 
1690 
1751 
42 
1166 
488 
55 
96.7 
Balance 
1950 1951 1952 
51 55 62 
1714 1924 2093 
1765 1980 2155 
42 42 79 
815 950 848 
342 342 342 
.If 
566 645 886 
67.8 67.3 58.8 
Department of the State Bank of Pakistan 
(Rs. in million) 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1~62 1963 1964 1965 1966 
120 125 117 73 100 116 159 126 109 85 80 135 
2417 2835 3202 3391 3413 3566 3609 3Q67 3988 4488 4832 5854 
2537 2960 3319 3464 3513 3682 3768 3793 4097 4573 4912 5989 
' 
i 
I 
i 
79 113 113 115 234 247 249 ~50 250 252 252 252 
I 
566 1134 860 626 578 707 810 ~65 725 766 758 829 
342 489 489 489 489 489 489 4;89 489 489 489 327 
1550 1224 1857 2234 2212 2239 2220 2~89 2633 3066 3237 4291 
175 290 
58.6. 44.0 35.4 36.9 39.1 41.0 32.9 30.5 23.5 
~~~\ifl~lY :;1 Source: State Bank of Pakistan - Banking S ta tis tics (Annual) , 
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supplement the current el~g~ble assets wh~ch were ~nadequate to 
l 
prov~de cover for the des~red expans~on ~n currency. The 
prom~ssory notes obta~ned by the Bank ~n respect of advances and loans 
made to local author~t~es, scheduled banks, co-operat~ve banks and 
the agr~cultural and ~ndustr~al f~nanc~ng ~nst~tut~ons, aga~nst 
stocks, funds and secur~t~es, other than ~mmovable property, and gold 
and s~lver or documents of t~tle to the same, have been made el~g~ble 
assets for the Issue Department. Moreover, the prom~ssory notes 
obta~ned by the Bank ~n respect of advances to co-operat~ve banks and 
~nst~tut~ons or banks spec~ally establ1shed for the purpose of 
promot1ng agr1cultural or 1ndustr1al development 1n the country have 
also been made el1g1ble assets for the Issue Department. 
More 1mportant, the prov1s1on 1n the Act that 30 per cent 
of the assets of the Issue Department should be kept 1n the form of 
gold co1ns, gold and s~lver bull~on and approved fore1gn exchange has 
2 
also been wa1ved. Now the amount of assets to be held 1n the Issue 
Department 1n the form of gold co1ns, gold and s1lver bull1on and 
approved fore1gn exchange would be spec~f1ed by the Central Government 
from t~me to t1me 1n consultat1on w1th the Bank. Th~s br1ngs the 
const1tut1onal prov1s1ons 1n respect of the regulat1on of note 1ssue 
1n Pak1stan 1n l1ne w1th the latest thought on the pol1cy of note 1ssue. 
1. Adm1n1strat1on C1rcular No. 4/67 dated February 9th, 1967. 
2. Adm1n1strat1on C1rcular No.67/65 dated November 24th,l965. 
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Government Banker and F1nanc1al Adv1ser ~ 
The State Bank acts as banker to both the central and 
prov1nc1al governments Superf1c1ally, the relat1onsh1p between a 
central bank and the government looks l1ke that between an ord1nary 
commerc1al bank and 1ts customers The rout1ne bank1ng bus1ness 
performed by a central bank for the government, however, has far-
reach1ng pol1cy s1gn1f1cance Th1s 1s because the l1ab1l1t1es of 
the central bank const1tute the "cash" of the system and thus the 
government expend1tures and rece1pts d1rectly affect the l1qu1d1ty 
of the bank1ng system. In return for bank1ng serv1ces, the 
government 1s requ1red to entrust the Bank w1th all the1r cash 
balances free of 1nterest. Th1s, however, does not debar governments 
from keep1ng the1r balances w1th other banks at places where there 
1s no branch of the State Bank or 1ts agent. The State Bank manages 
the publ1c debt of both the central and prov1nc1al governments and 
1ssues the1r new loans and treasury b1lls. 
The Bank makes ways and mean advances to the central and 
prov1nc1al governments w1thout any collateral secur1ty for a per1od 
of three months In add1t1on, prov1nc1al governments can borrow 
money from the Bank on the collateral of central government secur1t1es. 
There 1s no statutory l1m1t on the government's borrow1ngs from the 
Bank, but so far normally the amount has not been b1g and 1s 1ntended 
to ease temporary shortfalls between treasury rece1pts and 
d1sbursements The government can secure add1t1onal f1nanc1al 
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accommodat1on from the Bank through the sale of government secur1t1es 
and the 1ssue of ad-hoc treasury b1lls. There 1s no statutory l1m1t 
on the s1ze of 1nd1v1dual advances of th1s type. There were, however, 
ce1l1ngs on the State Bank's total hold1ngs of government secur1t1es 
1n both of 1ts departments The l1m1t on the absolute value of the 
secur1t1es to be held 1n the Issue Department was set by the statutory 
requ1rement that at least 30 per cent of 1ts assets should be kept 1n 
the form of gold and fore1gn exchange. By an amendment 1n the Act 1n 
February 1967 th1s statutory l1m1t has been removed and now the 
central government, after consultat1on w1th the Bank, can reduce the 
rat1o to any extent. To th1s extent, the Bank can now hold more 
government secur1t1es or b1lls of exchange The Bank can hold 
secur1t1es of any matur1ty 1n the Issue Department 
In the Bank1ng Department, the Act requ1red that the value 
of government secur1t1es should not exceed the aggregate amount of 
the share cap1tal of the Bank, the Reserve Fund and 60 per cent of the 
depos1t l1ab1l1t1es of the Bank1ng Department Recently the l1m1t 
has been ra1sed to the aggregate amount of the share cap1tal, reserve 
fund and 80 per cent of the depos1t l1ab1l1t1es of the Bank1ng 
Department. The restr1ct1on on the matur1ty of secur1t1es has also 
been removed. 
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Adm1n1strator of Exchange Control• 
The Bank has been ass1gned the respons1b1l1ty to hold 
country's external reserves and to adm1n1ster exchange control The 
broad allocat1on of fore1gn exchange expend1ture between government 
and pr1vate sectors lS made by the government through the Exchange 
Control Comm1ttee compr1s1ng the permanent heads of var1ous 
m1n1str1es and the Controller of Fore1gn Exchange of the State Bank. 
The share of the pr1vate sector 1s allocated to d1fferent users and 
uses by the 1mport-11cens1ng author1ty. W1th1n these broad 
allocat1ons, the Bank adm1n1sters the actual transact1ons. 
As an adm1n1strator of the fore1gn reserves of the 
country, the State Bank has not only 1nt1mate and up-to-date knowledge 
of the balance of payments pos1t1on of the country, wh1ch 1s one of 
the 1mportant factors affect1ng the money supply, 1t can use 1t as a 
del1berate tool of monetary pol1cy. Secondly, 1t enables the Bank to 
present 1ts po1nt of v1ew about the monetary s1tuat1on 1n the country 
at the t1me of preparat1on of annual development budgets and the 
commerc1al pol1cy. The consultat1ons between the d1fferent m1n1str1es 
of the government and the Bank thus lead to better coord1nat1on of 
f1scal, commerc1al and monetary pol1c1es, wh1ch lS essent1al for 
susta1ned econom1c growth 1n an env1ronment of monetary 
stab1l1ty. 
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Bankers' Bank 
The State Bank has extens~ve powers for regulat~ng the 
bank~ng system ~n the country. It ~s empowered to change Bank Rate 
as well as to conduct open market operat~ons. It can request the 
central government to change the legal reserve requ~rements to any 
extent or completely d~spense w~th them, as warranted by the 
ex~genc1es of chang~ng s1tuat~ons. Another constra1nt upon banks 
concern~ng the~r assets and ult1mately l1m~t~ng the~r power of cred~t 
expans1on ~s the requ1rement of a l~qu~d~ty rat~o. Every 
1 
scheduled bank ~s requ~red to ma~nta~n 20 per cent of ~ts demand and 
t~me l~ab1l~t~es ~n the form of cash 1n b~lls, balances w~th the 
State Bank and gold and unencumbered approved secur~t~es The 
'unencumbered' means that these secur~t~es have not been used as 
collateral for borrow~ngs from the State Bank 
The Bank ~s also entrusted w~th comprehens~ve powers of 
select~ve and d~rect cred~t control It can regulate the cred~t 
pol~cLes of banks ~n general or proh~b~t them from mak~ng advances for 
some spec~f~c purpose It can f~x the marg1ns to be ma~nta~ned by 
banks ~n respect of secured advances. It can also f1X the rates of 
~nterest on depos1ts and advances 
In return, the Bank acts as a lender of last resort. It ~s 
empowered to d1scount b~lls w1th matur~t1es rang~ng from 90 days to 5 
1. See below, Chapter 
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years, depend1ng on the nature of the b1lls It makes advances 
aga1nst government and approved secur1t1es and 1n t1mes of emergency 
1t can advance money on any secur1ty It makes almost all the 
assets of the scheduled banks sh1ftable to the State Bank 1n t1mes 
of need 
III 
ObJeCt1ves of the State Bank 
There are no standard ObJect1ves of central bank1ng to 
wh1ch all central banks should adhere at one per1od of t1me or any 
central bank should pursue for all t1mes to come. Central bank1ng, 
wh1ch grew out of the requ1rements and exper1ences 1n the developed 
countr1es, espec1ally 1n Great Br1ta1n, 1s a relat1vely new art and 1s 
st1ll 1n the process of evolut1on. The old class1cal concept of the 
central bank of a country as note 1ssu1ng author1ty and as a banker's 
bank has g1ven r1se to a much more comprehens1ve concept. Wh1le 
certa1n obJect1ves are common to all central banks, there are, 1n 
pract1ce, var1at1ons 1n the1r scope and emphas1s result1ng from the 
nature of a country's economy, the structure of 1ts cred1t 
1nst1tut1ons and the respect1ve stages of growth of both economy and 
structure. Even 1n the case of any one central bank, 1t 1s not 
cons1dered adv1sable to wed 1ts obJect1ves to current 1deas on monetary 
l 
management for ever 
1. E.A. Goldenwe1ser, Amer1can Monetary Polley, McGraw-H111 Book 
Company Inc., 1951, p.76. 
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The State Bank of Pak1stan was establ1shed 'to regulate 
the 1ssue of Bank notes and the keep1ng of reserves, w1th a v1ew to 
secur1ng monetary stab1l1ty 1n Pak1stan and generally to operate the 
currency and cred1t system of the country to 1ts advantage'. Th1s 
word1ng adopted from the Reserve Bank of Ind1a Act, 1934, conveyed 
clearly the regulatory funct1ons of the central bank1ng author1ty. 
Under the Bank1ng Compan1es Control Act 1948, the State Bank was 
vested w1th extens1ve and effect1ve powers for 1nfluenc1ng the 
pol1c1es of the banks, 1f necessary, by 1ssu1ng d1rect1ves of a b1nd1ng 
nature. Th1s leg1slat1on strengthened the control exerc1sed by the 
State Bank and granted 1t spec1f1c powers but d1d not alter 1n any 
respect the preva1l1ng v1ew regard1ng the purpose of central bank1ng 
accord1ng to wh1ch a central bank superv1ses the bank1ng and cred1t 
system and operates 1t so as to make 1t subserve the publ1c 1nterest. 
Th1s v1ew of the purpose and respons1b1l1ty of a central bank was 1n 
harmony w1th 1ts theory as evolved 1n the advanced countr1es. The 
central bank1ng had developed 1n the advanced countr1es to regulate 
and control the pol1c1es and operat1ons of commerc1al banks and other 
f1nanc1al 1nst1tut1ons 1n the 1nterest of publ1c good, as 1t was 
conce1ved from t1me to t1me, and cons1stent w1th the preva1l1ng v1ew 
1n respect of free enterpr1se. These countr1es had already well-
developed commerc1al, 1ndustr1al and agr1cultural banks and other 
f1nanc1al 1nst1tut1ons and any d1rect and act1ve 1nterference by the 
central bank to promote the1r growth would have been resented. 
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Th~s was a very restr~cted and wholly ~nadequate v~ew of 
the ObJect~ves of central bank~ng ~n the cond~t~ons of Pak~stan. 
We shall see ~n Chapter 3 that the areas compr~s~ng Pak~stan had a 
fa~rly developed bank~ng system. It was, however, enter~ng only to 
the cred~t requ~rements of commerce.The ban~ system rece~ved a 
shatter~ng blow at the t~me of Part~t~on. Thus the only sector, v~z. 
commerce, for wh~ch cred~t fac~l~t~es were ava~lable before Part~t~on 
were also d~srupted. There were no ~nst1tut~ons to meet the cred~t 
requ~rements of ~ndustry and agr~culture. Under these cond~t~ons the 
ass~gnment of only regulatory funct~ons to the State Bank was out of 
place. Secondly, the Government of Pak1stan comm1tted 1tself from 
the outset to planned econom~c development, by wh1ch was meant the 
act1ve part1c1pat~on of the government 1n econom1c development. The 
share of publ~c 1nvestment ~n total 1nvestment 1ncreased from 28 per 
cent 1n 1949-50 to 48 per cent ~n 1964-65. The government's 
development programmes m1ght have been hampered ~f they d1d not make 
full prov~s~on for the promot~on and development of a cred~t system 
wh~ch, ~twas felt, could not be left to the pr~vate ~n~t~at~ve. 
So ~nstead of conf1n~ng ~ts act~v~t~es to the regulat~on 
of the monetary and cred~t s1tuat~on, the State Bank had to accept 
the development of an eff~c~ent monetary-~nst~tut~onal framework as 
one of ~ts foremost dut~es. Moreover, the State Bank had not only to 
develop these ~nst~tut1ons 1 ~t had to ~nfluence the~r behav~our, 
outlook and pract~ces 1n such a way as to br1ng them ~nto harmony 
w~th the maJor nat1onal econom~c ObJeCt1ves. The bas1c ~dea was that 
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the State Bank should develop the bank~ng system and mould ~t ~n 
such a way that ~t becomes an effect~ve eng~ne of growth. 
The amendments made from t~me to t~me ~n central bank~ng 
leg~slat1on ~n Pak~stan clearly reflect th~s concern for the 
development of the monetary ~nst~tut~onal framework. These w~der 
obJect~ves of the central bank~ng, as they are accepted today ~n 
Pak~stan, were embod~ed 1n the preamble to the State Bank of Pak~stan 
Act, 1956, wh~ch states that "~t ~s necessary to prov1de for the 
const1tut~on of a State Bank to regulate the monetary and cred~t 
system of Pak1stan and to foster ~ts growth ~n the best nat1onal 
1nterests w1th a v~ew to secur1ng monetary stab1l1ty and fuller 
ut1l~sat1on of the country's product1on resources". The Bank 1s now 
expected not only to regulate the monetary and cred~t system but also 
to foster ~ts growth 1n l1ne w1th the country's requ~rements. More 
~mportant, ~t has to J01n hands w1th the Government ~n the fuller 
ut~l~sat~on of the country's product~on resources. The Bank's 
ObJect~ves have now become more comprehens~ve compared to the 
trad~t~onal v~ew of the funct~ons cons~dered proper for a central bank. 
Thus the fundamental ObJect~ves of the State Bank's 
pol~c~es are to help the government ~n atta~n~ng max~mum and steady 
rate of growth, to ma~nta~n pr~ce and exchange stab~l~ty and to 
develop money and cap~tal markets. Wh~le the broad obJect~ves of 
pol~cy are eas~ly stated, the actual ~mplementat1on somet~mes br~ngs 
to the surface certa~n apparent confl~cts. Th~s ~s part1cularly true 
- 54 -
1n countr1es l1ke Pak1stan that have embarked on amb1t1ous 
development programmes where the confl1cts appear to be qu1te sharp, 
at least 1n the short-run. A very rap1d growth of the economy may 
endanger the ma1ntenance of domest1c pr1ce stab1l1ty and stra1n the 
balance of payments. On the other hand, excess1ve concern about 
stab1l1ty may appear to endanger econom1c growth through fa1lure to 
stretch fully resources ava1lable for development. S1nce 1n 1ts 
day-to-day work1ng monetary pol1cy 1s pr1mar1ly concerned Wlth the 
ma1ntenance of f1nanc1al stab1l1ty 1 1ts obJeCtlves superf1c1ally 
appear to confl1ct w1th the atta1nment of max1mum growth. Thus 1f 
1nflat1onary pressures emerge dur1ng the 1mplementat1on of 
development plans, the monetary author1t1es may be forced to adopt 
measures l1ke 1ncreas1ng the cost of cred1t or reduc1ng 1ts 
ava1lab1l1ty to the borrowers, lead1ng to the 1mpress1on that the 
tempo of growth 1s be1ng affected. Thls type of confl1ct of 
obJeCtlves 1s, however, of a short-term character and of a superf1c1al 
nature In the long run, rap1d growth of the nat1onal economy takes 
place most effect1vely 1n the general framework of pr1ce and exchange 
stab1l1ty and 1s better promoted 1f the burdens of development are 
appropr1ately d1str1buted rather than 1nd1scr1m1nately thrown upon 
the weakest elements of the commun1ty through the forced sav1ngs of 
the 1nflat1onary process. In such a s1tuat1on not only are sav1ngs 
extracted 1n an 1nequ1table manner, but the resources thus released 
are l1able to be fr1ttered away 1n unproduct1ve or lower pr1or1ty 
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~nvestments. Thus there ~s no real confl~ct between econom~c 
l expans~on and f~nanc~al stab~l~ty ~n the long run. 
State Bank's Relat~onsh~p w~th the Government 
No prec~se def~n~t~on or descr~pt~on of the relat~onsh~p 
between the Government and the State Bank and of the methods and 
manner ~n wh~ch the pol~c~es of the Bank are to be coord~nated w~th 
those of the Government have been la~d down ~n the law. The 
const~tut~on of the Bank ~n th~s respect ~s patterned on or 
~nfluenced by the Br~t~sh central bank~ng trad~t~on wh~ch left the 
subJect of the relat~onsh~p of the Government to the central bank 
legally undef~ned, to be moulded by trad~t~on, convent~on or need. 
Th~s ~s subJect to the follow~ng qual~f~cat~ons. As we noted above, 
the central government holds 51 per cent of the shares of the State 
Bank. Its vot~ng power ~s ~n fact greater than ~ts proport~on of 
hold~ngs of the Bank's shares because a pr~vate shareholder cannot 
cast more than 10 votes. The Governor and Deputy Governors are 
appo~nted by the central government. Out of n~ne D~rectors of the 
Central Board of the Bank, s~x are nom~nated by the central 
government and hold off~ce at ~ts pleasure. The Act empowers the 
government to supersede the Central Board of D~rectors, ~f ~n the 
op~n~on of the government the Board has fa~led to carry out any of ~ts 
obl~gat~ons ~mposed on ~t under the Act. These prov~s~ons ensure 
government control over the affa~rs of the Bank wh~ch ~s expected to 
1. B.K Madan, "The Role of Monetary Pol~cy ~n Econom~c Development", 
~n State Bank of Pak~stan (ad.) SEANZA Lectures, Vol.l, p.64. 
- 56 -
work ~n the nat~onal econom~c ~nterest. On the other hand, there are 
prov~s~ons ~n the Act wh~ch ensure that the Bank does not become 
s~mply a department of government. F~rstly, the Governor and Deputy 
Governors are appo~nted for a f~xed per~od, and dur~ng the tenure of 
the~r off~ce the terms and cond~t~ons of the~r serv~ce cannot be 
altered to the~r d~sadvantage. Moreover, they cannot be removed from 
off~ce except under the cond~t~ons spec~f~cally la~d down ~n the Act. 
Secondly, of the s~x nom~nated D~rectors of the Central Board, only 
one ~s a government off~c~al wh~le the rema~n~ng f~ve represent 
agr~cultural, 1ndustr1al and commerc~al ~nterests ~n the country. 
The Bank ~s free ~n the conduct of ~ts cred~t control pol1cy. F~nally, 
there ~s no prov1s~on ~n the leg~slat~on for the government to ~ssue 
d~rect~ves, wh1ch the Bank may be forced to carry out. "The sp~r1t of 
the leg~slat1on appears to be that, except ~n abnormal c1rcumstances 
JUst~fy~ng the use of sweep1ng emergency powers of the government, the 
Bank should be allowed to funct~on freely under the expert d~rect~on 
of the Governor and the Central Board of D~rectors. Success1ve 
governments ~n Pak~stan have recogn~sed the need for the central bank 
to ma~nta~n an ~ndependent pos~t~on, there have been no cr~ses ~n 
the~r relat~onsh~p desp~te d~fferences ~n v~ewpo~nts on matters of 
l ~mportance". 
1. Dr Z~audd~n Ahmed, op c~t., See also ~naugural speech of 
F1nance M~n~ster of Pak~stan, SEANZA Lectures, 1964. 
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The cord1al relat1onsh1p between government and the 
State Bank seems to have been establ1shed at the expense of the 
latter The two maJor f1elds of confl1ct between the government and 
the State Bank are def1c1t f1nanc1ng and 1nterest rate on government 
debt placed w1th the bank1ng system. Pr1or to 1958, the governments 
1n Pak1stan d1d not pay much attent1on to the adv1ce of the State 
l 
Bank regard1ng recourse to def1c1t f1nanc1ng~ The government's 
1ns1stence on low 1nterest rates on 1ts debt has not only destroyed 
the chances of develop1ng secur1ty market 1n Pak1stan, 1t has also 
destroyed whatever hopes the State Bank m1ght have had of er.e~t1ng 
2 1nd1rect monetary controls 1n the economy. In June, 1966, the State 
Bank was hold1ng ad hoc treasury b1lls wocth Rs 2,398 m1ll1on 
bear1ng only one-half per cent 1nterest. Recently, the Bank has come 
under pressure to enlarge 1ts ass1stance to government-sponsored 
±1nanc1al 1nst1tut1ons for development of agr1culture and 1ndustry at 
3 
concess1onal rates of 1nterest 
In future, the f1nanc1al pos1t1on of the government 1s 
l1kely to be more stra1ned due to 1ncrease 1n development expend1ture 
1. Speech del1vered by Mr Abdul Qad1r, Governor, State Bank of Pak1stan, 
at the Seventh Annual General Meet1ng of the Inst1tute of Bankers 1n 
Pak1stan, Journal of the Inst1tute of Bankers 1n Pak1stan (January, 
1959), pp 62-63. 
2 For a deta1led d1scuss1on see Chapter 5 below. 
3 For a deta1led d1scuss1on see Chapter 6 below. 
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1n the publ1c sector The 1ncrease 1n the resources of the 
government may not be commensurate The government may hes1tate to 
1ncrease taxes, wh1ch are pol1t1cally unpopular, or cut down 1ts 
non-development expend1ture, wh1ch needs pa1nful readJUStments It 
may thus take the easy but dangerous course to the def1c1t 
Secondly, we shall d1scuss 1n chapters 5 and 6 below 
that at present there seems to be a strong case for an upward 
readJustment of market rates of 1nterest, espec1ally the rates 
charged by the development banks. Th1s w1ll be poss1ble only 1f the 
Bank 1s able to pursuade the government to rev1se 1ts cheap cred1t 
pol1cy. In such a s1tuat1on, 1t 1s necessary that the State Bank 
should be 1n a pos1t1on to g1ve ~und and obJect1ve adv1ce and that 
the government pays the attent1on to 1t. It 1s pert1nent to po1nt 
l 
out that the government 1s also comm1tted to f1nanc1al stab1l1ty 
But the fact rema1ns that the government's ma1n concern 1s w1th 
max1m1s1ng the rate of growth and the volume of employment and w1th 
promot1ng equ1ty 
In these c1rcumstances, the present arrangement 1n 
Austral1a seems more su1table for an underdeveloped coutry l1ke 
Pak1stan, wh1ch 1s comm1tted to planned econom1c development In 
1. "One of the 1mportant a1ms of the Plan 1s to ma1nta1n a reasonable 
degree of f1nanc1al stab1l1ty". Second F1ve-Year Plan (1960-65), 
Govt of Pak1stan, p.57, "Pr1ce stab1l1ty would cont1nue to be a 
bas1c pol1cy obJect1ve dur1ng the Th1rd Plan", Th1rdJF1ve-Year 
Plan, (1965-70), Government of Pak1stan, p.73 
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Austral1a, the law requ1res the Reserve Bank to keep the Government 
1nformed from t1me to t1me of 1ts monetary and bank1ng pol1cy and 
prov1des that 1f 1n the op1n1on ofthe Government that pol1cy 1s 
wrong, the Governor of the Bank and the Treasurer shall confer and 
seek to resolve the1r d1fferences. If they fa1l to do so, then the 
Government may 1ssue a d1rect1on to the Bank wh1ch the Bank must 
g1ve effect. When smch a d1rect1on 1s g1ven, the Government 1s 
requ1red to 1nform Parl1ament and to lay on the table of the House a 
statement by the Treasurer and the Governor of the Bank, sett1ng out 
the1r respect1ve v1ews on the 1ssues 1nvolved. Th1s arrangement has 
many advantages. F1rstly, 1t author1ses the Reserve Bank to 
formulate 1ts own pol1cy Secondly, 1t ensures that the pol1cy of 
the Bank rema1ns 1n harmony w1th the pol1c1es of the government 
Th1rdly, 1t ensures that the adv1ce of the Bank w1ll not be taken 
l1ghtly by the government. 
The follow1ng observat1.ons of the former Governor of the 
Reserve Bank of Ind1a are qu1.te reveal1ng "It 1s of the essence of 
sound work1ng relat1onsh1ps between a Treasury and the Board of a 
Central Bank that the Board should cons1st of people who are 
1ndependent and who feel that they express the1r v1ews w1th candour 
and w1thout fear. That 1s the case 1n the Un1ted K1ngdom. But the 
extent of Government's control 1n Ind1.a 1n econom1c matters 1s vastly 
more comprehens1ve than 1n the Un1ted K1ngdom. Hav1ng regard to the 
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stage of economic development through which we are passing, a 
planned and controlled economy is inevitable, whatever may be the 
arguments about particular forms and details of control. It 
follows, however, as a consequence, that non-official members of 
Statutory Boards taken from industry and commerce, however high their 
sense of duty, may possibly, on occasions, feel somewhat inhibited 
in expressing their views with complete frankness. The fact that a 
Minister represents the power of the State which is pretty all-
pervasive in matters of industrial development and that the members of 
the Board have often to make requests for official sanctions under 
various enactments could possibly affect their relations in a manner 
which does not happen in countries less subject to control such as 
the United Kingdom". 1 This is true about Pakistan also. 
It will be helpful to have the nature and extent of the 
Bank's autonomy embodies in the legislation. The government will 
still remain final authority but it will introduce healthy checks 
and balances. In some countries the government's recourse to control 
2 
bank credit has been limited by law. This, however, has obvious 
drawbacks. Sometimes it may be in the national interest to incur 
2. Edward Nevin, Capital Funds in Underdeveloped Countries, 
Macmillan, 1963, p.39; E.E.Juker-Fleetwood, Money and Finance in 
Africa, George Allen and Unwin, 1964, p.94. 
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def1c1t-f1nanc1ng and these 11m1tat1ons may stand 1n the way. 
Ult1mately, however, we have to depend "on the good sense and 
prob1ty of the government of a terr1tory and on noth1ng else, 
solvency and sound f1nance cannot be prov1ded by statute". 1 
1. Edward Nev1n, op.c1t., p.4o. 
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Chapter 3. 
THE DEVEWPMENT OF COMMERCIAL 
BANKS AND THE MONEY 
MARKET. 
The obJect of the present chapter ~s twofold to 
d1scuss the pr1nc1ples of the bank1ng pol1cy of the State Bank of 
Pak1stan and the1r 1mpact on the evolut1on of the present 
structure of the bank1ng systemJ and to exam1ne 1ts role 1n the 
development of money market. 
I 
The ma1n features of the bank1ng pol1cy of the State 
Bank have been (l) to accept respons1b1l1ty for the act1ve promot1on 
of the bank1ng system, (2) to ensure that the predom1nant sect1on of 
the bank1ng structure 1s of local or1g1n, (3) to ensure that the 
expans1on of banks 1s controlled and orderly, (4) to fac1l1tate the 
consol1dat1on of bank1ng 1n a relat1vely small number of large 
1nst1tut1ons, and {5) to safeguard the soundness of the bank1ng 
system. 
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The Effect of Part~t~on on the Bank~ng System. 
The areas now const~tut~ng Pak~stan had a fa~rly well 
developed bank~ng system before Part~t~on. The bank~ng systemwas compr1sec 
of the Reserve Bank of Ind~a, wh~ch was the central monetary 
author~ty for und~v~ded Ind~a, commerc~al banks and ~nd~genous 
bankers and money-lenders. The commerc~al banks could be d~v~ded 
~nto two ma~n groups, namely scheduled banks and non-scheduled banks. 
The scheduled banks were those banks wh~ch had a pa~d-up cap~tal 
and reserves of Rs. 0.5 m~ll~on or more and were 1ncluded ~n the 
Second Schedule of the Reserve Bank of Ind~a Act, 1934 Pr~or to 
Independence, the number of scheduled banks operat~ng ~n terr~tor~es 
1 
now compr~s~ng Pak~stan was 46 w1th as many as 631 off~ces Of 
2 
these seven were exchange banks w~th a total number of 19 off~ces. 
As regards non-scheduled banks, although the number of the~r off~ces 
at 704 stood h~gher compared to scheduled banks' off~ces, the~r 
depos~ts and loans and advances were only a small fract~on of the 
3 
total advances and depos~ts. The scheduled banks were heav~ly 
1. The State Bank of Pak1stan - Its Growth 1 Funct~ons and 
Organ~sat~on, Karach~, p.2. 
2 The term "exchange banks" owes ~ts or~g~n to the fact that fore~gn 
banks ~n the Indo-Pak sub-cont~nent were, pr~or to Independence, 
engaged pr~mar~ly ~n the f~nanc~ng of fore~gn trade and as such 
part~c~pated largely ~n fore~gn exchange bus~ness. 
3. S.A. Meena~, Bank~ng System of Pak~stan, State Bank Press, Karach~, 
1964, p.l5. 
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concentrated 1n larger c1t1es and were cater1ng to the cred1t 
requ1rements of only b1g and we11-establ1shed bus1ness concerns 
Farmers, who form more than 75 per cent of the work1ng populat1on 
and small bus1nesmen and manufacturers~ rural as well as urban, 
had no access to the bank1ng fac1l1t1es. Thus the burden of meet1ng 
the cred1t needs of the overwhelm1ngly large proport1on of the 
populat1on of the area was be1ng shouldered by the 1nd1genous bankers 
and money-lenders who, accord1ng to one est1mate, were f1nanc1ng 
1 
nearly 90 per cent of Ind1a 1 s 1nternal trade They were also 
2 
supply1ng as much as 70 per cent of rural cred1t 1n Ind1a Moreover, 
through the med1at1on o£ 1nd1genous banks, the commerc1al bank 
cred1t was percolat1ng among the small traders to the extent that 
the commerc1al banks were prepared to sanct1on l1m1ts to the 
1nd1genous bankers to d1scount the1r 1 hund1s' or 1nd1genous 1nternal 
b1lls of exchange 
The commerc1al banks 1n these areas had two pr1nc1pal 
features F1rstly, they were geared to meet almost exclus1vely the 
cred1t needs of commerce. Th1s was ow1ng to the fact that the 
economy of these reg1ons was pr1mar1ly agr1cultural and export 
1. W1lson, J.S.G., "The Bus1ness of Bank1ng 1n Ind1a" 1n R s. Sayers 
(ed ) Bank1ng 1n the Br1t1sh Commonwealth, Oxford Un1vers1ty Press 
1952, p.l77. 
2. Report of the Comm1ttee of D1rect1on 
Survey, Vol.II, 1954. 
All Ind1a Rural Cred1t 
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or1ented even by sub-cont1nental standards. Thus banks serv1ng 
them could do no more than f1nance the seasonal flow of food and 
raw mater1als to larger c1t1es and ports The exchange banks had 
1 
the monopoly of f1nanc1ng fore1gn trade wh1le Ind1an banks were 
concentrat1ng on 1nternal trade Secondly, the bank1ng bus1ness 
was almost ent1rely 1n the hands of H1ndus and Europeans Of the 
39 Ind1an scheduled banks operat1ng 1n these reg1ons before 
part1t1on, all, except one small bank, were owned, managed and manned 
by H1ndus. As these non-Musllms were dom1nat1ng 1n commerce, they 
also f1gured prom1nently as borrowers and depos1tors of the bank1ng 
system. 
Th1s bank1ng system wh1ch Pak1stan 1nher1ted v1rtually 
collapsed JUSt after Independence. It was attr1butable to the fact 
that the H1ndus~ who had a monopoly of bank1ng bus1ness~ m1grated en 
masse to Ind1a due to country-w1de communal r1ots and bloodshed of an 
1ntens1ty and character almost unparalleled 1n h1story. Th1s 
resulted 1n large-scale closure of bank off1ces and a transfer of 
funds to Ind1a By the end of June, 1948, the number of scheduled 
banks operat1ng 1n Pak1stan had decl1ned from 46 to 38 and the number 
of the1r off1ces was sharply reduced from 631 to 195. Of these, two 
were Pak1stan1 banks w1th 25 off1ces, 7 exchange banks w1th 19 off1ces, 
1. Banks w1th head off1ce 1n Ind1a and owned and managed by 
H1ndus. 
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1 
and 29 Ind~an banks w~th 151 off~ces Most of these Ind~an 
scheduled banks were funct~on~ng ~n name only pend~ng the w~nd~ng 
up of the~r bus~ness ~n Pak~stan. Th~s ~s ev~dent from the fact 
that dur~ng the per~od from July, 1948, to June, 1952, as many as 
2 16 Ind~an banks w~thdrew from Pak~stan. The number of non-
scheduled bank off~ces has decl~ned stead~ly over the years from 
704 before part~t~on to 30 ~n 1966. The~r share ~n total bank 
advances and depos~ts ~s now JUSt a fract~on of one per cent. W~th 
the exodus of H~ndus, the ~nd~genous banker and money-lender has 
become almost completely ext~nct ~n Pak~stan. Accord~ng to 
d~fferent surveys ~n Pak~stan, the money-lenders' share ~n the 
supply of cred~t ~n rural areas ranged between 1.3 per cent and 8.9 
3 per cent only compared to 70 per cent ~n Ind~a. Th~s shows that the 
only sector, v~z. commerce, for wh~ch cred~t fac~l~t~es were 
ava~lable before part~t~on were also d~srupted. There were no 
~nst~tut~ons to meet the cred~t requ~rements of ~ndustry and 
agr~culture. 
In order to meet the s~tuat~on dep~cted above, the State 
Bank f~rst of all offered a morator~um of three months to every 
1. The State Bank of Pak~stan, Twelve Years of Bank~ng ~n Pak~stan, 
Karach~, 1960 1 p.3. 
2. The State Bank of Pak~stan, Annual Reports, 1948-52. 
3. Board of Econom~c Inqu~ry, PunJab, Report on the Need and Supply of 
Cred~t ~n the Rural Areas of PunJab, Publ~cat~on No.lOl, Lahore, 
1951, Soc~o-Econom~c Survey Board, Dacca Un~vers~ty "Rural Cred~t 
and Unemployment ~n East Pak~stan 1956". 
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commerc1al bank wh1ch needed protect1on on account of pan1cky 
w1thdrawal of depos1ts. Secondly, through an Inter-Dom1n1on 
Agreement on Bank1ng of Apr1l, 1949, the State Bank tr1ed to 
safeguard the 1nterests of Pak1stan1 depos1tors hav1ng accounts w1th 
1 
the branches of Ind1an banks, wh1ch were rap1dly clos1ng down. 
Under th1s Agreement an Inter-Dom1n1on Comm1ttee was formed to 
fac1l1tate (a) the transfer and payment of the bank depos1ts of 
the persons who had m1grated from one country to the other, 
(b) orderly w1thdraw1ng of banks from Pak1stan 1 and (c) to exchange 
1nformat1on regard1ng 1nact1ve depos1t accounts w1th banks to 
fac1l1tate the trac1ng of the depos1tors or the1r successors. The 
commerc1al banks 1n Pak1stan were allowed to close the1r bus1ness and 
rem1t the1r surplus funds prov1ded they depos1ted the equ1valent 
of the1r outstand1ng l1ab1l1t1es 1n Pak1stan w1th another bank approved 
by the State Bank. 
These were Just emergency measures. As a f1rst pos~t1ve 
step towards the rehab1l1tat1on and expans1on of bank1ng serv1ces, the 
State Bank, w1th1n one month of 1ts establ1shment, sponsored a 
tra1n1ng scheme to 1mpart an 1ntens1ve course of theoret1cal and 
pract1cal tra1n1ng 1n commerc1al bank1ng to 100 un1vers1ty graduates. 
1. The State Bank of Pak1stan, Annual Reports 1949, pp.23-26, 
1950, p.22. 
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The scheme has been repeated almost every year. The State Bank 
gave 1t f1rst pr1or1ty because 1t real1sed that the shortage of 
traJned personnel was the most ser1ous bottleneck hold1ng up the 
growth of bank1ng. An Inst1tute of Bankers was establ1shed 1n 
1951 to 1mprove the operat1onal eff1c1ency of the commerc1al 
bank1ng system and to prov1de better fac1l1t1es for tra1n1ng and 
educat1on 1n bank1ng to the 1n-serv1ce personnel. In 1959, two 
B~nkers' Tra1n1ng Inst1tutes were set up, one 1n each w1ng of 
the country The result of these measures was that by 1953 the 
"shortage of tra1ned men, except 1n the h1gher grades, was no 
l longer a bottleneck". 
The second step taken to expand bank1ng fac1l1t1es was 
to sponsor a scheme for sett1ng up of a commerc1al bank w1th 
government part1c1pat1on 1n 1ts share cap1tal. The need for a state 
2 
sector 1n commerc1al bank1ng was recogn1sed from the outset. It 
was felt that w1th all the encouragement from the State Bank the pace 
of growth of pr1vate banks would not be adequate. The pr1vate 
commerc1al banks, wh1ch are run str1ctly on cons1derat1ons of 
prof1tab1l1ty, would not f1nd 1t prof1table to open branches 1n 
smaller towns due to low depos1t potent1al and the 1nab1l1ty of 
1. The address of Governor, The State Bank of Pak1stan, to Rotary 
Club, Karach1, January, 1953 
2 Annual Speech of the Governor, The State Bank of Pak1stan, 
September, 1950, p.B. 
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borrowers to offer acceptable secur1ty. Moreover, the State Bank 
wanted a Pak1stan1 bank wh1ch should be able to take up 1ts agency 
funct1ons from the Imper1al Bank of Ind1a. These cond1t1ons 
warranted the establ1shment of a bank w1th a truly nat1onal outlook 
and wh1ch could take up and preserve a bold programme of branch 
expans1on relat1vely un1nfluenced by cons1derat1ons of 1mmed1ate ga1n 
or loss. The const1tut1on of the State Bank d1d not allow 1t to 
contr1bute d1rectly to the share cap1tal of the new 1nst1tut1on On 
the request of the State Bank, the government agreed to lend 1ts 
support to the promot1on of a pr1vate shareholders' bank w1th at 
least 25 per cent government part1c1pat1on 1n 1ts share cap1tal The 
Nat1onal Bank of Pak1stan was establ1shed by Ord1nance on November 
8th, 1949, and 1s now the largest bank 1n the country 
More recently, 1t became apparent that certa1n reg1ons 
cont1nued to suffer from a relat1ve 1nadequacy of bank off1ces S1nce 
the go~ernment placed h1gh pr1or1ty on the balanced reg1onal 
econom1c growth, the Plann1ng Board 1n the F1rst Flve-Year Plan 
recommended that the State Bank, 1n collaborat1on w1th the lead1ng 
Pak1stan1 banks, should sponsor the organ1sat1on of reg1onal banks 
It was suggested that the State Bank should prov1de not only techn1cal 
gu1dance and a few exper1enced off1cers, but also a part of the 
l 
cap1tal of the new banks. The State Bank accepted th1s proposal and 
1. Plann1ng Commlsslon, The Government of Pak1stan, The F1rst Flve-
Year Plan (1955-60), 1957, p.l6l 
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at 1ts request the government amended the State Bank of Pak1stan 
Act, 1956, 1n February, 1959, to enable the Bank to subscr1be to 
the share cap1tal of a bank1ng company establ1shed for the purpose 
of promot1ng agr1cultural or 1ndustr1al development 1n the country. 
Under th1s power, the Bank helped 1n the sett1ng up of a reg1onal 
bank 1n East Pak1stan, namely the Eastern Mercant1le Bank. 
As an 1ntegral part of 1ts developmental act1v1ty, the 
State Bank, 1n collaborat1on w1th the scheduled banks, has set up a 
Bank1ng Publ1c1ty Board to popul~r1se bank1ng hab1t and sav1ng 
amongst the masses The State Bank also prov1des rem1ttance and 
clear1ng fac1l1t1es to the banks. The rem1ttance fac1l1t1es are 
1mportant because a two-way flow of funds between metropol1tan and 
small centres ensures the 1ntegrat1on of small cred1t outlets w1th the 
ma1n channels of funds thereby develop1ng a truly country-w1de money 
market 
It 1s ev1dent from Table 3-l that due to the State Bank's 
effort and the 1n1t1at1ve of the Pak1stan1 enterpr1se, the commerc1al 
banks have not only recovered from the earl1er setback but have made 
rap1d progress 1n recent years The number of banks operat1ng 1n 
1966 was st1ll below that 1n 1948 Over th1s per1od 12 Pak1stan1 banks 
were establ1shed and 4 new exchange banks opened the1r off1ces 1n 
Pak1stan. Th1s was, however, more than balanced by the w1thdrawal of 
20 Ind1an banks. At present although there are only 34 banks operat1ng 
TABLE 3-l Growth of Commerc1al Banks 1n Pak1stan 
Per1od No of No. of Populat1on Bank Depos1ts 
End-June Banks Bank per Bank (General) 
Off1ces Ofhce (In 
* thousands) Per Off1ce Percent 
(M1ll1on of G.N.P. 
Rs). at Current 
Factor 
Cost 
1948 38 195 J83 4.52 5.6 
1955 32 251 352 7.13 8.0 
1960 28 407 243 7.23 9.0 
1965 34 1,470 76 4.68 14.3 
1966 34 1,846 63 4.33 14.6 
--- L---- L.....- -------- ------------
Source (1) The State Bank of Pak1stan 
(a) Annual Reports on Currency and F1nance 
(b) Annual Bank1ng Stat1st1cs of Pak1stan 
(11) Government of Pak1stan, Econom1c Survey, 1965-66. 
Bank Cred1t 
* Per Off1ce Percent 
(M1ll1on of G.N P. 
Rs). at Current 
Factor 
Cost 
l.Ol 2.4 
3.52 4 3 
3.97 4.9 
4.34 12.7 
3.57 13.1 
- - - - -
* The f1gures of bank depos1ts and bank cred1t used 1n these columns are weekly averages of the 
f1scal year, July-June. The percentage f1gures 1n the f1rst two relate to the year 1949-50, 
as the f1gures of G.N.P. before th1s are not ava1lable. 
...:J 
...... 
- 72 -
compared to 46 1n the pre-part1t1on per1od, the number of bank 
off1ces has gone up almost three t1mes There 1s now one bank off1ce 
per 63 thousand persons as aga1nst one bank off1ce for every 383 
thousand persons 1n 1948 and 114 thousand persons before Independence. 
At the same t1me, the bank1ng bus1ness has 1ncreased substant1ally. 
One po1nter to the growth 1n the bus1ness of commerc1al banks 1s the 
r1se 1n the rat1o of bank depos1ts and bank cred1t to gross nat1onal 
product at current factor cost Both rat1os 1ncreased from 5 6 per 
cent and 2.4 per cent 1n 1949-50 to 14 6 per cent and 13 l per cent 
respect1vely dur1ng 1965-66. The bus1ness per bank off1ce, however, 
has tended to decl1ne recently. 
2 State Bank's Emphas1s on Promot1ng Pak1stan1 Banks 
In 1950, the State Bank dec1ded to restr1ct the open1ng 
of new branches of fore1gn banks only to port towns or larger c1t1es 
where substant1al fore1gn trade was carr1ed on. In the 1nter1or of 
the country only Pak1stan1 banks were allowed to open branches The 
creat1on of th1s monopoly was, of course, d1scr1m1natory, but 1n th1s 
Pak1stan 1s not un1que. In the Un1ted States, for 1nstance, fore1gn 
banks are not allowed to accept depos1ts and have to conf1ne the1r 
1 
act1v1t1es to fore1gn exchange only, and d1scr1m1nat1on aga1nst 
1. The Annual Speech of Governor, The State Bank of Pak1stan, 
September, 1951, pp 9-10 
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1 fore1gn banks 1s to be found 1n Ceylon and Ghana, amongst others. 
The JUSt1f1cat1on for dlscr1m1nat1on 1s that 1t lS often 
alleged that fore1gn banks 1n underdeveloped countr1es concentrate 
excessu.oely on f1nanc1ng fore1gn trade and "expatr1ate 1ndustr1es" and 
neglect local 1ndustry and agr1culture, that they JUdge worth1ness 
by cr1ter1a wh1ch may be appropr1ate to the metropol1tate countr1es 
but wh1ch when appl1ed to underdeveloped countr1es retard the process 
of econom1c development, and that w1th access to funds from parent 
2 
off1ces, they are less amenable to control by the central bank 
The State Bank restr1cted the expans1on of off1ces of 
fore1gn banks 1n the 1nter1or to shelter Pak1stan1 banks from more 
powerful compet1tors w1th super1or management and organ1sat1on, and 
because Pak1stan1 nat1onals had very l1ttle chance to occupy key 
posts 1n fore1gn banks As the pol1c1es of banks exert a strong 
1nfluence on the economy, 1t was thought necessary to ensure that these 
pol1c1es rema1n 1n the hands of Pak1stan1 nat1onals Th1s exped1ent 
seemed preferable to that the alternat1ve of obl1g1ng fore1gn banks to 
employ local people 1n key posts It was also thought that wh1lst 
Pak1stan banks would of course also want to max1m1se the1r prof1ts, 
1n the1r case the prof1t mot1ve m1ght be tempered by sent1ments of 
3 patr10t1sm 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Cr1ck, W.F., (ed.), Commonwealth Bank1ng Systems, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1965, p 35 
2 Nev1n, E , Cap1tal Funds 1n Underdeveloped Countr1es, Macm1llan and 
Co , London, pp 45-56, and references there1n 
3. The Annual Speech of the Governor, State Bank of Pak1stan, 
September 1951. 
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Let us now exam~ne the effect of State Bank's pol~c~es on 
the structure of bank~ng ~n Pak~stan. The Ind~an banks rema~ned 
dom~nant for some t~me after Part~t~on ~n sp~te of the w~thdrawal of 
a numher of these banks from Pak~stan. At the end of 1948, they st~ll 
held 40 per cent of total depos~ts and were respons~ble for 64 per 
cent of total bank cred~t. The~r share ~n the total bank~ng bus~ness 
has decl~ned stead~ly and ~n December 1965 they accounted for only 
1.7 per cent of total depos~ts and less than one per cent of bank 
cred~t. The ma~n reason for the~r decl~ne, apart from the stra~ned 
pol~t~cal relat~ons between Ind~a and Pak~stan ~s that s~nce the~r 
bus~ness was conf~ned ent~rely to f~nanc~ng trade w~th Ind~a, the 
drast~c decl~ne of th~s trade s~nce 1949 removed most of the~r bus~ness 
An analys~s of the~r balance sheets as at the end of December, 1965, 
shows that the cash ~n t~lls and balances w~th the State Bank of 
Pak~stan formed 25 8 per cent of the~r depos~ts l~ab~l~t~es. Th~s ~s 
too h~gh a rat~o by any conservat~ve standard of l~qu~d~ty The 
cred~t-depos~t rat~o of these banks was as low as 44 5 per cent 
The number of exchange banks has gone up from 7 ~n 1948, 
~ostly of Br~t~sh or~g~n, to 11 banks from s~x d~fferent countr~es ~n 
1966 Th~s reflects the d~vers~f~cat~on of trade and f~nanc~al 
relat~ons of Pak~stan Some of the exchange banks of Br~t~sh or~g~n 
were merged on account of grow~ng compet~t~on from local and other 
banks. The Nat~onal Bank of Ind~a and the Gr~ndlays Bank were merged 
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1n 1958 and the new Nat1onal and Gr1ndlays Bank absorbed Lloyds Bank 
1n 1961. In July, 1948, fore1gn banks were respons1ble for 31 per 
cent of total deposlt llabllltles and they accounted for 17 per cent 
of total bank cred1t, 1 e. advances and bllls purchased and 
d1scounted By January 1, 1960, thelr share 1n total bank cred1t had 
1ncreased to 28 per cent and 1n bank depos1ts 1t had decl1ned to 28 
per cent In subsequent years, although the1r buslness reg1stered 
substant1al 1ncrease 1n absolute terms, the proport1on of both the1r 
depos1ts and cred1t to the total bank depos1ts and cred1t decl1ned to 
14 1 per cent by the end of December, 1965 
In th1s group, Br1t1sh banks account for 59.4 per cent 
of depos1ts and 70 per cent of bank cred1t and the share of Amer1can 
banks comes to 36.5 per cent and 20.3 per cent respect1vely The 
depos1ts of Amer1can banks have 1ncreased sharply by v1rtue of transfer 
of u.s owned counterpart funds from the State Bank to them. The 
growth 1n the1r cred1t operat1ons has not been commensurate as they 
are relat1vely new entrants and have not been able to form w1de 
connect1ons w1th the bus1ness and 1ndustr1al commun1t1es. Most of the1r 
funds they lend to other banks 1n the lnter-bank call money market 
The balance sheets of Amer1can Express Inc and the F1rst Nat1onal 
Clty Bank for December 1965 reveal that the balances w1th other banks 
were 41 2 per cent of thelr depos1t l1ab1l1t1es On the other hand, 
the1r cred1t-depos1t rat1o was as low as 38.3 per cent The ma1n 
borrowers 1n the 1nter-bank call money market are Br1t1sh banks. The1r 
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borrow~ngs from banks were 42.3 per cent of the~r depos~t 
l~ab~l~t~es ~n December 1965. Th~s enabled them to ma~nta~n cred~t" 
depos~t rat~o at 110 per cent. 
The fore~gn banks have, to a great extent, held the~r 
f1eld 1n the face of 1ncreas1ng compet1t~on from Pak1stan~ banks and 
the adverse effect on the~r growth of the State Bank's restr1ct~on on 
open1ng of branches They have lost relat~vely more depos~tors than 
borrowers F~rstly, th1s ~s because the "number of domest~c branches 
1 1s less 1mportant cr1ter1on to bank borrowers than to depos~tors". 
Secondly, and more 1mportant, the fore1gn banks have rad1cally 
1ncreased the scope of the1r bus1ness. Table 3-2 below reveals that 
the share of non-trade sectors 1n total advances has 1ncreased 
rap1dly over the years The second more 1nterest1ng feature 1s that 
the rat1o of advances to non-trade sectors to total advances 1s h1gher 
1n the case of fore1gn banks than for the Pak1stan1 banks. 
The Pak1stan1 banks have moved fast from a small segment 
to a dom1nant force 1n the bank1ng system of the country At the end 
of 1948 1 they accounted for only 29 per cent of total depos1ts and 
the1r share 1n total bank cred1t at the end of 1949 was hardly 19 per 
cent On December 18, 1959, they held 62 per cent of total bank 
depos1ts and were respons1ble for 63 per cent of total bank cred1t. 
1. Porter, R.C., "L1qu1d1ty and Lend~ng The Volume of Bank Cred1t 
1n Pak1stan, The Inst1tute of Development Econom1cs, Karach1, 
1963, p.40 
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TABLE 3-2 Class1f1cat1on of Advances of Pak1stan1 
and Fore1gn Banks by Econom1c Groups 
(Per cent) 
Pak1stan1 Banks Fore1gn Banks 
1953 1966 1953 1966 
1. Agr1culture 31.47 2 38 10.53 1.13 
2 M1n1ng and Quarry1ng 
-
0 29 - 1.37 
3 Manufactur1ng 23 28 39.02 9 21 37.18 
4. Construct1on 0 43 1.28 1.97 8.60 
5 Electr1c1ty, Gas, Water 
and san1tary Serv1ces 0.43 0.49 - 0.09 
6 Commerce 29 74 40.61 65.13 33 78 
7. Transport, Storage and 
Commun1cat1ons 0.43 2 79 5 92 1.03 
B. Serv1ces 6 90 7.01 4.61 8.85 
9. Others 7.33 6.14 2 63 7 95 
10. Total 100.00 100.00 100 00 100.00 
Source State Bank Bank1ng Stat1st1cs of Pak1stan 
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By the end of December, 1965, the1r share 1n total bank cred1t had 
1ncreased to 85 per cent and 1n total bank depos1ts to 84 2 per 
cent. The1r cred1t-depos1t rat1o at the end of December 1965 wab 
80.7 per cent. The pos1t1on of 1nd1v1dual banks, however, var1ed 
greatly. In the last three years, the rat1o of advances to depos1ts 
for all banks has swung ma1nly between 80 and 90 per cent w1th an 
average seasonal var1at1on of about 10 percentage po1nts. Table 3-3 
g1ves the summary of the structure of the bank1ng system at the end 
of December, 1965 
3 Planned and Orderly Growth of Banks 
The State Bank has prevented the open1ng of weak 
1nst1tut1ons as 1t 1s consulted by the Controller of Cap1tal Issues 
before sanct1on 1s granted for the 1ssue of cap1tal to any bank1ng 
company At the same t1me, the approval of the Bank 1s needed before 
banks are amalgamated or w1nd up the1r bus1ness Moreover, all banks 
need the State Bank's perm1ss1on to open a new branch or to change 
the locat1on of an ex1st1ng branch. Before perm1tt1ng a bank to open 
a new branch, the State Bank carefully exam1nes the cond1t1on of 1ts 
f1nances, the general character of 1ts management, the adequacy of 1ts 
cap1tal structure, the earn1ng prospects and the publ1c 1nterest 
l1kely to be served by the branch. Secondly, 1t 1s 1ntended to 
encourage banks to spread 1nto the 1nter1or of the country and to 
TABLE 3-3. Structure of Commerc~al Banks ~n Pak~stan. 
(Rs. ~n m~11~on). 
Total Pak~stan~ (2) as Fore~gn (4) as Ind~an 
Banks % of Banks % of Banks 
(1) (1) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) {5) (6) 
1. Number of Banks. 34 14 41.2 11 32.4 9 
2 Number of Bank 1,846 1,774 96.1 39 2 1 33 Off~ces 
3. Depos~ts 7,887 6,639 84.2 1,116 14.1 132 
4. Cash ~n t~lls and 
Balances, w~th 929 803 86 4 92 9.9 34 
State Bank. 
5. Advances. 5,807 4,933 85.0 820 14.1 54 
6 B~1ls Purchased and 
D~scounted. 497 426 85.7 66 13.3 5 
7. Investment. 1,913 1,653 86.4 237 12.4 24 
8. Cap~tal & Reserves. N.A 262 - N.A. - N.A. 
Rit~o of 
9. (4) to (3) 11.8 12.1 8 3 
110 (5 + 6) to (3) 80 0 80 7 79.4 
,11. (7) to (3) 24 3 24.9 21.2 
12 (8) to (3) N.A. 3 9 N A. 
Source State Bank of Pak~stan - Annual Bank~ng Stat~st~cs of Pak~stan. 
(6) as 
% of 
(1) 
(7) 
26 4 
1.8 
1.7 
3.7 
0.9 
1.0 
1.2 
-
25.8 
44 5 
17.8 
N.A 
I 
...,J 
(.0 
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d~scourage over concentrat~on of bank off~ces ~n b~g c~t~es For 
th~s purpose, the Bank has la~d down that for every new branch ~n 
a b~g c~ty, bank should open two off~ces ~n smaller towns. As a 
result, the number of places served by scheduled banks has ~ncreased 
from 90 ~n June, 1957 to 449 ~n June, 1966 
Why have banks been so reluctant unt~l recently to open 
off~ces away from the b~g c~t~es ? F~rst, because, accord~ng to 
banks, there ~s l~ttle commerce to be f~nanced ~n small towns and 
rural areas and most farmers and small traders are ~nsuff~c~ently 
cred~t-worthy to be el~g~ble for loans, so that the ma~n form of 
bus~ness ~s to attract depos~ts. But to mob~l~se depos~ts ~n these 
areas ~s costly ~f only because poor commun~cat~ons make the movement 
of cash to far off off~ces an expens~ve bus~ness. The alternat~ve 
~s to leave the cash where ~t ~s depos~ted, but then ~t earns noth~ng. 
Secondly, the farmers are l~kely to show ~nterest ~n only depos~t 
and sav~ng accounts As a cons~derable port~on of farmers' money 
~ncome ~s concentrated ~n the cash crop harvest~ng season, one would 
expect a part of the average farmer's sav~ng depos~ts to cons~st of 
transact~on balances Th~s ~mpl~es that a bank~ng off~ce~rv~ng a 
rural commun~ty would requ~re large cash resources relat~ve to depos~t 
l~ab~l~t~es on wh~ch the bank would have to pay ~nterest. 
These factors are los~ng force gradually New ~ndustr~al 
and commerc~al centres are emerg~ng ~n the ~nter~or of the country 
TABLE 3-4. Receipts, Disbursemh:jl; li. and.Lt 
i~.f:i~~ttan, 
End-June 
1953 
1960 
1965 
Capital 
and 
Reserves 
48.5 
149.4 
225.2 
Receipts 
Tota"l 
34.6 
473.2 
Interest 
and 
Conun-
ission 
etc. 
33.7 
Disburse 
Total 
22.7 
73 .. 9 
387 .. -l 
Source: The State Bank of Pakistan, Banking Statistics 
Pakistan, 1948-57 1 1960-61 and 1965~66. 
lo The table excludes the Industrial Development Bank of 
Pakistan and the Agricultural Development Bank of 
Pakistan. 
Profits of Scheduled Banks 1 
I 
Profits 
Percent Percent 
of of 
Amount Capital Total 
and Dis bur-
Reserves sement 
ll.9 24.5 52.4 
34.8 23 .. 3 47.1 
86.,1 38.2 22.5 
(Rs. in million). 
I 
oreign Banks 
Receipts Disbursements Profits 
Interest Interest Per-
Co nun- Conuni- Work- cent 
Total iss ion ',Total ssion ing Total of 
etc. etc. Total 
Paid Expen- Disbu-
ses. 
rseme-
nts. 
35.2 34.1 29.8 9.7 18.7 5.4 18.1 
72 .. 8 70.6 56.,9 26 .. 3 27 .. 1 15.9 28 .. 0 
120.,9 ll7.0 .105.,9 58.,6 41.8 15.,0 14.2 
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The State Bank has set up an eff1c1ent and cheap system of rem1ttance 
The banks have come under 1ncreas1ng pressure of 
demand for bank cred1t so that they seem to be more 1ncl1ned to 
venture 1nto new areas 1n search of loanable funds. It 1s ev1dent 
from table 3-5, that although the average per off1ce depos1ts are 
much lower 1n small towns, they have 1n total 1ncreased from ll 7 per 
cent of total depos1ts 1n June, 1962 to 20 3 per cent 1n June, 1966 
Over the same per1od, the number of depos1t accounts 1n smaller towns 
has gone up from 188,253 to 1,004,811 and the1r share 1n total 
depos1t accounts has 1ncreased from 22 9 per cent to 36 3 per cent 
The bulk of the depos1ts mob1l1sed 1n these areas 1s s1phoned off to 
large c1t1es, a feature wh1ch w1ll be d1scussed 1n more deta1l later 
Here we exam1ne only the effect of branch expans1on on the 
prof1tab1l1ty of the bank1ng system.~ 
Table no 3=4 g1ves the summary of rece1pts, d1sbursements 
and net prof1ts of the scheduled banks by the nat1onal1ty of the 
banks. It shows that the prof1ts of Pak1stan1 banks have gone up not 
only 1n absolute amount, but the annual rate of 1ncrease has also 
accelerated from 27.5 per cent dur1ng 1953-60 to 29.5 per cent 1n 
1960-65 On the other hand, the prof1ts of fore1gn banks reg1stered 
a decl1ne 1n the second per1od. Secondly, the rat1o of prof1ts to 
cap1tal and reserves 1n the case of Pak1stan1 banks has recorded a 
substant1al 1ncrease 1n the latter per1od as aga1nst a decl1ne 1n the 
former per1od The compar1son of prof1ts of fore1gn and Pak1stan1 
TABLE 3 ... 5. The Distribution of Bank Offices, Bank Dep+its and Bank Advances by Cities. 
! 
j_ 30tlt June...t. I 1962. 
-City Bank Bank Deposits Bank Advance~ 
Offices Amount Per Percent Amount 
Office of Total 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Karachi 102 1630.5 15.99 44.32 1,075.5 
Lahore 57 442.,0 7.75 12.01 404.1 
Dacca 31 285.1 9.20 7.,75 308.4 
Chittagong 29 246.6 8.50 6.70 166.7 
Rawalpindi 17 149.9 8.,82 4.07 31.0 
Lya11pur 12 77.,9 6.49 2.12 91.6 
Hyderabad 12 71.5 5.96 1.94 51.0 
Narayangarij 12 53.6 4.47 1.46 6R,5 
Multan 14 50.,3 3.57 1.37 49.1 
Peshawar 13 47.7 3.67 1.30 29.9 
Khu1na 10 36.4 3.64 0.99 18.1 
Sargotha 7 31.,4 4.49 0.85 16.,4 
Gujranuz1a: 8 26.8 3.35 0.,73 16.7 
Sia1kot I 5 26.8 5.36 0.,73 8.7 
Quetta 6 26.5 4.42 0.72 5.,4 
Sukkar 6 22.,5 i 3.75 0.61 9.0 
Montgomery 5 22.3 4.46 Oo61 1b.4 
Sub-Total 346 3247.8 9.39 88.28 2361.5 
Rest 273 431.2 1.58 11.72 231.2 
' 
Total 619 3679.0 I 5.94 100.00 2592.7 
Source: State Bank of Pak~stan - (Quarterly) Stat~st~cs ~n 
Scheduled Banks in Pakistan. 
I Per Percent 
Of fica qi Total 
(6) I (7) 
I 
10.54 41.48 
7.09 15.59 
9.95 11.89 
5.,75 6.43 
1.82 1.20 
7.63 3.53 
4.25 1.97 
5.,71 2.64 
3.51 1.89 
2.30 1.15 
1.81 0.70 
2.34 o.63 
2.09 0.64: 
1.74 0.34: 
0.,90 0.21 
1.50 
i 
o.35 
I 
2.,28 0.44 
6.83 i 91.08 
I 
0.85 I 8.92 
4.19 I il:_oo.oo 
I 
Bank Bank Deposits 
Offices Amount Per 
Office 
(8) (9) (10) 
226 2,667.6 11.80 
113 1,091.7 9.66 
97 261.5 8.,88 
73 457.8 6.,27 
36 383.4 10.65 
30 204.0 6.80 
36 108.4 3.01 
25 92.,2 3.69 
29 102.,8 3.54 
27 106.4 3.94 
19 85.3 4.49 
11 62.1 5.65 
9 64.4 7.16 
12 68.5 5.71 
13 58.2 4.,48 
12 39.6 3.30 
8 44.0 5.50 
776 6497.9 8.37 
1070 1651.7 1.54 
1846 8149.6 4.41 
( Rs. in million • ) 
30th June__J_ 1966. 
Bank Advances 
Percent Amount Per Percent 
of Total Office of Total 
(11) (12) (13) (14) 
! 
32.,73 2,432.1 10.76 38.51 
I 
13.40 760.~ 6.,73 12.04 
I 19.,24 10.57 1,215.t 12.53 
,, 
5.,62 363.f 4.98 5.75 
4.70 
I 
103.t 2.86 1.63 
2.50 135.T 4.52 2.15 
1.33 83.~ 2.31 1.31 
1.13 133.,t 5.33 2.11 
1.26 74.,f 2.58 1.18 
1.30 54.7 2.03 0.87 " 
1.,05 70.$ 3.68 1.11 
0.76 26. 2.42 0.42 
0.79 40. 4.53 0.64 
0.84 24.~ 2.,02 0.38 
I 0.,71 30.f 2.35 0.,49 
0.,49 llof 0.97 0.,18 
0.54 29.~ 3.,69 0.47 
79.74 5589.p 7.20 88.49 
20.26 727. 0.68 11.51 
100.00 6316.? 3.42 100.00 
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banks 1eveals that the prof~ts of the latter have not been affected 
adversely by the open~ng of branches ~n rural areas. Secondly, ~n 
the case of Pak~stan~ banks, the open~ng of a far larger number of 
off~ces ~n rural areas dur~ng 1960-65 compared to the earl~er per~od 
has not affected the rate of growth of the~r prof~ts. Th~s ~s 
partly because the banks are not s~mply 1ntermed~ar~es wh~ch collect 
loanable funds and lend them to other part~es They create cred~t as 
well. By open~ng off~ces and offer~ng h~gher rates on depos~ts 7 the 
banks have succeeded ~n reduc~ng the rat~o of currency ~n c~rculat~on 
to money supply wh~ch has enabled them to bu~ld a larger pyram~d of 
earn~ng assets on a g~ven cash base. 
However, the rat~o of prof~ts to total d~sbursements ~n 
the case of both Pak~stan~ and fore~gn banks has gone down 
s~gn~f~cantly over the last f~ve years. Th~s ~s due to a sharp 
~ncrease ~n d~sbursements. The ~ncrease ~n the1r d~sbursements ~s 
largely attr~butable to r~se ~n ~nterest payments wh1ch, ~n turn, have 
~ncreased due to r~se ~n depos~t rates and the sh~ft to t~me depos~ts. 
4. S~ze D~str~but~on of Pak~stan~ Banks 
The follow~ng analys~s of banks by s~ze ~s conf~ned to 
Pak~stan~ banks only Th~s ~s because the growth of fore~gn banks has 
been restr~cted to large c1t~es. The class1f~cat~on of banks by 
s~ze ~s based on the~r depos1t l~ab~l~t~es. Banks hav~ng depos~ts of 
less than Rs 50 m~ll~on have been class~f~ed as small. Those hav~ng 
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depos~ts of Rs 50 m~ll~on, but less than Rs 150 m~ll~on, are 
regarded as med~um-s~zed 1 and large-s~zed banks are those hav~ng 
depos~ts of Rs 150 m~ll~on and above. There ~s noth~ng sacrosanct 
about s~ze d~str~but~on of banks by amount of depos~ts. It could 
have been based as well on amount of cred~t or number of off~ces. 
Accord~ng to our class~f~cat~on f~ve banks fall ~n the category of 
small-s~zed banks, 3 are med~um-s~zed banks and 6 large-s~zed banks. 
Of the total number of 1,774 branches, large-s~zed banks account for 
1 1 604 off~ces, med~um-s~zed banks for 147 off~ces and small-s~zed 
banks for only 23 branches. 
Table No.3-6 below g~ves selected ~terns of the balance 
sheets of the three categor~es of banks as on December, 1965. It 
reveals, among others, the follow~ng po~nts (1) The small banks 
account for 2.1 per cent of depos~ts and 3.1 per cent of cred~t. If 
we exclude the PunJab Prov~nc~al Co-operat~ve Bank, the~r share ~n 
bus~ness comes to less than 1.5 per cent. At the other end of the 
scale, the large banks account for 92.3 per cent of depos~ts, 91.5 
per cent of cred~t and 94.4 per cent of ~nvestments. (2) It shows 
that the class1f1cat~on of banks by s~ze on any bas1s 1s extremely 
arb~trary. W1th1n each group, every bank has such an 1nd1v~dual 
~dent1ty that ~t mer1ts separate treatment. For that reason, we have 
g~ven the pos1t~on of some ~nd1v~dual banks ~n the table. (3) The 
cash rat~o 1s h~ghest ~n the case of me~um-s1zed banks and lowest ~n 
the case of small banks, exclud1ng the PunJab Prov~nc~al Co-operat~ve 
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Bank. In v1ew of the1r small s1ze and of the fact that all of them 
are operat1ng 1n b1g c1t1es, presumably 1n compet1t1on w1th large 
banks, one would have expected them to have a h1gher cash rat1o than 
the large banks. One poss1ble explanat1on of the1r low cash rat1o 
1s that although they are operat1ng 1n large c1t1es, they do not 
compete w1th the large banks. The large banks' cr1ter1on of credJ.t-
worthJ.ness makes them reluctant to cater for small bus1ness wh1ch 
do not come up to the1r standard. They leave these "second-best" 
customers to the smaller banks. {4) The cap1tal base, 1.e. the 
rat1o of paJ.d-up cap1tal and reserves to depos1ts, 1s small 1n the 
case of large and medJ.um-sJ.zed banks. The pos1t1on of 1nd1V1dual 
banks var1es from the lowest level of 2.4 per cent for the Un1ted 
Bank Ltd. to 4.4 per cent for the Hab1b Bank Ltd. {5) A h1gh credJ.t-
deposJ.t rat1o for the Nat1onal Bank of Pak1stan shows 1ts 
aggress1ve cred1t pol1cy and the lowest cred1t-depos1t rat1o for the 
second b1ggest bank, v1z. Hab1b Bank, shows an extremely conservat1ve 
loans pol1cy. 
Among Pak1stan1 banks, the Nat1onal Bank of Pak1stan 
needs spec1al ment1on. It was establ1shed 1n November, 1949. It 
has a paJ.d-up cap1tal of Rs 30 m1111on, of wh1ch not less than 25 per 
cent 1s held by the central government. In1t1ally 1ts act1v1t1es 
were restr1cted to the task of f1nanc1ng the market1ng of JUte w1th 
the ass1stance of the State Bank, wh1ch stepped 1n under 1ts 
TABLE 3-6. Selected Items of the Balance Sheets of Pakistani Ban~s as on December 31, 1965. 
(Rs. in million). 
Large-Sized Banks I Smalll..Sized Banks 
All All All Excluding Punjab 
Pakistani Large- National Habib United Medium Small- Provincial 
Banks Sized Bank of li. Bank Bank Sized Sized Co ... operative 
·Banks Pakistan Ltd. Ltd. Banks Banks Bank Ltd. 
1. Capital and Reserves 262 224 73 88 27 15 24 5 
2. Deposits 6~638 6,127 1,989 it,974 1,155 374 138 92 
3o (a) 1,362 1,224 1,069 
-
108 45 93 7 Due to other Banks i 
4. Cash (net)(b) 656 567 195 ·154 lll 57 34 5 
5. Bank Credit 5,359 4,906 2,129 1,234 833 282 171 62 
(i) Advances 4,933 4~513 1,977 1,127 764 250 169 60 
(ii) Bills Purchased and 
Discounted 426 393 ~ 152 107 69 32 2 2 
6. Investments 1,653 1,561 643 538 202 67 25 15 
7. Ratio of Capital and 
Reserves to Deposits 3.9 3.6 3.6 4 .. 4 2.4 3.7 17.1 5.9 
8. Ratio of Inter-Bank 
Borrowing to Deposits 20.5 20.,0 53.7 
-
9.3 12.,0 67.4 7.,6 
9., Cash Ratio 9.,9 9.3 9.8 7.8 9.6 15.2 24.6 5.4 
10., Credit-Deposit Ratio 80.7 80.1 107.,0 62.5 72.1 75.4 123.,9 67.,4 
llo Investment Deposit Ratio 24.9 25.5 32.,3 27 .. 3 17.,5 17.9 18.1 16.3 
.'<) 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan - Banking Statistics (Annual), 1965-66. I 
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emergency powers to prov1de the necessary funds. The Jute trade 
1n East Pak1stan was fac1ng a cr1s1s due to the trade deadlock 
Wlth Ind1a. The Ind1an traders were not only the largest buyers 
of Jute, they were the ma1n suppl1ers of f1nance for the JUte trade 
as well. In the 1n1t1al stages the bank borrowed from the State 
Bank but soon afterwards 1t obta1ned cons1derable funds by way of 
f1xed depos1ts and lnter-bank call loans, wh1ch 1t was allowed to 
accept 1n sums of not less than Rs 0.1 m1ll1on 1n the former case, 
and Rs 2.5 m1ll1on 1n the latter. The Nat1onal Bank supported the 
Jute market by mak1ng d1rect advances to the purchas1ng agents of 
the Government Jute Board to the extent of Rs 40 m1ll1on and more 
effect1vely st1ll by overcom1ng through 1ts presence the hes1tat1on 
of other banks to make advances aga1nst Jute. In 1950 and 1951, 
the per1od of the Korean war boom and recess1on, 1t helped 1n the 
stab1l1sat1on of the cotton market 1n West Pak1stan by prov1d1ng 
75 per cent of the total cotton f1nance. After the trans1t1onal 
per1od, the Nat1onal Bank undertook all types of bank1ng bus1ness, 
1nclud1ng exchange bank1ng. Even now the maJor funct1on of the 
Nat1onal Bank cont1nues to be the f1nanc1ng of the cash crops and 
other agr1cultural commod1t1es. It has also undertaken spec1al 
f1nanc1ng operat1ons connected w1th government pr1ce support schemes 
and has also f1nanced the1r food procurement and stockp1l1ng 
programme. It extends cred1t fac1l1t1es to co-operat1ve soc1et1es 
1n order to ass1st the rural economy of the country. It Wlll help to 
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forge a l1nk between the co-operat1ve cred1t structure and the 
commerc1al bank1ng system. In 1ts role as a pace-setter, 1t has 
broken new ground 1n regard to cred1t to small borrowers. It 
started the People's Cred1t Scheme 1n January 1964 to prov1de 
cred1t fac1l1t1es to small traders and 1ndustr1al1sts. By the 
end of 1966, 1t had sanct1oned small loans amount1ng to Rs 325 
m1ll1on. In June, 1966, 1t had a network of 528 branches, 
account1ng for 28.7 per cent of the total branches of scheduled 
banks 1n the country. In December, 1965, 1t accounted for 25.2 
per cent of total scheduled bank depos1ts and 33.8 per cent of 
total bank cred1t. 
5. Regulat1on and Safeguard1ng the Soundness of the Bank1ng System. 
The State Bank has w1de powers under the State Bank of 
Pak1stan Act 1956 and the Bank1ng Compan1es Ord1nance !962 to ensure 
soundness of commerc1al bank1ng. The Bank keeps a close watch over 
the affa1rs of banks through per1od1cal returns and regular 
1nspect1ons. If the 1nspect1on report reveals an unsat1sfactory 
pos1t1on of the bus1ness of any bank, the State Bank has powers to 
depute 1ts off1cers to 1mprove the management of the bank or requ1re 
the bank to make necessary changes 1n 1ts management. It may 
proh1b1t the bank aga1nst enter1ng 1nto any part1cular transact1on 
or class of transact1ons or, on 1ts recommendat1on, the government 
may proh1b1t the bank to accept fresh depos1ts or order the w1nd1ng 
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up of the bank. 
The Bank has taken care to weed out unsound 
~nst~tut~ons. It de-scheduled as many as 16 banks by the end of 
June, 1952. Of these two were amalgamated w~th other scheduled 
banks and the rest were l~qu~dated. Dur~ng 1955-60, 10 more banks 
were de-scheduled, of wh~ch seven were l~qu~dated and 3 were 
merged w~th other banks. In the last s~x years th~s process has 
slowed down as the number of weak ~nst~tut~ons has apprec~ably 
decl1ned. 
All banks are requ~red to ma~nta~n w~th1n the country 
a certa~n percentage of the1r assets aga1nst the~r demand and t1me 
llabllltles, wh1ch at present 1s 80 per cent. Th1s prov1s1on 1s 
des1gned not only to protect the 1nterests of depos1tors but also 
to ensure that resources ra1sed by banks ~n Pak~stan are largely 
employed ~n the country 1tself. 
The Bank 1s author1sed to control the cap~tal and reserves 
of banks because an adequate level of cap1tal and reserves ~s 
necessary to cush~on the losses ~ncurred due to bad debts or 
deprec1at~on 1n the value of g1lt-edged ~nvestments follow1ng r~se 1n 
~nterest rates, and to fac~l~tate ventures ~nto flelds, such as 
med~um-term cred~t and loans to small borrowers, wh1ch have a larger 
element of r~sk than the convent~onal short-term lend~ng. F1nally, 
although the safety of depos1tors ult~mately l~es ~n the qual~ty of 
advances and the adequate l1qu1d1ty of banks, the strong cap~tal base 
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does enhance publ1c conf1dence 1n banks. 
Every Pak1stan1 bank 1s requ1red to have a m1n1mum 
aggregate pa1d-up cap1tal and reserves rang1ng between Rs 0 1 
m1ll1on and Rs 1.0 m1ll1on, depend1ng on the geograph1cal coverage 
and locat1on of the bank concerned. They are requ1red to transfer 
every year 20 per cent of the1r net prof1t to the reserve fund 
unt1l 1t 1s equal to the pa1d-up cap1tal. Every fore1gn bank 18 
requ1red to keep an aggregate of pa1d-up cap1tal and reserves 
amount1ng to at least Rs 2 m1ll1on or an amount equal to 5 per cent 
of 1ts demand and t1me l1ab1l1t1es 1n Pak15tan, wh1chever 1s h1gher. 
Th1s amount should be depos1ted w1th the State Bank 1n cash or 
unencumbered approved secur1t1es by transfer of funds from abroad. 
The ObJeCt of th1s depos1t requ1rement 1s that fore1gn banks should 
have some r1sk cap1tal of the1r own 1n th1s country. 
The rat1o of cap1tal and reserves to depos1ts 1n the 
case of Pak1stan1 banks has decl1ned rap1dly over the last s1x years. 
The pos1t1on 18 worse 1n the case of large banks. Th1s 18 due to 
the marked growth of depos1ts and an 1nadequate 1ncrease 1n cap1tal 
and reserves. It has been suggested that the requ1rement of cap1tal 
and reserves should be f1xed as a certa1n percentage of depos1t 
l l1ab1l1t1es. In Ind1a 1 the local banks are requ1red to transfer 
l Andrus, J.R. and A.F. Mohammed, Trade, F1nance and Development 
1n Pak1stan, Oxford Un1vers1ty Press, Karach1, 1966, p 116. 
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TABLE 3-7. The Cap~tal Base of the Pak~stan~ 
Commerc~al Banks. 
(Rs ~n m~ll~on) 
Rat~o of 
PaJ.d-up (1) + (2) 
Cap~ tal Reserves Depos~ts to (3) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
June 1953 34.9 13.6 777.2 6.2 
December 1953 34 9 13.7 800.9 6.1 
June 1955 40.0 17.2 1,012 6 5.6 
December 1955 41.3 27.7 1,002.9 6.9 
June 1960 72.9 46 4 2,035.6 5 9 
December 1960 75.5 51.0 2,076.9 6.1 
June 1965 124.8 100 7 5,833.6 3.9 
December 1965 140.2 102.6 6,417.3 3.8 
June 1966 140.2 114.2 7,399.6 3.4 
Source State Bank of Pak~stan - Bank~ng Stat~st~cs of Pak~stan, 
(Annual). 
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20 per cent of their profits to reserve fund every year and the 
foreign banks are required to deposit the same percentage of their 
f . . h h k f d " 1 pro 1ts w1t t e Reserve Ban o In 1a. 
Most of the Pakistani banks are owned by big 
businessmen and industrialists, or they have controlling interest 
in them. The banking law does provide some safeguards to prevent 
the misuse of the resources of banks for their personal ends. But 
these safeguards seem to be inadequate. It has been recommended 
that the Boards of Directors of banks should be made more broad-
. 2 based and the share ownership of banks should be widely d1spersed. 
It might be better if the State Bank established a cell in every 
Banking Control Department of its offices on the lines of Service 
Central des Risques in the Bank of France. Then every bank should 
be asked to submit detailed information about its sizeable loans 
and overdrafts to different parties. This will provide a check on the 
misuse of bank resources by the big businessmen having controlling 
interest in banks. The Bank will know the extent of accommodation a 
party has received from different banks and it will be "of great 
practical value to the individual banks in the event of customers 
attempting to buttress an untenable position by increasing their 
3 borrowings from other banks". 
1. Madan, B.K., India, in Crick, W.F. (ed.), op.cit., pp.203-204. 
2. Meenai, S.A., An Appraisal of the Credit and Monetary Situation in 
Pakistan, State Bank Press, Karachi, 1962, p.91. 
3. W~t'h . f . s. c,. _' Fy'~u ~ 'f.?. 5'/ ,(4/. .) t3~ ....... W~ f. ~c. ) 
0*~ 1 l'i'J.. I~ , /) 
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II. 
The Money Market. 
In th1s sect1on we shall d1scuss the role of the 
l State Banks 1n the development of money market 1n Pak1stan. 
The ma1n obJect1ves of develop1ng a money market, among others, 
are as follows (1) The money market, by prov1d1ng a w1de array 
of relat1vely l1qu1d assets, encourages the economy 1n general 
to econom1se 1n the use of cash. (2) It spec1f1cally enables the 
commerc1al banks to operate w1th a m1n1mum and stable reserve base. 
In the normal course of bus1ness, the banks ga1n and lose depos1ts 
to each other. Thus some banks become long of cash and others 
short of cash. The 1nter-bank call money market enables the banks 
long of cash to ut1l1se the ster1le excess reserves prof1tably and 
the banks short of cash can borrow 1n the call money market before 
2 be1ng forced to resort to the central bank f1nance. In th1s way 
1. For the def1n1t1on of money market, see Fonsek1 P.G., Fore1gn 
Central Bank1ng The Instruments of Monetary Pol1cy, Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, 1957 1 p.82, W1lson, J.S.G., 'The 
Structure of Money Markets', 1n Monetary Pol1cy and the 
Development of Money Markets, George Allen and Unw1n Ltd, 1966, 
p.218, Newlyn, W.T. and D.C.Rowan, Money and Bank1ng 1n Br1t1sh 
Colon1al Afr1ca, Oxford Un1vers1ty Press, 1954, p.l43. 
2. In U.K., the banks long and short of cash adJust the1r cash 
reserves by extend1ng and w1thdraw1ng call loans to the D1scount 
Houses. In u.s., the banks adJust the1r cash reserves 1n the 
Federal Funds market e1ther by d1rect 1nter-bank deal1ngs or 
through a dealer. See Dacey, W.M., The Br1t1sh Bank1ng Mechan1sm, 
Hutch1nson and Co.Ltd., 1967 (Repr1nt) pp.56-57, Sayers, R.s., 
'The New York Money Market through London Eyes' 1n Central Bank1ng 
after Bagehot, Oxford Un1vers1ty Press, 1957, pp.l39-40 
Newlyn, W T., Theory of Money, Oxford Un1vers1ty Press, 1965 
(Repr1nt), p.26. 
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the banks stretch the~r reserves to the l~m~t. (3) A broad and 
~ntegrated money market makes monetary pol~cy relat~vely more 
effect~ve. The ex~stence of a broad range of short-term monetary 
assets and the stabl cash reserve rat~os of banks at the m~n~mum 
level, allow an effect~ve and flex~ble use of open market operat~ons 
and Bank Rate The transact~ons of a reasonable magn~tude ~n the 
market by the central bank affect the reserve rat~os of banks 
w~thout upsett~ng the pr~ces of monetary assets The banks also 
have to resort to the central bank f~nance (d~rectly ~n the case of 
U S A and Pak~stan and ~nd~rectly through D~scount Houses ~n the 
Un~ted K~ngdom) more frequently due to r~g~d~ty of the~r cash rat~os 
at a low level Th~s makes the Bank Rate an effect~ve ~nstrument 
l 
of control. (4) The ava~lab~l~ty of proper k~nd of assets, hav1ng 
a reasonable degree of l~qu~d~ty, to ~nvestors would, f~rstly, 
encourage the d~rect~on of the flow of sav1ngs to most su~table and 
~mportant ends. Secondly, the ava1lab1l~ty of attract~ve, safe and 
lucrat~ve outlets for the employment of sav~ngs would ~ncrease the 
2 
rate of sav~ngs. 
1. Sayers, R.S., 'Introduct~on' to Sayers (ed.), Bank~ng ~n the 
Br~t~sh Commonwealth, pp XII to XV, Dorrance, G.S., The Bank 
of Canada, ~n Sayers (ed.) op c~t , pp.l2l-24. 
2 Nev~n, E , op c~t., 1963, p 89, Fousek, op c~t , p 83. 
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Market for B1lls of exchange 
The demand for bank cred1t 1n Pak1stan unt1l recently 
was subJeCt to strong seasonal pressures. The banks were forced 
to seek f1nanc1al accommodat1on 1n the busy season and were left 
w1th surplus funds 1n the slack season. They sought the State 
Bank's ass1stance e1ther by sell1ng government secur1t1es to 1t or 
borrowed aga1nst the1r collateral. The State Bank had to extend 
f1nanc1al accommodat1on to the banks to fac1l1tate the movement of 
export crops. It also had to avo1d sharp fluctuat1ons 1n the 
secur1t1es markets. It could, 1n part1cular monetary s1tuat1ons, 
have 1nflat1onary consequences So the State Bank 1ntroduced a B1ll 
D1scount1ng Scheme 1n 1952 to 1mpart a degree of automat1c seasonal 
elast1c1ty to the bank cred1t 1n conform1ty w1th genu1ne commerc1al 
1 
requ1rements. 
Under th1s Scheme, the scheduled banks were requ1red to 
spl1t up the1r current overdrafts and cash cred1ts 1nto two parts, 
a part of these overdrafts, etc., was to be converted 1nto usance 
(t1me) prom1ssory notes and the rest was to cont1nue to be covered by 
1. Annual Speech of Governor, The State Bank of Pak1stan (1951} 1 p.4, 
The SBP, Annual Report (1953}, p.9. 
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demand prom~ssory notes of the~r const~tuents as usual. The ~dea 
was that th~s would enable banks to offer the same fac~l~t~es to 
the~r customers as before and at the same t~me they would be able 
to lodge the usance prom~ssory notes w~th the State Bank as 
secur~ty for advances. The State Bank announced ~ts read~ness to 
red~scount or make demand loans to banks aga~nst the secur~ty of 
the~r demand prom~ssory notes supported by usance prom~ssory notes 
of the~r const~tuents at a concess~onal rate of 0.5 per cent below 
1 Bank Rate. It also agreed to bear half of the stamp duty. 
Table No.3-8 shows that the rat~o of b~lls of exchange purchased 
and d~scounted to total bank cred~t was hardly 4 per cent ~n 1948-49. 
After ~ncreas~ng to 15 5 per cent ~n 1953-54~ ~t has gone down 
aga~n to 5 8 per cent ~n 1965-66. The reasons for the unpopular~ty 
of b~lls of exchange and hence the fa~lure of the State Bank to 
establ~sh a broad-based market for them are as follows 
(1) It ~s cheaper for the customers to borrow from the 
banks ~n the form of overdraft and cash cred~t than to d~scount 
b~lls. In the case of overdraft, a borrower can draw up to an agreed 
l~m~t, but he pays ~nterest only on the da~ly amount by wh~ch h~s 
account ~s overdrawn. Under cash cred~t, the customer ~s granted loan 
on wh~ch he can draw ~n ~nstalments. However, he has to pay ~nterest 
1. Meena~, S.A., Bank~ng System of Pak~stan, op.c~t., p.58. 
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TABLE 3-8. D1str1but1ons of Bank Cred1t between 
Advances and B1lls Purchased and 
D1scounted. 
(Rs 1n m1ll1ons) 
Per1od B1lls Purchased Total Rat1o of 
(July-June) Advances and D1scounted Bank B1lls to 
Cred1t Bank Cred1t 
1948 .. 49 358 14 372 3.9 
1951-52 683 75 758 9.9 
1953-54 634 117 751 15.5 
1955-56 880 153 1~033 14.8 
1958-59 1~187 166 1,353 12.3 
1959-60 1,368 176 1,544 11.4 
1962-63 3,046 261 3~307 7.9 
1964-65 5,385 420 5,805 7.2 
1965 .. 66 6,128 379 6,507 5.8 
Source: The State Bank • Annual Reports on Currency and F1nance. 
N.B. The f1gures are weekly averages for the f1scal year. 
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on an agreed port~on of the loan whether he actually ut1l~ses that 
loan fac~l~ty at all or not. On the rema~n~ng amount of the loan, 
he pays ~nterest only to the extent he draws the sum exceed~ng the 
compulsory ~nterest bear~ng l~m~t. 
(2) It 1s more conven~ent for the customer to borrow ~n 
the form of overdraft and cash cred~t. B~lls are ~ssued for a 
spec1f~ed per~od and must be honoured at the t~me of matur1ty. 
Techn~cally, overdraft and cash cred~t are repayable on demand. But 
~n pract~ce, as ~n other countr~es, overdraft fac1l~t~es are normally 
renewed on exp1ry. Th~s fac~l~ty of roll~ng over of loans ~s 
consp~cuously absent ~n the case of d~scouni1ng of b~lls. 
(3) The commerc1al banks also prefer advances from the 
State Bank to red~scount1ng b~lls w~th 1t for the same reason that 
they can more or less choose themselves when to repay them. 
(4) The use of b~lls of exchange to f1nance 1nternal 
trade has decl1ned due to growth of branch bank~ng and the use of 
telegraph~c transfers. 
(5) F~nally, due to absence of d1scount houses and other 
~ntermed~ar~es, market transact~ons ~n commerc~al b~lls have not 
developed. The government Plann~ng Board recommended 1n 1957 the 
establ~shment of d~scount houses. The Board was assured that var~ous 
f~rms and 1nd~v~duals w1th adequate funds were ready to establ~sh 
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l d1scount houses. The proposal for the establ1shment of d1scount 
houses, w1th the powers of "acceptance", was aga1n repeated 1n 
1959 by the Cred1t Enqu1ry Comm1ss1on. Thev also recommended the 
2 
appo1ntment of guarantee brokers. The State Bank has so far 
shown no enthus1asm for these proposals. Th1s 1s perhaps due to 
lack of substant1al amount of b1lls of exchange for reasons 
d1scussed above. 
Treasury B1lls Market• 
Follow1ng the decl1ne 1n the use of b1lls of exchange~ 
the central banks have attempted to broaden money markets on the 
bas1s of treasury b1lls and short-dated government bonds. These 
have the advantage of h1gh cred1t-stand1ng, the1r volume can be 
eas1ly adJusted to su1t the current needs of the economy, and they 
can be 1ssued regularly at short 1ntervals and w1th d1fferent 
matur1t1es to su1t the taste of the people look1ng for short-term 
1nvestment of funds. But 1f the Bank 1s to be successful, the 
supply of treasury b1lls needs to be ta1lored to the requ1rements of 
1. Nat1onal Plann1ng Board, Government of Pak1stan, The F1rst 
F1ve-Year Plan (1955-60), 1957, p.l6l. 
2. Government of Pak1stan~ The Report of the Cred1t Enqu1ry 
Comm1ss1on, 19591 pp.l09-llO, See also Government of Pak1stan, 
The Report of the Cred1t Comm1ttee, 1962, p.l7. 
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the economy and not to the f~nanc~al needs of the government. The 
b~lls need to attract a relat~vely h~gh rate of ~nterest, and the 
central bank needs to ensure the~r l~qu~d~ty by generous red~scount 
fac~l~t~es. Lastly, there needs to be ~nst~tut~ons or 
~ntermed~ar~es for hold~ng 'stock ~n trade' and for market~ng these 
1 b~lls to keep the short-term funds 'revolv~ng'.-
The State Bank has however, fa~led to create a demand 
for treasury b~lls because 1t has not offered a suff~c~ently h~gh 
rate of ~nterest. The average rate of 1nterest was always well 
below l per cent unt~l the last quarter of 1957. At the same t~me, 
the ~nterest rate on sav~ngs depos~ts ranged between l per cent 
and 2~ per cent. Th~s expla1ns why no one, except the scheduled 
banks ever bought treasury b~lls, and the latter only unt~l 1960. 
In June 1956 1 the treasury b~lls const~tuted 8 per cent of the~r 
total ~nvestments ~n government secur~t~es. After that, the~r 
hold~ngs of treasury b~lls started decl~n~ng and they completely 
d~sappeared from the~r portfol~os ~n 1960. The banks bought treasury 
b~lls ~n the early years because they were often loaded w~th surplus 
funds ~n the slack season. They had the cho~ce between ~nvestment ~n 
treasury b~lls and loans ~n the ~nter-bank call money market and as 
most of them exper~enced excess l~qu~d~ty s~multaneously, the demand 
1. Nev~n, E., op.c~t., p.94. 
- 102 -
for funds 1n the 1nter-bank call money market was small and the 
1nter-bank call money rate would go down as low as 0.25 per cent 
(see table No. ~~9 below). In th1s s1tuat1on, 1nvestment 1n 
treasury b1lls dur1ng the slack season was more prof1table. As 
the seasonal fluctuat1ons 1n the demand for bank cred1t became 
less 1ntense and the demand for bank cred1t rose sharply after 1960, 
the 1nvestment 1n treasury b1lls ceased to be prof1table. The 
1ssue of treasury b1lls on tender was stopped 1n 1960. The 
government started 1ssu1ng 3 month treasury b1lls on tender aga1n 1n 
1964, carry1ng 3 per cent rate of 1nterest. In the meant1me, the 
depos1t rates and the call money rate had also gone up. The 
1nterest rate on sav1ngs depos1ts was 3.5 per cent 1n 1966 and the 
m1n1mum 1nter-bank call money rate dur1ng 1965-66 was 3.75 per cent. 
No wonder the State Bank rema1ns the sole holder of treasury b1lls. 
The second reason for the fa1lure of the Bank to 
establ1sh treasury b1lls market 1s that 1t 1s comm1tted to lend to 
the banks aga1nst the collateral of government secur1t1es. Th1s 
makes the secur1t1es of all matur1t1es equally l1qu1d. Moreover, the 
State Bank has all along a1med to keep the pr1ces of government 
secur1t1es stable. Thus the banks have no fear of cap1tal loss, and 
s1nce, 1n add1t1on the rate of 1nterest on long-dated secur1t1es 1s 
comparat1vely h1gh, 1t 1s no wonder that there has been a sharp 
1ncrease 1n the long-dated secur1t1es 1n the1r portfol1os. Between 
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1958 and 1966 the~r proport~on ~n the government secur~t~es 
portfol~os rose from 6 per cent to 45 per cent. 
Th~rdly, on the supply s~de, the central government 
borrows from the State Bank by ~ssu~ng ad hoc treasury b~lls at a 
nom~nal rate of ~nterest. The State Bank was hold~ng ad hoes 
worth Rs. 2,398 m~ll~on ~n June 1966. These b~lls are not 
marketable due to the~r extremely low rate of ~nterest. Moreover, 
the borrow~ngs of prov~nc~al governments from the commerc~al banks 
under the counterf~nance agreement are also not marketable debt. 
F~nally 1 there are no f~nanc~al ~ntermed~ar~es for hold~ng 'stock ~n 
trade' and arrang~ng act~ve market for buy~ng and sell~ng of these 
low-y~eld short-dated assets. 
Call Money Market 
The call money market ~s the core of money market ~n 
Pak~stan. Only soheduled banks part~c~pate ~n ~t. It ~s s~m~lar to 
the Federal Funds market ~n the Un~ted States ~n that ~t ~s also a 
market ~n depos~ts held at the central bank. The banks, wh~ch are 
long of cash, lend ~n the call market ~nstead of hold~ng excess 
reserves and banks short of cash borrow ~n the call market before 
resort~ng to the central bank f~nance. The loans may be made through 
brokers, but generally the transact~ons take place d~rectly between 
banks. Although the market ~s located ~n Karach~, ~n pract~ce ~t 
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serves the ent1re country. Th1s 1s because the scheduled banks have 
an extens1ve network of branches spread all over the country. The 
head off1ces of almost all b1g banks are 1n Karach1. Branches rem1t 
the1r surplus cash to the head off1ce 1 wh1le those short of cash 
borrow from the head off1ce. The State Bank has a network of 
currency chests all over the country and prov1des rem1ttance fac1l1t1es 
at concess1onal rates of 1nterest. 
1 The f1gures of call money and the call money rates 1n 
table No.3-~ below show two d1st1nct character1st1cs. F1rst 1 both 
the funds borrowed or lent 1n th1s market and the money rate are 
subJect to strong seasonal fluctuat1ons 1 stronger 1n the case of the 
latter than the former. Th1s 1s because all banks are subJect to the 
same seasonal 1nfluences. If we assume that all banks followed the 
same portfol1o pol1c1es as well, there would be no transact1ons 1n the 
call money market below the Bank Rate dur1ng the busy season. The 
transact1ons at or above the Bank Rate would take place only when some 
banks have no collateral to borrow from the State Bank (l1qu1d1ty 
restra1nt) or the1r borrow1ngs have already reached the l1m1t f1xed by 
the State Bank. Dur1ng the slack season, all banks would have surplus 
1. These are the f1gures reported on the asset s1de of the scheduled 
banks' weekly returns. For d1fferent est1mates of net 1nter-bank 
reallocat1on of funds from the publ1shed balance sheets of banks 
and the problems 1nvolved 1n 1t 1 see Porter, R.C., L1qu1d1ty and 
Lend1ng, op.c1t., pp.58-62. 
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funds and the call money rate would fall to zero. In fact, 
d~fferent banks pursue d~fferent portfol~o pol~c~es. The Hab~b 
Bank and the Amer~can banks are the ma~n lenders ~n t~ call 
money market. The ma~n borrowers are Br~t~sh banks. Due to 
restr~ct~ons on the open~ng of branches, they have lost more 
depos~tors than borrowers. Secondly, they have always worked on 
f~ne cash reserve rat~os. Some Pak~stan~ banks also borrow ~n the 
call market. 
The second ma~n character~st~c ~s the sharp ~ncrease 
~n the volume of funds borrowed or lent ~n the call money market 
after 1959-60. Th~s ~s due to sharp ~ncrease ~n cred~t demands 
follow~ng the stepp~ng up of ~nvestment act~v~ty and the 
consequent pressure on the resources of banks. The call money 
rate has also gone up sharply. Up to 1959 1 the call money rate 
seldom went above the Bank Rate because of generous f~nanc~al 
accommodat~on made ava~lable by the State Bank. s~nce the ~mpos~t~on 
of the Quota System ~n 1963 on scheduled banks' borrow~ngs from the 
State Bank, the max~mum call rate has generally exceeded the Bank 
Rate dur~ng the subsequent busy seasons. It even exceeded the 
'top slab' rate of the State Bank. 
TABLE 3-9. 
F1scal Year 
(July-June) 
1954-55 
1955M56 
1956-57 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961-62 
1962-63 
1963-64 
1964-65 
1965-66 
- 106 -
The Call Money and the Call Money 
Rates. 
(Rs. 1n m1ll1on) 
(Rate % per annum) 
Call Money Call Money Rate 
M1n1mum Max1mum M1n1mum MaxJ..mum 
28 85 o.5o 2.50 
38 122 0.50 3.00 
47 128 0.75 3.50 
85 173 o.5o 3.00 
19 145 0 0 25 2.75 
31 146 0.50 4.50 
107 246 1.50 4.75 
149 327 2.75 4.00 
223 340 2.25 3.50 
218 362 1.75 4.50 
208 367 2.50 7.25 
234 539 3.75 7.00 
Source• The State Bank of Pak1stan, Annual Reports on Currency 
and F1nance. 
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Chapter 4. 
THE OPERATION OF THE SCHEDULED BANKS 
IN PAKISTAN. 
In the last chapter we descr1bed the role of the 
State Bank 1n the growth of the bank1ng system. The obJect of th1s 
chapter 1s to analyse the performance of the scheduled banks, wh1ch 
const1tute the largest segment of the monetary system In the 
f1rst sect1on we shall descr1be the growth of the assets of banks 
over t1me 1n absolure amount and 1n relat1on to the depos1t 
llab1l1t1es of the banks and the factors 1nfluenc1ng the1r growth. 
In the second sect1on1 we shall enqu1re 1nto the d1str1but1on of 
banks' earn1ng assets, v1z. bank cred1t and 1nvestments 1 1nto cla1ms 
on the publ1c and pr1vate sectors and the reasons for the1r 
relat1ve 1mportance over t1me. In the th1rd part, we shall d1scuss 
the sources of funds, namely bank depos1ts and borrow1ngs from the 
State Bank. We shall exam1ne 1n some deta1l the relat1ve roles of 
1ncrease 1n 1nterest rates on depos1ts and the branch expans1on 
programme of the scheduled banks 1n the mob1l1sat1on of depos1ts. 
I 
1. Cash Assets 
The cash assets of an 1nd1v1dual bank cons1st of cash 
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1n t1lls~ balances w1th the central bank, and balances w1th other 
banks. For the bank1ng system as a whole~ only the f1rst two 
assets are relevant. Banks can 1ncrease the1r cash assets e1ther 
by borrow1ng from the central bank or by sell1ng some of the1r 
assets to 1t or f1nally by 1nduc1ng the publ1c to hold less cash and 
more bank depos1ts. The balances w1th the central bank cons1st of 
statutory reserves and excess reserves. We shall concentrate on the 
excess reserves and cash 1n t1lls, f1rst, because 1t 1s only the 
excess reserves upon wh1ch the banks can draw to accommodate 
customers' demand for cash, and secondly, because the analys1s of 
banks' att1tude towards cash assets over t1me would not be affected 
by changes 1n legal reserve requ1rements. 
Once the banks have, by exper1ence, come to establ1sh 
a safe rat1o between depos1t l1ab1l1t1es and cash assets~ 1t 1s 1n 
the 1nterest of banks from the po1nt of v1ew of prof1tab1l1ty to keep 
1t stable at that level. Th1s, however, presupposes the presence of 
two cond1t1ons. F1rst, there 1s an act1ve market for short-term funds. 
Secondly, the banks can have resort to central bank f1nance 1n t1mes 
of emergency. Even 1n the presence of these cond1t1ons 1 the cash 
rat1os may not be stable. Th1s 1s because the banks are all the t1me 
try1ng to keep b&lance between cons1derat1ons of 11qu1d1ty and 
prof1tab1l1ty. If there 1s an 1ncrease 1n demand for cred1t, the 
banks m1ght try to squeeze the1r cash reserve rat1o and at other t1mes 
they may let 1t r1se a l1ttle h1gher The actual cash rat1o at a 
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t~me may vary from bank to bank depend~ng on ~ts att~tude to 
l~qu~d~ty and the supply of secondary reserves. 
The absolute amount of cash assets held by banks r~ses 
w~th the ~ncrease ~n depos~ts, though not necessar~ly ~n the same 
proport~on. In order to remove th~s secular trend, the cash assets 
~n Table 4-1 have been presented as a rat~o to depos~t l~ab~l~t~es 
(general, ~.e. non-bank depos~ts). 
The data regard~ng cash assets of the scheduled banks 
shows two d~st~nct trends. F~rstly, the rat~o of cash assets, ~.e. 
cash ~n t~lls plus excess reserves, to depos~t l~ab~l~t~es (general) 
has decl~ned from 14.9 per cent ~n 1948-49 to 3.3 per cent ~n 1960"61. 
S~nce then ~t has become almost stable at that level. The break-up 
of cash assets reveals that the decl~ne ~n cash ~n t~lls ~n relat~on 
to depos~t l~ab~l~t~es up to 1959/60 has been steady but small. 
s~nce then the rat~o has edged up, but ~t ~s far below the level 
preva~l~ng ~n the earl~er years. The excess reserves, on the other 
hand, have reg~stered a sharp decl~ne over the per~od under study. The 
ma~n reason, as we shall see, ~s that the sharp ~ncrease ~n the demand 
for bank cred~t has not been accompan~ed by a commensurate ~ncrease 
~n depos~t resources. It has ~nduced the banks to econom~se ~n the~r 
reserves. Secondly, ~t ~s ev~dent from table 4-2 that the w~de 
seasonal fluctuat~ons ~n the excess reserves, wh~ch character~sed the 
bank~ng system up to 1959/60, have decl~ned substant~ally. Moreover, 
the net free reserves of banks have completely d~sappeared s~nce 1961. 
TABLE 4-1 
1948-49 
1949-50 
195G-51 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954-55 
1955-56 
1956-57 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961-62 
1962-63 
1963-64 
1964-65 
1965-66 
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Rat~o of Cash Assets of the Scheduled Banks 
to Total Bank Depos~ts (General). 
All Scheduled Banks Pak~stan~ Banks 
Cash ~n Excess Cash ~n Cash ~n T~lls 
T~lls Reserves T~lls plus + Balances 
Excess w~th the 
Reserves State Bank 
3.4 11.5 14.9 N.A. 
3.2 100 13.2 N.A. 
3.1 4.1 7.2 N.A. 
3.2 6.2 9.4 N.A. 
2.9 4.2 7.1 10.9 
2.6 4.0 6.6 9.9 
2 5 2.7 5 2 9.9 
2.3 3.5 5 8 9.7 
2.3 3.2 5.5 9.3 
2.2 2.5 4 7 10.1 
2.2 2.8 5.0 10 8* 
2.1 2.4 4.5 10.1 
2 2 1.1 3.3 8.7 
2.3 1.0 3.3 9.1 
2.3 1.1 3.4 N.A. 
2.5 0.9 3.4 101 
2 3 o. 7 3.0 N.A. 
2.4 0.8 3 2 9.9 
Source The State Bank Annual Bank~ng Stat~st~cs of Pak~stan. 
Fore~gn 
Banks 
Cash ~n 
T~lls plus 
Balances 
w~th the 
State Bank 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
14.7 
13.7 
12.7 
13.5 
11.1 
10.1 
10.6* 
9.3 
7.9 
7 8 
N.A. 
9.1 
N.A. 
8.9 
l) The rat~os ~n the f~rst three columns are calculated from the weekly 
average f~gures of cash assets and bank depos~ts (general) as reported 
~n the Weekly Statements of the Scheduled Banks. 
2) The rat~os ~n the last two columns are based on the quarterly average 
f~gures as reported ~n the Quarterly Balance Sheets of the Scheduled 
Banks. These two columns are not comparable w~th the f~rst three, as 
the cash assets here ~nclude cash ~n t~lls plus ent~re balances w~th 
the State Bank. As the ma~n purpose of these two columns ~s to compare 
the relat~ve pos~t~on of Pak~stan~ and fore~gn banks, and the 
statutory reserve requ~rements are the same for both Pak~stan~ and 
fore~gn banks, th~s change ~n def~n~t~on should not make any d~fference. 
* The r~se ~n the reserve r~t~o dur~ng 1958-59 was largely due to 
unearth~ng of h~dden wealth, wh~ch was be~ng used for the purpose of 
black market~ng 1 smuggl~ng and hoard~ng of goods. These act~v~t~es •••• 
/cont~nued• 
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The study of cash reserve pol~c~es of Pak~stan~ and 
fore~gn banks separately reveals that up to 1956/57 the fore~gn 
banks were ma~nta~n~ng a larger rat~o of cash assets to total depos~t 
l~ab~l~t~es (general). S~nce then they have ma~nta~ned a somewhat 
lower rat~o compared to Pak~stan~ banks. The ma~n reason for th~s 
change ~s that the Ind~an banks, wh~ch were an ~mportant segment of 
fore~gn banks up to 1956/57, have decl~ned ~n ~mportance. We have 
seen ~n Chapter 3 that the Ind~an banks keep a very h~gh cash rat~o. 
So w~th the~r decl~ne, the rat~o for fore~gn banks has gone down. 
It would be of ~nterest to compare our f~nd~ngs w~th 
1 those of Professor Porter Our conclus~ons d~ffer from those of 
Professor Porter on two counts. The f~rst d~fference relates to the 
behav~our of rat~o of cash ~n t~lls to depos~t l~ab~l~t~es (general) 
for all banks Wh~le Professor Porter found no trend ~n ~t, table 
4-1 shows a def~n~te decl~n~ng trend. Th~s d~fference ~n results may 
be attr~buted to the fact that he took ~nto cons~derat~on the pos~t~on 
of banks as on the last Fr~day of December each year, wh~le we are 
compar~ng the weekly averages of the f~scal year But the rat~o, based 
on the f~gures for the last Fr~day of June each year, also shows a 
••• were restr~cted, for the t~me be~ng, after the Lmpos~t~on of Mart~al 
Law ~n 1958, and the h~dden wealth came to surface after the declarat~on 
of Tax Amnesty Scheme. Th~s, f~rstly, ~ncreased the l~qu~d~ty of banks. 
Secondly, ~t reduced the demand for bank cred~t ~n the short run. 
N.A. = Not Ava~lable. 
1). Porter, R.c., L~qu~d~ty and Lend~ng. The Volume of Bank Cred~t ~n 
Pak~stan, The Inst~tute of Development Econom~cs, Karach~, 1963, 
pp.80-85. 
TABLE 4-2. Excess Reserves and Net Free Reserves of Scheduled Banks 
(Weekly Averages) 
(Rs. 1n mi.lli.on) 
* Excess Reserves Net Free Reserves 
1948-49 1955-56 1958-59 1961-62 1964-65 1955-56 1958-59 1961-62 1964-65 
F1scal Year 122 64 70 34 30 23 41 - 412 
- 1077 (July-June) 
July-September 185 86 133 31 53 100 !53 
- 279 
-
533 
October-December 100 37 33 23 21 
- 10 - 44 - 354 
-
953 
January""'i\1arch 79 37 32 31 24 
- 93 ... 64 - 571 - 1344 
Aprll-June 123 97 84 51 24 95 118 - 445 - 1476 
-- - - - - -
source The State Bank of Pak1.stan .,.. Annual Reports on Currency and F1.nance. 
* Net Free Reserves = Cash 1n T1lls + Excess Reserves - Borrow1.ngs from the State Bank. 
The f1gures w1.th m1.nus s1.gn 1.nd1cates 'net borrowed reserves'. 
1965-66 I 
- 1224 
- 1291 
- 1304 
- 1390 
-
912 
--- -----
1-' 
1-' 
1\:1 
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decl1n1ng tendency On average, 1t has gone down from 0.0304 dur1ng 
1949M60 to 0.0257 1n 1961-66. Moreover the range between wh1ch the 
rat1o var1es has also narrowed from 0.022 - 0.045 1n the f1rst 
per1od to 0.024 - 0.027 1n the second per1od. There 1s bound to be 
some fluctuat1on 1n the rat1o as the dec1s1ons are made da1ly by 
hundreds of branch managers and 1t 1s humanly 1mposs1ble 1 w1th all 
the eff1c1ency and effort to econom1se on reserves, to keep the cash 
rat1o da1ly stable at the lowest level. 
Secondly, Professor Porter came to the conclus1on that 
the rat1o of cash assets to depos1ts 1n the case of fore1gn banks 
was about half that of Pak1stan1 banks. He attr1buted th1s d1fference 
to the fact that "the fore1gn banks, w1th almost no 1ncrease 1n 
branches over these years, were able to reduce, almost stead1ly, the 
cash rat1o by half. Th1s follows from elementary large-number theory 
1f depos1ts (per branch) double, a bank need not as much as double 1ts 
vault cash to cover the same degree of r1sk of temporary shortage. 
The branch expans1on of the Pak1stan1 banks has precluded the~ from 
shar1ng these econom1es of scale. Not only 1s the1r cash rat1o 
l double that of the Iore~gn banks, but 1t 1s r1s1ng". Table 4-l shows 
that although the rat1o 1s somewhat h1gher 1n the case of Pak1stan1 
banks s1nce 1959-60, the d1fference 1s not as great as Professor Porter 
has 1nd1cated. He came to a d1fferent conclus1on due to the fact that 
- 114 -
he calculated the rat~os of cash ~n t~lls to depos~t l~ab~l~t~es for 
Pak~stan~ and fore~gn banks separately. He found that the rat~o ~n 
the case of Pak~stan~ banks was more than tw~ce that of fore~gn banks. 
Then he calculated the rat~o of excess reserves to depos~ts for all 
banks JO~ntly. Th~s shows that he presumed that all banks had 
reduced the excess reserves to the same extent. Th~s, however, ~s not 
the case. The Pak~stan~ banks keep a larger proport~on of the~r cash 
assets ~n the form of cash ~n t~lls wh~le fore~gn banks keep a 
larger proport~on of the~r cash assets by way of balances w~th the 
State Bank. In June 1964, the rat~o of excess reserves to depos~ts ~n 
the case of fore1gn banks at 2.5 per cent was more than double that 
for Pak~stan~ banks at 1.2 per cent. In June 1966, the rat~os for 
fore~gn and Pak~stan~ banks were 1.8 per cent and 0 9 per cent 
respect~vely. Th~s ~s understandable. The fore~gn banks have the~r 
branches only ~n b~g c~t~es, where the State Bank too has ~ts branches. 
The Pak~stan~ banks are scattered all over the country and have a 
large branch network. They are naturally ~ncl~ned toHeep a larger 
port~on of the~r cash assets ~n the form of cash ~n t~lls. It ~s, 
however, true that the rat~o of total cash assets to depos~t 
l~ab~l~t~es ~s somewhat h~gher ~n the case of Pak~stan~ banks as 
compared w~th fore~gn banks. 
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2. Bank Cred~t to the Pr~vate Sector 
The outstand~ng level of bank cred~t to the pr~vate 
sector, ~.e. bank advances to the pr~vate sector plus b~lls 
purchased and d~scounted amounted to Rs. 372 m~ll~on dur~ng 1948-49. 
The absorpt~on of bank cred~t ~ncreased substant~ally by Rs. 386 
m~ll~on to Rs. 758 m~ll~on dur~ng 1951-52. The sharp expans~on ~n the 
volume of bank cred~t was almost ent~rely due to a r~se ~n the 
volume and pr~ces of exports and ~mports, follow~ng the post-Korean 
boom. The level of bank cred~t decl~ned ~n the subsequent two years 
of recess~on to Rs. 751 m~ll~on ~n 1953-54. After ~ncreas~ng 
marg~nally to Rs. 769 m~ll~on ~n 1954-55, the outstand~ng level of 
bank cred~t ~ncreased sharply to Rs. ~57 m~ll~on ~n 1956-57 due to 
larger trade act~v~ty follow~ng devaluat~on ~n July 1955. The benef~ts 
of devaluat~on were soon lost due to ~nflat~on at home, wh~ch was a 
by-product of mass~ve def~c~t f~nanc~ng. The exports started decl~n~ng 
and the ~mport restr~ct~ons were gradually t~ghtened. As a result, 
the growth of bank cred~t slowed down up to 1958-59. Bank cred~t 
~ncreased by Rs. 157 m~ll~on dur~ng 1955-56, Rs. 131 m~ll~on dur~ng 
1956-57, Rs. 76 m~ll~on dur~ng 1957-58, and Rs. 67 m~ll~on dur~ng 
1958-59. 
The pr~vate sector of the economy absorbed add~t~onal 
cred~t at the rate of Rs. 83 m~ll~on per annum up to 1958-59. The 
slow growth ~n bank cred~t over th~s per~od, ~n sp~te of steady ~ncrease 
~n bank off~ces, was largely due to small ~ncrease ~n the demand for 
TABLE 4-3. Bank Cred1t and Related Data. (Rs. 1n m1ll1on) 
Per1od Bank Cred1t Advances to Total Rat1o of Pr1vate 
(July-June) to the the Govt. Bank Total Bank Imports Exports Inv@st-
Pr1vate Sector Sector. Cred1t. Cred1t to ment 
Total Depos1ts 
(General) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1948-49 372 
-
372 35 l 1,258 958 N.A. 
1951-52 758 - 758 53.4 1,430 2,009 580 
1953-54 751 
-
751 49.3 735 1,286 690 
1955-56 926 107 1,033 55 3 990 1,784 750 
1958-59 1,200 153 1,353 55.0 840 1,325 890 
1959-60 1,377 167 1,544 54.9 1,682 1,843 900 
1962-63 2,992 315 3,307 80.2 2,800 2,247 2,640 
1964-65 5,183 622 5_,805 89.4 4,418 2,408 3,390 
1965-66 5,921 586 6,507 90.0 3,363 2, 718 3,330 
Sources 1) The State Bank - Weekly Statements of Scheduled Banks publ1shed 1n Reports on Currency and F1nance. 
11) Government of Pak1stan, Econom1c Survey, 1966-67. 
N.B. The f1gures 1n column (3) are weekly averages for the f1scal year. 
F1gures 1n column (2) are averages of end-June and end-December f1gures. 
Column (1) = Column (3) -Column (2). 
1-' 
1-' 
~ 
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bank cred~t. The follow~ng factors restra~ned the demand for bank 
cred~t. F~rstlyJ the pr~vate sector, ~n the sense of the market 
economyJ was not only small, ~t was work~ng under a number of d~rect 
controls on the pr~ce and d~str~but~on of goods. Th~s ~nh~b~ted 
the demand for bank cred~t. SecondlyJ the l~m~ted ava~lab~l~ty of 
fore~gn exchange to the pr~vate sector restr~cted the level of pr~vate 
~nvestment act~v~ty. Th~rdly, there was an excess~ve l~qu~d~ty ~n 
the economy due to large-scale def~c~t f~nanc~ng, wh~ch obv~ated the 
need for bank cred~t. F~nally, the lend~ng pol~cy of banks, based 
as ~t was on the trad~t~onal cr~ter~on of cred~t-worth~ness, was very 
conservat~ve. Th~s ~s ev~dent, f~rstly, from a very h~gh percentage 
of cred~t to commerce ~n early years, and secondly, from the 
concentrat~on of about 63 per cent of bank cred~t ~n only 222 accounts 
~n March 1959. 
In short, the growth ~n bank cred~t to the pr~vate 
sector up to 1958-59 was small and fluctuated more ~n sympathy w~th 
fore~gn trade than any other factor Secondly, the rate of 
expans~on of bank cred~t to the pr~vate sector dur~ng th~s per~od was 
determ~ned by the demand for bank cred~t - wh~ch sat~sf~ed the str~ct 
cred~t-worth~ness cr~ter~on. 
The s~tuat~on changed rad~cally after 1958-59. The 
absorpt~on of bank cred~t over the next seven years was pronouncedly 
h~gher compared to earl~er years. The average annual growth of bank 
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cred1t to the pr1vate sector at Rs. 674 m1ll1on was more than e1ght 
t1mes that 1n the preced1ng decade. Th1s, however, conceals the fact 
that the annual absorpt1on of bank cred1t 1ncreased stead1ly from 
Rs. 177 m1ll1on 1n 1959-60 to Rs. 1,392 m1ll1on 1n 1964-65 It came 
down to Rs. 738 m1ll1on 1n 1965-66. The factors contr1but1ng to the 
sharp 1ncrease 1n bank cred1t, among others, were the follow1ng 
(1) The government removed d1rect controls on the pr1ce and 
d1str1but1on of a number of essent1al commod1t1es 1n 1960 ThlS 
process of l1beral1sat1on of the economy from d1rect controls was 
ma1nta1ned 1n the later years. (11) The most 1mportant factor was the 
1ncrease 1n pr1vate 1nvestment (at current pr1ces), wh1ch rose 
stead1ly from Rs. 890 m1ll1on 1n 1958-59 to Rs. ~90 m1ll1on 1n 
1964-65. (111) Exports more than doubled over th1s per1od due to 
fast expans1on of the 1ndustr1al sector and the break-through 1n the 
prev1ously almost stagnant agr1cultural product1on. (1v) Imports on 
pr1vate account 1ncreased almost four t1mes. Th1s was made poss1ble 
by larger export earn1ngs and a substant1al 1ncrease 1n fore1gn a1d. 
As a result of the factors ment1oned above, there was 
an upsurge 1n the demand for bank cred1t. The nature of demand for 
cred1t was such that 1t met the most conservat1ve standards of the 
'commerc1al loan' theory. F1rst, w1th the expans1on of the 1ndustr1al 
sector, the banks were faced w1th an 1ncreas1ng demand for work1ng 
cap1tal The loans for work1ng cap1tal are 1n l1ne w1th the theory. 
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Secondly, the 1ncrease 1n demand for bank cred1t ar1s1ng out of 
larger exports and 1mports also sat1sf1ed th1s cr1ter1on The 
1ncrease 1n demand for cred1t was so large that the banks felt 
constra1ned to sat1sfy 1t. F1rst of all, they econom1sed on the1r 
cash reserves. Th1s we have d1scussed above. Secondly, they took 
1ncreas1ng recourse to borrow1ngs from the State Bank. In the f1rs~ 
decade, they used to borrow from the State Bank at the peak of the 
busy season. In the slack season, they were left w1th surplus funds. 
After 19601 however, the1r 1ndebtedness to the State Bank became a 
permanent feature. Not only that, the1r 'net borrowed reserves' 
1ncreased tremendously after 1963 and, on average, amounted to 
Rs. 1 1 224 m1ll1on dur1ng 1965-66 (see table 4-2) 
Advances to the Government Sector. 
The central and prov1nc1al governments borrow from the 
banks under the 'counter-f1nance' scheme for the purpose of state 
trad1ng. The 'counter-f1nance' scheme was 1ntroduced 1n 1954 when 
government undertook large-scale foodgra1n procurement operat1ons. 
Under th1s scheme, the commerc1al banks prov1de f1nanc1al ass1stance 
to the government and 1n l1eu thereof are ent1tled to ass1stance from 
the State Bank. Or1g1nally, 1t was expected that the banks would 
meet the government demand for funds ma1nly from the1r own resources 
and would turn to the State Bank for marg1nal ass1stance. However, 
w1th the t1ghten1ng up of the1r l1qu1d1ty pos1t1on 1n recent years, 
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the banks are f1nanc1ng government almost wholly by means of 
borrow1ngs from the State Bank. Under these c1rcumstances, the 
government borrow1ng from the commerc1al banks 1s tantamount to 
borrow1ng from the State Bank. The government borrow1ngs under 
'counter-f1nance' scheme 1ncreased cons1derably from Rs. 4.9 m1ll1on 
1n 1956-57 to Rs. 622 m1ll1on 1n 1964-65. At th1s level, they 
const1tuted about 11 per cent of total bank cred1t. Th1s 1s 1n sp1te 
of the fact that the foodgra1n trade was transferred to the pr1vate 
sector 1n 1959-60 
We would ment1on br1efly only three po1nts regard1ng 
government borrow1ngs from the banks under th1s scheme. (1) Professor 
Porter has asked that "why governments prefer to borrow from 
commerc1al banks 1nstead of 1ssu1ng ad hoc b1lls to the State Bank 1s 
a mystery" l Th1S partly because the bulk of the borrow1ng under 1S 
th1s scheme 1s by the prov1nc1al governments, who are not ent1tled to 
1ssue ad hoes. Secondly, the government cons1ders borrow1ng from 
commerc1al banks, as aga1nst the central bank, less 1nflat1onary. 
(11) The second po1nt concerns the effect of government 
borrow1ngs from banks on the ava1lab1l1ty of cred1t to the pr1vate 
sector. Dr. Meena1 has suggested that, "1n sp1te of support1ng 
fac1l1t1es from the State Bank, the greater cla1m of Government on 
1. Porter, R.c., op.c1t., p.54. 
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commerc1al bank cred1t has had the effect at least techn1cally of 
reduc1ng the ava1lab1l1ty of cred1t to the pr1vate sector Th1S 
1s for the reason that the total ass1stance that the State Bank 
prov1des to the banks 1s determ1ned 1n the l1ght of the overall 
monetary s1tuat1on. Moreover, commerc1al banks also operate w1th 
due regard to the overall s1ze of the1r 1ndebtedness to the State 
1 
Bank". The follow1ng factors, however, 1nd1cate that government 
borrow1ng from the banks under th1s scheme does not affect the 
2 
ava1lab1l1ty of cred1t to the pr1vate sector. The government borrows 
ma1nly from the Nat1onal Bank of Pak1stan and to a small extent from 
the Hab1b Bank and the Eastern Mercant1le Bank. The State Bank has 
to ensure that 1t should not 1n any way affect the capac1ty of these 
banks to extend cred1t to the pr1vate sector relat1ve to other banks. 
Otherw1se, 1t would have one of the two effects. F1rstly, these 
banks would refuse to lend to the government. Secondly, 1f they are 
forced to lend, 1t would be d1scr1m1nat1on aga1nst them, and the 
central bank s1mply cannot afford d1scr1m1nat1on 1n 1ts deal1ngs w1th 
the banks. 
1. Meena1, S.A , 'Pak1stan' 1n W.F Cr1ck, Commonwealth Bank1ng Systems, 
Oxford Un1vers1ty Press, 1965, p.276. 
2 We shall d1scuss the 1mpl1cat1ons of government borrow1ngs from 
the commerc1al banks under the counter-f1nance scheme for the 
cred1t control pol1c1es of the State Bank 1n the next chapter. 
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(111) The scheduled banks make advances to the 
government at or below Bank Rate. The State Bank, 1n turn, prov1des 
counterf1nance at a concess1onal rate of 1nterest to the banks. To 
be more prec1se, the rate of 1nterest charged by the Bank 1s one-half 
per cent below that charged by banks from the government to cover 
the1r costs. 
3. Investments. 
The data regard1ng 1nvestments of banks 1s not 
ava1lable up to 1952. In 1953, the 1nvestments of banks stood at Rs. 
590 m1ll1on. Thereafter, except1ng 1960-61, the 1nvestments kept on 
1ncreas1ng stead1ly and reached the level of Rs. 1P61 m1ll1on 1n 
1965-66. The yearly accret1ons to 1nvestments, for reasons d1scussed 
1n the second part of the chapter, ranged between 2.7 per cent and 
20.4 per cent. The bulk of tho 1nvestments cons1sts of government 
secur1t1es. The1r 1nvestments 1n pr1vate secur1t1es rema1ned very 
small unt1l 1961-62. Th1s year, however, marks a turn1ng po1nt 1n 
the att1tude of banks. S1nce then, they have stepped up 1nvestment 
1n pr1vate shares and consequently the1r share 1n total investments 
has gone up from 3 per cent 1n 1961-62 to 15 percent 1n 1965-66. 
The rat10 of 1nvestments to total depos1ts (general) 
rema1ned fa1rly h1gh up to 1959-60. Thereafter, 1t decl1ned stead1ly 
from 44 per cent 1n 1959"60 to 27 per cent 1n 1965-66. The decl1ne 
1n the rat1o of 1nvestments to depos1ts 1s ma1nly expla1ned by the 
TABLE 4-4: 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954-55 
1955-56 
1956 ... 57 
1957-58 
1958 ... 59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961-62 
1962 ... 63 
1963-64 
1964 ... 65 
1965-66 
Investments @ 
Govt. 
Securities 
(1) 
567 
611 
699 
771 
819 
930 
1,021 
1,201 
1,290 
1,264 
1_,251 
1,393 
1,608 
1,671 
Others 
(2) 
23 
20 
20 
21 
18 
23 
31 
32 
32 
35 
84 
105 
195 
290 
Total 
(3) 
590 
631 
719 
792 
837 
953 
1,052 
1,233 
1,322 
1,299 
1,335 
1,498 
1,803 
1,961 
Investments of Scheduled 
Ratio of 
(2) 
to (3) 
(4) 
3.9 
3.1 
2.8 
2.6 
2.1 
2.4 
2.9 
2.6 
2.4 
2.7 
6.2 
7 .o . 
10.8 
14.8 
(3) to Total 
Deposits 
(General) 
(5) 
45.0 
41.4 
42.8 
42.4 
42.3 
42.7 
42.7 
43.8 
42.8 
38.6 
32.3 
29.4 
27.8 
!7.1 
Banks (Rs. in million) 
* Maturity Distribution of Investments in Govt. Securities 
·Treasury 
Bills 
(6) 
8 
8 
8 
6 
7 
4 
Under 5 
years 
(7) 
40 
64 
72 
78 
81 
87 
75 
75 
66 
75 
77 
72 
54 
55 
Securities Maturing in 
5 to 10 10 to
1 
15 
Years Years 
Percent 
(8) (9): 
55 
25 
17 
12 
9 
4 
7 
7 
15 
18 
18 
26 
36 
33 
2 
2 
2 
2 
4 
2 
14 
18 
19 
7 
5 
3 
7 
Over 15 years 
(10) 
3 
1 
1 
2 
7 
5 
-------,-------~----------._------~-----~~-----~---------------- ----·-------~--------~------------~-------~-----L-----------------
Source: The State Bank: i) Annual Banking Statistics of Pakistan. 
ii) Reports on Currency and Finance. 
@ The figures of total investment and its components are weekly 
averages. 
* The percentage distribution of investments in govt. securities 
by maturities is based on the end-June figures of every 
financial year. 
1 
- 124 -
expans1on of econom1c act1v1ty and the consequent r1se 1n the demand 
for bank cred1t. Banks have mod1f1ed the1r asset structure 1n 
favour of advances~ wh1ch are more remunerat1ve~ by absorb1ng less 
of the new government 1ssues offered. Secondly~ 1t seems that the 
banks s1nce recently are adopt1ng somewhat bolder lend1ng pol1c1es. 
Th1s 1s ev1dent from substant1al 1ncrease 1n the1r hold1ngs of 
pr1vate scr1pts. 
The d1str1but1on of scheduled banks' hold1ngs of 
government secur1t1es by matur1ty shows a trend towards secur1t1es of 
longer matur1t1es. The treasury b1lls, wh1ch had decl1ned from 8.5 
per cent of the total 1nvestments 1n government secur1t1es 1n 1954 
to 4 per cent 1n 1959~ d1sappeared altogether from bank portfol1os 
afterwards~ except for a short per1od 1n 1962. The reason for sh1ft 
to longs seems to be h1gher y1eld of these secur1t1es. The banks 1n 
advanced countr1es generally prefer shorts because they are afra1d of 
cap1tal loss on longs due to r1se 1n 1nterest rates. The banks 1n 
Pak1stan have no fear of cap1tal loss because the State Bank has all 
along been support1ng secur1t1es market. Secondly, whatever the 
matur1t1es, the secur1t1es are, for all pract1cal purposes, qu1te 
l1qu1d for banks as they can borrow aga1nst them from the State Bank. 
II 
D1str1but1on of Banks' Earn1ng Assets 1nto cla1ms on pr1vate and publ1c 
sectors 
The class1f1cat1on of scheduled banks' earn1ng assets 
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1nto cla1ms on publ1c and pr1vate sectors lS qu1te reveal1ng. The 
cla1ms on the pr1vate sector const1tuted 57.9 per cent of total 
earn1ng assets of banks 1n 1952-53. The1r share came down to 48.3 
per cent 1n 1954-55. After 1ncreas1ng to 55.3 per cent 1n 1956-57, 
the1r share aga1n fell to 50.7 per cent 1n 1959-60. Thereafter, the 
cla1ms on the pr1vate sector started mount1ng and the1r share 1n the 
total earn1ng assets 1ncreased to 73.3 per cent 1n 1965-66. The 
reverse happened 1n the case of cla1ms on the publ1c sector. The 
break-up of cla1ms on the publ1c sector 1nto 1nvestments 1n government 
secur1t1es and advances to the government sector shows that the latter 
have ga1ned 1n 1mportance 1n recent years relat1ve to 1nvestments 1n 
government secur1t1es. The rat1o of bank advances to the government 
sector to 1nvestment 1n government secur1t1es decl1ned from 20 9 per 
cent 1n 1954-55 to 6.0 per cent 1n 1956-57 and then 1ncreased stead1ly 
to 38 7 per cent 1n 1964-65. It came down to 35.1 per cent 1n 
1965-66 
How do banks d1str1bute the1r earn1ng assets between 
the pr1vate and publlc sector, keep1ng 1n v1ew the facts that banks 
want to max1m1se prof1ts, the advances to the pr1vate sector are more 
profltable compared to 1nvestment 1n government secur1t1es or advances 
to the government, and the d1fference 1n y1elds exceeds the marg1n to 
cover the r1sk d1fferent1al ? 
The law requ1res banks to ma1nta1n m1n1mum cash reserve 
and l1qu1d1ty rat1os. Under the latter restra1nt, the banks are 
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requ1red to keep 20 per cent of the1r demand and t1me l1ab1l1t1es 
1n the form of cash 1n t1lls, balances w1th the State Bank and 
unencumbered approved secur1t1es. The cash 1n t1lls and balances 
w1th the State Bank, wh1ch also serve the purpose of cash reserve 
rat1o and work1ng balances, earn no 1ncome. The rest of the assets, 
to fulf1l the cond1t1on of l1qu1d1ty rat1o, are held 1n the form of 
government secur1t1es. If the 1nvestments of the banks 1n 
government secur1t1es are at a much h1gher level than 1s warranted 
by l1qu1d1ty rat1o cons1derat1ons, then there can be two 
explanat1ons for 1t. F1rstly 1 g1ven the 1nflex1ble standard of 
cred1t-worth1ness, there 1s 1nadequate demand for bank cred1t 1n the 
pr1vate sector. Secondly, 1f the demand for bank cred1t 1n the 
pr1vate sector 1s there, then the only poss1ble explanat1on can be 
the coerc1on from the central bank forc1ng the banks to 1nvest 1n 
government secur1t1es more than they would have w1ll1ngly done. 
Up to 1961-62, the banks were hold1ng government 
secur1t1es 1n the1r portfol1os far 1n excess of the l1qu1d1ty rat1o 
1 
requ1rements. We shall now enqu1re 1nto th1s seem1ngly unprof1table 
portfol1o d1str1but1on and try to determ1ne wh1ch of the two factors 
ment1oned above, v1z. the coerc1on of the State Bank or the lack of 
demand for cred1t, was respons1ble for 1t. We shall concentrate on 
1. Porter, R.c., L1qu1d1ty and Lend1ng, op.c1t., 1963, pp. 
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1 
the portfol1o pol1c1es of scheduled banks as a whole. Professor 
Porter~ wh1le analys1ng th1s problem, had come to the conclus1on 
that "some one-fourth of the Scheduled Banks' assets are held for 
reasons wh1ch can be only partly expla1ned by econom1c analys1s 
Some of these secur1t1es they are requ1red to hold by law (for the 
l1qu1d1ty rat1o requ1rements)~ the rest are held for a m1xture of 
2 largely non-econom1c reasons, mostly because of State Bank pressure". 
H1s argument 1s based on two factors The bank1ng 
system, 1nclud1ng the State Bank, holds 92 per cent of the 
marketable government debt. So 1f the State Bank wants to sell 
secur1t1es, 1t can place them only at the doors of the scheduled banks. 
Conversely, the scheduled banks, as a whole, can sell secur1t1es 
only to the State Bank. The l1qu1d1ty of the secur1t1es 1n the 
portfol1os of banks thus depends solely on the w1ll1ngness of the 
State Bank e1ther to purchase secur1t1es at the 1n1t1at1ve of banks, 
or to monet1se these secur1t1es by mak1ng advances aga1nst the1r 
collateral. In add1t1on to the lack of broad-based secur1t1es market, 
the actual y1eld on government secur1t1es 1s below the equ1l1br1um 
y1eld so that the State Bank has "to force the Scheduled Banks to hold 
3 
more secur1t1es than they w1sh". 
1. For the est1mates of l1qu1d1ty rat1os for Pak1stan1 and fore1gn 
banks separately, see Porter, op.c1t , pp 94-100. 
2. Porter, op.c1t., p.28. 
3. Porter, op.c1t , p 21. 
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TABLE 4-5 Scheduled Banks' Cla1ms on the Government 
and Pr1vate Secto1s. 
(Rs. 1n m1ll1on). 
Per1od 
Cla1ms on(a) Cla1ms on(b) Change 1n Rat1o of 
(July-June) Govt. Pr1vate (l) to Sector Sector (l) (2) (l + 2) 
(l) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
* 1949-50 481* 469 - - 50.6 
1950-51 514* 677 + 33 + 208 43.2 
1951-52 462 758 ... 52 + 81 37.9 
1952-53 567 779 + 105 + 21 42.1 
1953•54 611 771 + 44 
-
8 44.2 
1954-55 845 789 + 234 + 18 51.7 
1955-56 878 947 + 33 + 158 48.1 
1956-57 868 1,075 - lO + 128 44.7 
1957-58 1,009 1,156 + 141 + 81 46.6 
1958-59 1,174 1,231 + 165 + 75 48.8 
1959-60 1,368 1,409 + 194 + 178 49.3 
1960-61 1,406 1,794 + 38 + 385 43.9 
1961-62 1,596 2,340 + 190 + 546 40.5 
1962-63 1,566 3,075 
-
30 + 735 33.7 
1963-64 1,803 3,896 + 237 + 821 31.6 
1964-65 2,231 5,378 + 428 +1,482 29 3 
1965-66 2,257 6,210 + 26 + 832 26.7 
Source 1) State Bank of Pak1stan - Annual Reports on Currency and 
F1nance. 
11) Government of Pak1stan - Econom1c Survey, 1966-67. 
* Est1mated. 
a) Investment 1n government secur1t1es plus advances to the central 
and prov1nc1al governments. 
b) Advances to the pr1vate sector, b1lls purchased and d1scounted and 
1nvestment 1n pr1vate shares and debentures. 
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In support of h1s argument, he po1nts to the 
follow1ng emp1r1cal ev1dence. F1rst, he found that 1n the years of 
't1ght' l1qu1d1ty pos1t1on, the Nat1onal Bank of Pak1stan absorbed 
relat1vely more secur1t1es compared to other banks. In the years 
of 'comfortable' l1qu1d1ty pos1t1on, the roles were reversed. Th1s, 
accord1ng to Professor Porter, shows that dur1ng the years of 
t1ghtness the State Bank was unable to coerce the banks to absorb all 
secur1t1es, wh1ch 1t wanted to place w1th them. Thus, the Nat1onal 
Bank of Pak1stan, wh1ch we have seen 1n Chapter 3, has a spec1al 
relat1onsh1p w1th the State Bank, absorbed l1on's share. Secondly, 
he found "some sl1ghter ev1dence that the State Bank 1tself holds a 
larger share of the secur1t1es when the Scheduled Banks show 
1 
reluctance". 
Professor Porter's content1on that the State Bank 
forced the banks to hold a larger amount of government secur1t1es 1n 
the1r portfol1os 1s not altogether supported by the ev1dence. The 
portfol1o pol1c1es of banks were ne1ther 1rrat1onal nor uneconom1c. 
The real reason seems to be the lack of 'el1g1ble' demand for bank 
cred1t from the pr1vate sector. As the demand for bank cred1t 
1ncreased after 1958-59, the share of bank advances to the pr1vate 
sector 1n the total earn1ng assets of banks started r1s1ng. On the 
other hand, the rat1o of 1nvestments to total earn1ng assets decl1ned 
1. Porter, op.c1t., pp.22-23. 
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to 19.2 per cent ~n 1965-66. Andrus and Mohammed have suggested 
that "th~s was ach~eved by ~nvest~ng at a d~m~n~sh~ng rate ~n 
1 government secur~t~es as def~c~t-f~nanc~ng operat~ons were curta~led". 
Th~s ~s part~ally true. The banks d~d ~nvest at a d~m~n~sh~ng rate, 
but on average there has been no decl~ne ~n the def~c~t f~nanc~ng. 
The annual average gross def~c~t f~nanc~ng dur~ng 1960~66 was Rs. 505 
m~ll~on compared to the annual rate of Rs. 453 m~ll~on dur~ng 1955-60 
2 
and Rs. 294 m~ll~on ~n 1950-55 Th~s shows that w~th an 1ncrease 
~n 'el~g1ble' demand for bank cred~t, the banks were able to ra~se 
the share of loans to the pr~vate sector 1n the~r total assets, ~n 
sp~te of ~ncrease ~n def~c~t f~nanc~ng. 
The second po~nter to the lack of demand for cred1t 
~s the behav~our of the excess reserves of the banks. The banks on 
average kept relat~vely large excess reserves up to 1958-59. Once 
the demand for cred1t 1ncreased 1 the excess reserves were almost 
complately w~ped out LTable 4-!j. The pos~t~on of 'net free 
reserves' also conf1rms one hypothes1s. In the early years, the banks 
used to have substant~al 'net free reserves' ~n the slack season. 
Now they are cont1nuously depend~ng on 'net borrowed reserves'. 
LTable 4-iJ. 
1. Andrus, J.R. and A.F. Mohammed, Trade 1 F1nance and Development ~n 
Pak1stan, Oxford Un1vers1ty Press, London, 1966, pp.ll6-117. 
2. The f~gures of def~c~t f1nanc1ng are the net 1ncrease 1n the cla1ms 
of banks, 1nclud1ng the State Bank, on the central and prov1nc1al 
governments, w1thout adJustment for accret1ons to counterpart 
funds. 
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The banks 1n Pak1stan, as we shall see below, can 
borrow from the State Bank aga1nst, among others, the collateral 
of government secur1t1es. The upper l1m1t to borrow1ngs aga1nst 
government secur1t1es 1s set e1ther (a) by the1r hold1ngs of 
government secur1t1es above the l1qu1d1ty requ1rements, or (b) by 
the State Bank wh1ch, to be an effect1ve restra1nt, should be below 
the excess hold1ngs of secur1t1es by the banks. If the banks have 
excess1ve secur1t1es and do not fully ut1l1se the l1m1t sanct1oned 
by ~he State Bank for borrow1ng, then the only poss1ble explanat1on 
can be lack of prof1table opportun1t1es to ut1l1se these funds. The 
max1mum borrow1ngs of banks from the State Bank aga1nst government 
secur1t1es were Rs. 56 m1ll1on 1n 1958-59 and Rs. 203 m1ll1on 1n 
1961-62 aga1nst the sanct1oned l1m1ts of Rs. 315 m1ll1on and Rs. 576 
l 
m1ll1on respect1vely. 
III 
Sources of Funds 
Bank Depos1ts 
The bank depos1ts of scheduled banks 1n Pak1stan are 
class1f1ed 1nto two ma1n categor1es, v1z. demand depos1ts and t1me 
depos1ts. The demand depos1ts cons1st of 'current depos1ts', 'call 
1. Meena1, S.A., An Appra1sal of the Cred1t and Monetary S1tuat1on 
1n Pak1stan, The State Bank Press, Karach1, 1962, p.34. 
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depos1ts' and that part of 'sav1ngs' and 'other depos1t accounts' 
wh1ch can be w1thdrawn on demand. The t1me depos1ts 1nclude all 
f1xed depos1ts and that part of 'sav1ngs' and 'other depos1t 
accounts' wh1ch 1s l1able to payment after a not1ce. The pol1c1es 
of banks regard1ng w1thdrawal of sav1ngs depos1ts are not cons1stent. 
Some of the banks l1m1t the number of w1thdrawals per week and the 
others put l1m1t on the amount wh1ch can be w1thdrawn 1n a week 
w1thout not1ce. In the case of former banks, the amount under 
'sav1ngs' and 'other depos1t accounts' 1s d1v1ded 1nto demand and 
t1me depos1ts accord1ng to a set rat1o determ1ned by each bank 1n 
consultat1on w1th the State Bank. In fact, the holders of all k1nds 
of depos1t accounts, except f1xed depos1ts, are 1ssued w1th cheque 
books and the l1m1ts on the w1thdrawals on 'sav1ngs' and 'other 
depos1t accounts' -whether by way of restr~ct1on on number of 
cheques drawn per week or amount drawn per week - are exerc1sed 1n a 
very flex1ble manner. 
Total bank depos1ts (general) 1ncreased at an annual 
rate of Rs. 117 m1ll1on or (8.9 per cent) from 1949 to 1955. The 
growth of bank depos1ts rose to Rs. 231 m1ll1on per annum (or 10.6 
per cent) dur1ng the f1ve years end1ng June, 1960. In the follow1ng 
s1x years, the rate of growth accelerated further to Rs. 841 m1ll1on 
(or 18.2 per cent) per annum. The break-up of total depos1ts 1nto 
demand and t1me depos1ts reveals that the t1me depos1ts formed only 
17.0 per cent of total depos1ts 1n 1949. The rat10 of t1me depos1ts 
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to total depos~ts ~ncreased to 29.0 per cent ~n 1955 and edged up to 
32.1 per cent ~n 1960. Afterwards, ~t went up sharply to 50.6 per 
cent ~n 1966. Th~s ~s due to the fact that the marg~nal rat~o of 
t~me depos~ts to total depos~ts at 47.7 per cent up to 1955 , at 
37.0 per cent up to 1960 and at about 61.3 per cent thereafter, 
was well above the average rat~o. 
We shall now enqu~re how far the growth of bank 
depos~ts was the result of an ~ncrease ~n reserve money and the 
des~re on the part of banks to acqu~re more earn~ng assets The 
banks can mater~al~se the~r des~re to ~ncrease the~r earn~ng assets 
and l~ab~l~t~es by (~) econom~s~ng on the~r cash assets, <~~) ~nduc~ng 
the publ~c to hold more depos~ts and less currency, and <~~~) by 
borrow~ng from the State Bank. The banks can ~nduce the publ~c to 
hold a larger proport~on of the~r l~qu~d assets ~n the form of 
depos~ts by spread~ng the network of the~r off~ces and by o±fer~ng a 
h~gher rate of ~nterest on depos~ts. Moreover, we shall exam~ne 
the factors underly~ng the larger growth rate of t~me depos~ts compared 
to both demand depos~ts and currency ~n c~rculat~on. 
Total bank depos~ts (general) ~ncreased by Rs. 1,743 
m~ll~on ~n the decade end~ng June, 1960. Over the same per~od, bank 
cred~t ~ncreased by Rs. 1,126 m~ll~on. The growth of bank depos~ts 
at the rate of more than one and a half t~mes the growth of bank 
cred~t ~nd~cates that the ~ncrease ~n bank depos~ts up to 1960 was not 
due to the des~re on the part of the banks to acqu~re more earn~ng 
TABLE 4-6 Bank Depos1ts (General) (Rs. 1n m1ll1on) 
June Total Bank Depos1ts Demand Depos1ts T1me Depos1ts 
(Last Fr1day) Amount Change Percentage Amount Change Percentage Amount Change Percentage 
Change Change Change 
1950 1,200 1,000 200 
1951 1,375 + 175 + 14.6 1,098 + 98 + 9.8 277 + 77 + 38.5 
1952 1,288 
-
87 
-
6.4 1,045 ... 53 
-
4.8 243 
-
34 
- 12.4 
1953 1,422 + 134 + 10.4 1,118 + 73 + 7.0 304 + 61 + 25.1 
1954 1,635 + 213 + 15.0 1,202 + 84 + 7.5 433 + 129 + 42.6 
1955 1,790 + 155 + 9.5 1,270 + 68 + 5.7 519 + 86 + 19.9 
1956 1,995 + 205 + 11.5 1,431 + 161 + 12.7 564 + 45 + 8.5 
1957 2,059 + 64 + 3.2 1,490 + 59 + 4.1 569 + 5 + 0.9 
1958 2,389 + 330 + 16.1 1,689 + 199 + 14.1 700 + 131 + 23.1 
1959 2,623 + 234 + 9.8 1,870 + 181 + 10.7 753 + 53 + 7.6 
1960 2,943 + 320 + 12.2 1,997 + 127 + 6.8 946 + 193 + 25.6 
1961 3,218 + 275 + 9.3 1,991 
-
6 
- 0.3 1,227 + 281 + 29.7 
1962 3,697 + 479 + 14.9 2,190 + 199 + 10.0 1,507 + 280 + 22.8 
1963 4,715 +1018 + 27.5 2,780 + 590 + 26.9 1,935 + 428 + 28.4 
1964 5,706 + 991 + 21.0 3,274 + 494 + 17.8 2,432 + 497 + 25.7 
1965 6,883 +1177 + 20.6 3,655 + 381 + ll.6 3,228 + 796 + 32.7 
1966 7,988 +1105 + 16.0 3,949 + 294 + 8.0 4,039 +8ll + 25.1 
-
Source State Bank of Pak1stan - Reports on Currency and F1nance. 
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assets. The decl~ne ~n the rat~o of bank reserves (cash ~n t~lls 
plus balances w~th the State Bank) to total reserve money (currency 
~n c~rculat~on w~th the publ~c plus bank reserves) from 0.096 ~n 
June, 1950 to 0.085 ~n June, 1955 and further to 0.061 ~n June,l960, 
and the presence of net free reserves ~n the portfol~o of banks 
amount~ng to Rs. 106 m~ll~on ~n June, 1960, also seem to lend support 
to th~s v~ew 
The ma~n source of ~ncrease ~n bank depos~ts seems to 
be the h~gh rate of expans~on of reserve money, wh~ch ~ncreased by 
Rs 2,145 m~ll~on largely due to purchase of government debt by the 
State Bank. As a result of money creat~ng operat~ons of the government, 
bank resources were plent~ful and funds flowed ~nto the banks w~thout 
much effort. Interest rates on depos~ts were except~onally low and 
there was v1rtually no compet~t~on amongst banks on depos1ts. Wh~le 
mak~ng over ~ts sav1ngs to ~t, the pr~vate sector, for reasons 
d~scussed earl~er, was unable to make a substant1al demand on the 
l 
resources of the bank~ng system. 
The rise ~n bank depos~ts was much faster than that of 
nat~onal ~ncome up to 1955 for a number of reasons. The f~rst factor 
seems to be the des~re of the publ~c to bu~ld up the~r cash balances 
after the tremendous pol~t~cal and soc~al upheaval of Independence and 
1. Meena~, S.A., Bank~ng System of Pak~stan, The State Bank Press, 
Karach~, 1964, p.31. 
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Part1t1on. In the 1mmed1ate poast-Independence per1od 'currency 
and bank depos1ts were probably not even the most l1qu1d of 
assets, and they were certa1nly not the least r1sky. From a t1me 
when money balances were m1strusted and even eschewed 
there was undoubtedly a long per1od of r1s1ng des1res for real 
balances (and for those near moneys wh1ch complement a stable 
l 
pol1t1cal env1ronment, e.g. t1me depos1ts)'. As a result, the 
1ncrease 1n both bank depos1ts and currency 1n c1rculat1on was far 
h1gher than the r1se 1n Gross Nat1onal Product at current factor 
cost. The average rat1o of money supply (1nclud1ng t1me depos1ts) 
to G.N.P. 1ncreased from 0.144 1n June 1950 to 0.200 1n June 1955, 
the rat1o of currency 1n c1rculat1on to G.N.P. 1ncreased from 
0.083 to 0.117 and that of depos1ts from 0.061 to 0.083. The 
marg1nal rat1o of money supply to G.N.P. was as h1gh as 0.912, of 
th1s marg1nal rat10 for currency was 0.545 and for depos1ts 0.367. 
Another reason for the phenom1nal 1ncrease 1n the 
marg1nal rat1o of bank depos1ts and currency 1n c1rculat1on to G N.P. 
seems to be the severe 1mport restr1ct1ons after 1951-52, wh1ch led 
2 
to a postponement of consumpt1on and 1nvestment expend1tures. Th1s 
was, f1rstly, due to lack of suff1c1ent supply of compet1ng domest1c 
1. Porter, R c., "Income Veloc1ty and Pak1stan's Second 
Pak1stan Development Rev1ew, Summer, 1961, p.42, See 
and Mohammed, op.c1t., p.92. 
Plan" The 
'--also Andrus 
2. Parvez Hazan, Def1c1t F1nanc1ng and Cap1tal Format1on -The 
Pak1stan Exper1ence 1951-59, The Inst1tute of Development Econom1cs, 
Karach1, 1962, pp.20-26. 
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goods. Secondly, most of the essent1al commod1t1es were subJect to 
1 pr1ce and d1str1but1on controls. Th1s led to forced sav1ngs and 
the bu1ld1ng up of cash balances. Moreover, the prof1ts of 
1mporters and the small but grow1ng 1ndustr1al sector 1ncreased 
substant1ally. In the short run, there was a tendency towards 
hoard1ng of these prof1ts. Furthermore, the shortages of goods and 
the pr1ca and d1str1but1on controls gave r1se to a large black 
market. Th1s partly axpla1ns the large 1ncrease 1n currency 1n 
c1rculat1on compared to bank depos1ts. By 1955, the domast1c 
product1on of essent1al 1ndustr1al consumer goods, espec1ally cotton 
text1les, had 1ncreased substant1ally. The1mports of consumer goods 
under the u.s. commod1ty a1d programme further rel1eved shortages. 
The postponed consumpt1on expend1tures, therefore, tended to 1ncrease 
1n the subsequent per1od. 
Professor Porter, for the f1rst t1me, analysed 1n 
deta1l the role of the expans1on of bank off1ces and the 1ncreasa 1n 
1ntarest rates on sav1ngs and f1xed depos1ts 1n the mob1l1sat1on of 
depos1t resources. The number of bank off1cas more than doubled from 
202 1n June 1950 to 430 1n June 1960. The 1nterest rates on sav1ngs 
and f1xed depos1ts, however, rema1ned very low and edged up only 
sllghtly. In fact, after the 1ncrease 1n Bank Rata from 3 per cent to 
1. For the analys1s of the effect of pr1ce controls on the des1red 
cash balances, see Porter, R c., op.c1t., pp.43-47. 
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4 per cent ~n January 1959, the banks entered ~nto an Agreement to 
the effect that no bank should ra~se ~ts depos~t rates beyond an 
agreed l~m~t, wh~ch was kept very low. Professor Porter summed up 
h~s analys~s ~n the follow~ng words "The banks prefer branch 
expans~on to depos~t-rate r~ses as the means of ach~ev~ng th~s 
(mob~l~sat~on of depos~t resources). But there ~s great doubt 
whether e~ther of these methods can ~ncrease the propens~ty of the 
publ~c to use bank depos~ts. For the bank~ng system as a whole, the 
stab~l~ty of the currency-depos~t rat~o makes ~t unl~kely that new 
l 
reserves can be uncovered ~n th~s way". 
The average annual ~ncrease ~n bank depos~ts at 
Rs. 841 m~ll~on dur~ng July 1960 - June 1966, was almost f~ve t~mes 
that ~n the preced~ng decade. However, ~t was sl~ghtly above the 
growth ~n bank cred~t, wh~ch ~ncreased at an average annual rate of 
Rs. 829 m~ll~on. Th~s ~s ~n sharp contrast to the s~tuat~on 
preva~l~ng ~n the preced~ng decade when the growth of bank depos~ts 
was more than one and a half t~mes that of bank cred~t. The analys~s 
of growth ~n bank depos~ts over the th~rd per~od reveals the follow~ng 
po~nts The average rat~o of total bank depos~ts to money supply 
~ncreased substant~ally from 43.8 per cent ~n June, 1960 to 57.9 per 
cent ~n June, 1966. Th~s was due to sharp ~ncrease ~n marg~nal rat~o 
1. Porter, R.C., L~qu~d~ty and Lend~ng, op.c~t., p.5o. 
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from 45.5 per cent 1n the f1rst per1od to 70.8 per cent 1n the latter 
per1od. The rat1o of t1me depos1ts to money supply more than doubled 
from 14.1 per cent 1n 1960 to 29.3 per cent 1n 1966. Th1s 1ncrease 
took place almost ent1rely at the cost of currency 1n c1rculat1on. 
Dur1ng 1966-67, the rat1o of total depos1ts to money supply has gone 
up to 63.9 per centrum that of t1me depos1ts to 33.4 per cent. Th1s 
shows that, contrary to the conclus1on of Professor Porter, the banks 
were able to "1ncrease the propens1ty of the publ1c to use bank 
1 depos1ts". The average rat1o of depos1ts to G.N.P. at current factor 
cost rose s1gn1f1cantly from 0 091 1n 1960 to 0.148 1n 1966 The 
rat1o of currency 1n c1rculat1on to G.N.P., on the other hand, 
decl1ned from 0 114 to about 0 106 over th1s per1od. The rat1o of 
money supply to G.N.P. 1ncreased from 0.204 1n 1960 to 0.253, almost 
ent1rely due to sharp 1ncrease 1n t1me depos1ts. 
The State Bank of Pak1stan has extended the scope of 
the publ1shed data s1nce December 1961. Some aspects of the data 
regard1ng bank depos1ts, such as 1ts d1str1but1on by ownersh1p and types 
1s ava1lable s1nce September 1960. We shall base the analys1s of the 
growth of bank depos1ts dur1ng 1960-66 on th1s quarterly publ1shed 
data. 
The d1str1but1on of bank depos1ts by ownersh1p reveals 
that the manufactur1ng and commerce accounted for only 9 per cent of 
1. Porter, R.c., op.c1t., p.5o. 
~I 
! 
TABLE 4-7: The Classification :of Bank Deposits by Ownership and Types and 
Interest · i1-ates on Deposits. (Rs. in million) 
! 
i (Interest percent per annum) 
--------------------------------------------------------------~~.--~:'r-------------------------------------------------~~~~~·---r----~--------~T-------~ 1 Types of Deposits Weight! Ave- I Rates Ownership of Deposits 
June,l961 June,l966 Change Percent of 
Total Change 
r~ge Interest t 
, up o June,l961 June,l966 Change Percent ~une June 
of Total [960 1966 23rd 
Fove±gn Constituants 319 562 + 243 4.9 curr ent Deposits 1,523 2,645 
Government 527 1,625 +1098 22.0 Call . Deposits 124 215 
i) Central and 141 378 + 237 4.7 Othe 1r Deposit 355 965 Provincial Govts ···Ace ounts 
ii) Govt.Agencies and 386 lll247 + 861 17.3 13avi ngs.Deposits 390 lll757 Govt.Bodies I Business 1,149 2,251 +1102 22.1 :li'ixe d Deposits 767 2,567 
i) Agriculture 47 134 + 87 1.7 II ... ~.· i) Up to 6 months 236 559 
ii) Manufacturing 245 389 + 144 2.9 'hi) 6 months to 1 393 1,123 
.year 
iii) Commerce 287 589 + 302 6.1 iii) 1 year to 21 116 169 .~· I 
years 
iv) Others 570 1,139 + 569 11.4 iv) 2 years to 3 19 108 
years I 
Trust Funds, Non- v) Over 3 years 3 608 
Profitable Organisa- 171 313 + 142 2.8 
... I tions. -:· .. Personal 992 3,398 +2406 48.2 
Total Deposits 3,159 8,150 +4991 100.0 Total Deposits 3,159 8,150 
I 
* Rates of interest on special notice accounts or deposits witft-drawablE at notice of up to 29 days. 
@ Rates of interest on special notice accounts or deposits with-drawablE at_notice of up to 80 days or more. 
b Rates of interest on fixed deposits for a period of 3 years to 4 years. 
c.R~tes of interest on fixed deposits for 4 years and over. 
June Ch~nge 1965 
+1,142 22.5 0~28 o.o1 
91 2.01 * + 1.8 1.83 2.25 
+ 610 12.2 0 .• 53 1.87 2.50@ 
+1,367 27.4 1~53 3.47 ·2.50 
+1,800 36.1 
+ 323 6.5 2 .• 44 3.21 2.50 
+ 730 14.6 2~37 3.51 2.75 
! 
+ 53 1.1 3~37 4.06 3 
! 
+ 89 1.8 3~oOO 4.44 3.25 
! 
+ 605 12.1 2i85 4.82 3.50b 
4c 
+4,991 100.0 I 
Banker's 
Associa ... 
tion 
Rates in-
troduced 
from 24th 
June,l965 
* 2.25 
2.50@ 
3.50 
2.50 
3.25 
4 
4.25 
4.5ob 
5c 
State 
Banks' 
Rates 
Announce-
ment on I 
Aug. Oct. 
16th 16th 
1965 1967 
* I * 2.2512.25 i 
2.50 2.50 @ @ r· 
3.50 
I 
4 
I 
3.50 4 
3.75 4 
I 
4 4.25 
I 
4.25 4.50 
b I b ', 
4.50,4.51 
5cl y 
N.B. It is permisslbe for the scheduled banks incorporated in Pakistan and falling under the following categories to quote rate~ of interest on deposits higher tha~ 
those prescribed above, to the extent mentioned against each categdry:M 
i) Banks having deposits up to Rs.l50 million - 1 per cent above the pr,scribed rates; ii) Banks having deposits of over Rs.l59 million but not exceeding Rs.300 
million ... ! per cent above the prescribed rates; iii) Banks having deposits of Rs.300 million but not exceeding Rs.500 milli?n - ~ per cent above the prescribed 
rates; The above rates apply to all deposits except inter-bank call ~eposits accepted from institutions already approved fot the purpose. 
' ' 
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the total 1ncrease 1n depos1ts At the same t1me, these two sectors 
cla1med more than 75 per cent of the 1ncrease 1n bank advances 
Th1s 1s understandable. These sectors are trad1t1onal borrowers and 
the1r work1ng balances do not r1se 1n proport1on to the growth 1n 
the1r operat1ons. In sharp contrast to th1s, the agr1cultural 
sector was net cred1tor to the banks. Its depos1ts at Rs. 134 m1ll1on 
1n June 1966 were one and a half t1mes 1ts borrow1ngs from banks 
(exclud1ng Agr1cultural Development Bank of Pak1stan). Th1s 1s due to 
conservat1ve loan pol1c1es of banks. The depos1ts of 'other bus1ness' 
doubled over th1s per1od and accounted for 11.4 per cent of total 
1ncrease 1n depos1ts. Th1s category seems to 1nclude small traders 
and manufacturers. 
The government sector was respons1ble for 22 per cent 
of the 1ncrease 1n depos1ts. In the government sector, the really 
s1zeable 1ncrease took place 1n the depos1ts o± the central and 
prov1nc1al government agenc1es and local bod1es. The 1ncrease 1n the1r 
depos1ts 1s 1n l1ne w1th the 1ncreas1ng role ass1gned to them 1n the 
execut1on of the development programme. The government 1s allocat1ng 
funds to these agenc1es, such as Water and Power Development Author1ty 
and Pak1stan Industr1al Development Corporat1on, on an 1ncreas1ng 
scale for the1r proJects. They depos1t a part of these funds w1th the 
banks pend1ng the1r ut1l1sat1on. If the s1ze of the1r depos1ts 1s 
related to the1r total budgets, 1t may appear that the rat1o of depos1ts 
to total annual flows 1s not much larger. 
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The ~ncrease ~n bank depos~ts, although w~dely 
shared by all categor~es, was ma~nly due to a steep r~se ~n personal 
accounts. The personal accounts were respons~ble for 48 per cent 
of the total ~ncrease ~n bank depos~ts and the1r rat~o to total 
depos~ts ~mproved from 31 per cent ~n June 1961 to 42 per cent ~n 
June 1966. The bulk of the personal depos~ts are ~n the form of 
~nterest-earn~ng sav~ngs and f~xed depos~ts. In June l966,more than 
75 per cent of personal depos~ts were ~n the form of these two 
categor~es of depos~ts. The analys~s of growth of bank depos~ts by 
types corroborates th~s fact. Of the total ~ncrease ~n bank depos~ts, 
63 5 per cent was ~n the form of sav~ngs and f~xed depos~ts. Thus 
the~r rat~o to total depos~ts ~ncreased from 36.6 per cent ~n June 
1961 to 53.1 per cent ~n June 1966 Current and call depos~ts, on 
the other hand, accounted for only 24.3 per cent of the total 
~ncrease 1n depos1ts. 
The sharp ~ncrease ~n personal depos~ts 1s 
attr1butable largely to three factors, namely (~) the growth of 
nat~onal 1ncome, (1~) the expans~on of the bank~ng system, and 
<~~1) the ~ncrease ~n ~nterest rates on depos1ts. The pauc~ty of the 
publ1shed data does not allow to quant~fy the effect of these factors 
~nd~v~dually. We can, however, arr~ve at some tentat1ve conclus~ons 
by compar~ng the magn1tudes of these factors. 
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(1) The G.N.P. at current factor cost 1ncreased by 
43 per cent from 1960-61 to 1965-66 The 1ncrease 1n nom1nal per 
cap1ta 1ncome was 25 4 per cent and 1n real per cap1ta 1ncome only 
14 1 per cent. The personal depos1ts, on the other hand, 1ncreased 
by 243 per cent Th1s shows that, even 1f we expect a somewhat 
larger growth rate of depos1ts than 1ncome, the 1ncrease 1n nat1onal 
1ncome expla1ns only a small part of the r1se 1n personal depos1ts. 
(11) The commerc1al banks 1n Pak1stan bel1eve that 
"the1r exper1ence has clearly demonstrated that the only effect1ve 
approach to the problem of depos1t-mob1l1aat1on 1s to 1mprove the 
1 
coverage of the bank1ng system by open1ng new branches". The Cred1t 
Comm1ttee also came to the same conclus1on. They recommended that 
''an essent1al requ1rement for develop1ng new depos1 t resources 1s to 
extend the coverage of the bank1ng system, part1cularly 1n the less 
developed areas ••• The banks should be urged, even under compuls1on, 
to spread out 1n the less developed areas ••• The expans1on of the 
bank1ng system 1s of extreme 1mportance 1n the dr1ve for mob1l1s1ng 
2 depos1ts". Professor Porter, on the other hand, doubts that "the 
system as a whole can 1nduce much sh1ft from currency to depos1ts 1n 
3 
th1s way". Although 1t 1s d1ff1cult to quant1fy the role of branch 
1. Meena1, S.A., op.c1t., p.98. 
2. Report of the Cred1t Comm1ttee, Government of Pak1stan Press, 
Karach1, 1962, p.9. 
3. Porter, R.c., L1qu1d1ty and Lend1ng op.c1t., p.49. 
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expans~on ~n depos~t-mob~l~sat~on ~n the absence of data regard~ng 
the amount and types of depos~ts that are placed ~n the new branches, 
we can form a rough ~dea from the publ~shed data. We can safely 
assume that the depos~ts ~n small town branches of banks are mostly 
personal and that bank accounts are used for the safe custody of 
sav~ngs, wh~le current transact~ons are conducted mostly for cash. 
The total number of commerc~al bank off~ces went up 
from 619 ~n June 1962 to \846 ~n June 1966. At the same t~me, bank 
depos~ts ~ncreased from Rs. 3p79 m~ll~on to Rs. &150 m1ll~on. The 
average depos~ts per off~ce fell from Rs. 5 94 m~ll1on 1n June 1962 
to Rs. 4.41 m1ll~on ~n June 1966, and the marg1nal depos1ts per 
off1ce amounted to Rs. 3.64 m1ll~on. The break-up of bank off1ces and 
depos1ts ~nto 17 large c~ty centres and the smaller towns reveals that 
the number of bank off~ces 1n the former group rose from 346 to 777 
and the depos1ts 1ncreased from Rs. 3~28 m~ll~on to Rs. 6~98 m~ll~on. 
In the 1atter group, the number of off~ces went up from 273 to 1069 
and the depos~ts ~ncreased from Rs. 431 m~ll1on to Rs lp52 m~ll~on. 
The follow~ng po~nts of ~nterest emerge from these stat~st~cs. 
(~) The averaga depos~ts per off~ce ~n smaller towns were almost one-
s~xth of that 1n the centres. <~~) Although the smaller towns cla~med 
65 per cent of the ~ncreased ~n the number of bank off~ces, the~r 
contr~but~on to the ~ncrease ~n depos~ts was 27 per cent only. The~r 
average share ~n total depos1ts, however, ~ncreased from 11.7 per cent 
~n June 1962 to 20.3 per cent ~n June 1966. <~~1) The average depos1ts 
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per off1ce rema1ned stable 1n the smaller towns wh1le they 
recorded ll per cent decl1ne 1n the case of larger c1t1es. 
The 1ncrease 1n the rat1o of depos1ts mob1l1sed 1n the 
smaller towns to total depos1ts and the stab1l1ty of average per 
off1ce depos1t 1n that group shows that the spread1ng out of banks 
1n the 1nter1or of the country has helped 1n the mob1l1sat1on of 
depos1ts. The 1ncrease of Rs. 1~21 m1ll1on 1n depos1ts 1n smaller 
towns compared to the r1se 1n Rs. 496 m1ll1on 1n bank cred1t there 
shows that a greater part of these depos1ts was transferred to c1t1es. 
The decl1ne 1n the average depos1ts per off1ce 1n the large c1ty 
centres and comparat1vely a very low amount of depos1ts per off1ce 1n 
the smaller towns, on the other hand, shows that an exclus1ve 
rel1ance of banks on branch expans1on for depos1t-mob1l1sat1on may 
y1eld decreas1ng returns. 
(111) The depos1t rates 1n Pak1stan are qu1te low. The 
we1ghted average rate of 1nterest on depos1ts 1n December 1961 was as 
low as 1.14 per cent. S1nce then there has been an upward movement 1n 
1nterest rates on depos1~• and the we1ghted average rate of 1nterest 
has almost doubled. The best part of th1s 1ncrease took place 1n 
1965-66, the we1ghted average depos1t rate rose from 1.57 per cent 1n 
June 1965 to 2.23 per cent 1n June 1966. Th1s 1s because after an 
1ncrease 1n Bank Rate from 4 per cent to 5 per cent 1n June 1965 the 
State Bank d1rected the banks to 1ncrease the1r depos1t rates on 
sav1ngs and f1xed depos1ts by one per cent. 
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The commerc1al banks 1n Pak1stan~ unt1l recently, were 
1 
opposed to the r1se 1n depos1t rates. They came to bel1eve from 
the1r exper1ence that depos1ts were 1nterest-1nelast1c 2 For that 
reason~ when the Bank Rate was ra1sed from 3 per cent to 4 per cent 
1n January 1959, the banks entered 1nto an agreement to the effect 
that no bank should ra1se depos1t rates beyond an agreed l1m1t. The 
bel1ef 1n the 1nelast1c1ty of depos1ts to 1nterest rates rested on the 
h1gh and stable rat1o of currency to money supply up to 1958. 
Strangely enough, 1n sp1te of stable currency-money supply rat1o, the 
banks argued that the1r branch expans1on programme had been 
successful 1n mob1l1s1ng depos1ts. At the same t1me, they argued that 
wh1le 1ncrease 1n depos1t rates would not attract fresh depos1ts 7 1t 
would re-allocate ex1st1ng depos1ts 1n favour of 1nterest-bear1ng 
sav1ngs and f1xed depos1ts. Th1s would 1ncrease the average cost of 
ex1st1ng amount of depos1ts and would reduce the prof1ts of banks. 
The reduced prof1ts of banks would make 1t d1ff1cult for them to 
expand the1r network, wh1ch, 1n turn, would hamper the1r depos1t-
mob1l1sat1on effort. The banks, 1n fact, were suggest1ng that wh1le 
actual depos1tors were 1nterest-consc1ous, the potent1al depos1tors 
1. Porter, R.c., L1qu1d1ty and Lend1ng, op.c1t.~ p.45. 
2. Meena1 1 s.A., (1) An Appra1sal of the Cred1t and Monetary S1tuat1on 
1n Pak1stan, State Bank Press, Karach1 1 1962 1 pp.95-99, 122-124, 
(11) The Bank1ng System of Pak1stan, The State Bank Press, Karach1, 
1964, pp.l02-104, (111) 'Pak1stan' 1n W.F.Cr1ck, Commonwealth 
Bank1ng Systems, Oxford Un1vers1ty Press, London, 1965, pp.277-278, 
(1v) Money and Bank1ng 1n Pak1stan 7 The All1es Book Corporat1on, 
Karach1 1 1966 7 pp 223-225. 
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were not As regards the prof1ts of banks~ they are not determ1ned 
solely by the depos1t rates. They rather depend on the spread 
between the 1nterest rates on depos1ts and bank advances. The 
we1ghted average rate of 1nterest on advances 1ncreased from 4.21 
per cent 1n December 1958 to 5.26 per cent 1n December 1961. It rose 
to 6.64 per cent 1n June 1965 and further to 6.98 per cent 1n 
December, 1966. The spread between we1ghted average rates of 1nterest 
on depos1ts and advances has 1ncreased from 4.03 per cent 1n March~ 
1962 1 to 4.64 per cent 1n December, 1966. 
The Cred1t Comm1ttee endorsed the content1on of 
commerc1al banks that depos1ts are 1nterest-1nelast1c. ·~ large 
number of depos1tors are not 1nterest consc1ous. Under the 
c1rcumstances 1 many of the exper1enced w1tnesses and maJor1ty of the 
members of the Comm1ttee are of the v1ew that the convent1onal 
approach of 1ncreas1ng 1nterest rates to attract more depos1ts may 
not solve the problem. It 1s true that a dar1ng exper1ment of 
effect1ng a sharp 1ncrease 1n rates of 1nterest on depos1ts has not 
been carr1ed out 1n Pak1stan and 1t 1s poss1ble that 1f the rates were 
1ncreased substant1ally, say from 2 per cent to 4 per cent~ the 
response may be good. We do not, however, cons1der such a step 
1 
pract1cable for the present". The Plann1ng Comm1ss1on, on the other 
hand, has been advocat1ng an upward adJustment of the 1nterest rate 
1. Report of the Cred1t Comm1ttee, Government of Pak1stan Pres~, 
Karach1~ 1962, pp.8-9. 
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structure. "There ex1sts a good case for an upward rev1s1on 1n 
1nterest rates. Product1v1ty of 1nvestment 1s ••• as h1gh as 30 
per cent 1n large scale 1ndustry. The 1nterest rate structure 
should bear some relat1onsh1p to prof1tab1l1ty of 1nvestment ••• 
In fact, h1gher 1nterest rates should not only attract h1gher 
1 
sav1ngs but also br1ng about select1v1ty 1n 1nvestment". They 
aga1n emphas1sed that "1t 1s necessary to set the rewards of 
sav1ng and the cost to users of cred1t 1n l1ne w1th the true 
econom1c rate of 1nterest as far as poss1ble ••• the return on 
2 
sav1ngs has rema1ned 1nadequate". 
The State Bank has always favoured an 1ncrease 1n 
1nterest on depos1ts. However, 1ts moral pressure on the banks to 
ra1se the depos1t rates unt1l recently seems to be half-hearted. 
At 1ts 1nstance, the banks ra1sed the 1nterest rate on sav1ng depos1ts 
only from 2 per cent to 2! per cent on 14th May, 1962. In July 1963, 
the State Bank 1ntroduced Quota System to encourage the banks to 
mob1l1se depos1ts. Th1s fa1led to stem the 1ncreas1ng dependence of 
the banks on the central bank f1nance. Rather the1r borrow1ngs from 
the State Bank 1ncreased at an accelerated pace. After the 1ncrease 
1n Bank rate from 4 per cent to 5 per cent 1n June 1965, the State 
Bank for the f1rst t1me exerc1sed 1ts statutory powers and ra1sed the 
1. Plann1ng Comm1ss1on, Government of Pak1stan, The Second F1ve-Year 
~ (1960-65), June 1960, pp.77 and 79. 
2. Plann1ng Comm1ss1on, Government of Pak1stan, The Th1rd F1ve-Year 
~ (1965-70), June 1965, p.l23. 
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depos~t rates on sav~ngs and all categor~es of f~xed depos~ts by 
one per cent. The Bank seems to have acted on the suggest~on of 
Dr.Meena~ that, wh~le the scheduled banks' agreement on depos~t 
rates should rema~n, ~t should ra~se the depos~t rates upward. 
1 
Th~s would avo~d unhealthy compet~t~on among banks. 
It ~s ev~dent from table 4-8 that the we~ghted 
average rates of ~nterest on sav~ngs and f~xed depos~ts have 
recorded r~se over the last f~ve years. The r~se ~n depos~t rates 
was part~cularly sharp dur~ng 1965-66. The ~ncrease ~n depos~t 
rates also seems to have contr~buted to the sharp r~se ~n sav~ng and 
f~xed depos~ts. The annual average rate of ~ncrease ~n sav~ng and 
f~xed depos~ts more than doubled from Rs. 425 m~ll~on dur~ng 1961-64 
to Rs. 946 m~ll~on dur~ng 1964-66. Th~s ~s ~n l~ne w~th the 
exper~ence ~n other countr~es. In South Afr~ca, "the commerc~al banks 
have dur1ng recent years made v~gorous efforts to attract sav1ngs 
and t~me depos~ts, and have succeeded ~n do1ng so by stepp~ng up the~r 
2 sav~ngs and t~me depos~t rates". In Ind~a, "a much sharper ~ncrease 
~n t~me depos~ts was largely due to a r~s~ng trend ~n the ~nterest 
3 
rates offered on such depos~ts". In Austral~a, wh~le the proport~on 
1. Meena~, S.A., An Appra~sal ••• op.c1t., p.96. 
2. Arndt, E.H.D., 'South Afr~ca' 1n Cr~ck, W.F., Commonwealth 
Bank~ng Systems, Oxford Un1vers1ty Press, 1965, p.326. 
3. Madan, B.K., 1 Ind1a 1 1n Cr1ck, W.F., op.c~t., p.205. 
TABLE 4-8: Savings and Fixed Deposits and Weighted Average Rate of Interest .. 
(Rs. in lljillion) 
(Interest per cent per annum) 
i 
Savings Deposits Fixed Deposits 
I Up to 6 months 6 mont;hs t< 1 year to 2 years to Over 3 years ~ 1 year 2 years 3 years I 
Amount Interest Amount Interest Amount In erest Amount Interest Amount Interest 1 Amount Interest 
September, 1960 364 1.54 212 2.53 488 2 33 24 3.,27 8 2.,99 1 2 ... 94 
December, 1960 393 1.50 193 2 .. 55 400 \ 2 7o 121 2.,65 9 3.11 I 
-
3.07 
March, 1961 -388 1.48 197 2 .. 57 383 2 90 156 2.,82 9 3.4 I 2 4.15 
June, 1961 390 1.72 236 2.48 393 2 78 116 1.79 19 3.25 I 3 4.04 
September, 1961 413 1.73 250 2.,52 504 2 68 34 2.88 18 3.28 i 7 3.,99 I 
December~ 1961 425 1.79 292 2.74 523 2 76 40 3.21 19 3.,28 ! 12 4.00 
' March, 1962 433 1.,79 290 2.73 571 2.,72 38 3.13 25 3.37 !~ 18 4.00 
June, 1962 488 1.,97 279 2.78 586 t5 109 2.82 30 3 .. 28 25 3.92 September, 1962 528 2.05 375 2.55 661 2,,74. 43 3.31 30 3.44 37 3.,84 
December~ 1962 564 2.09 391 2.50 679 2.,84 43 3.22 35 3.50 I 53 4.06 
March, 1963 601 2 .. 10 403 2.51 ,.681 2, 82 53 3.,36 36 3.,45 I 60 4.,07 i 
June, 1963 666 2 .. 10 376 2 .. 53 711 2. 85 53 3.30 35 3.41 72 4.07 
September, 1963 739 2 .. 09 379 2.48 749 2. 76 75 3.,13 30 3.43 79 4.,04 
December, 1963 782 2.11 382 2.,54 763 2'. 86 91 3.24 31 3.54 92 3.,66 
March, 1964 889 1o90 354 2.52 812 2. 79 78 3.,23 34 3.52 110 3.70 
June, 1964 967 2.09 389 2.54 832 3 16 94 3.11 31 3.,52 I 120 4.03 
September, 1964 1,067 ·2.10 414 2 .. 49 896 2 81 93 3 .. 23 37 3.54 157 3 .. 62 
December, 1964 1,136 2.,12 486 2.,49 928 2. 87 108 3.22 39 3.,55 198 3.92 
March, 1965 1,206 2 .. 11 402 2.63 1,070 2. 89 138 3.08 46 3.52 ' 249 3.75 
June, 1965 1,292 2 .. 16 315 2.70 1,107 2. 91 114 3.22 43 3.53 327 4.11 
September, 1965 1,312 3.37 374 3.08 1,088 3. 38 112 3.75 60 3.84 I 395 4.49 
December, 1965 1,433 3.44 404 3.26 1,088 3.,33 140 3.86 62 4.07 445 4.64 
March, 1966 1,557 3.45 491 3.23 1,088 3~41 161 3 .. 96 82 4.,27 522 4.,74 
June, 1966 1,757 3.47 559 3.2i 1~123 3.151 169 4.,06 108 4.44 608 4.82 
I 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan: Bulletin (monthly), July to I 
November~ 1967. 
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of f1xed depos1ts to the total depos1ts has decl1ned from 60 per 
cent to 20 per cent due to "low 1nterest rates enforced by the 
central bank", aga1n 1ncreased "to 30 per cent under the 1ncent1ve 
l 
of h1gher 1nterest rates". 
2. Borrow1ngs From the State Bank of Pak1stan 
The understand1ng of the procedure of scheduled banks' 
borrow1ngs from the State Bank 1s 1mportant for the analys1s of the 
determ~nants of the volume of bank cred~t and 1ts control. The 
scheduled banks can replen1sh the1r cash reserves by sell1ng 
government and trustee secur1t1es to the Bank, red1scount1ng el1g1ble 
b1lls of exchange or by borrow1ng from 1t aga1nst the collateral of 
2 
secur1t1es and b1lls. The State Bank 1s not legally obl1ged to 
lend unl1m1ted amounts aga1nst the1r collateral, 1n fact, 1t f1xes 
l1m1ts for such borrow1ngs each year. The banks can also borrow to 
the extent of advances they have made to the central and prov1nc1al 
governments for state trad1ng purposes. Th1s, as we have seen above, 
1s termed 'counterf1nance' F1nally~ the Bank may lend money to the 
scheduled banks aga1nst government guarantee or any other form of 
3 
secur1ty, wh1ch 1n 1ts op1n1on 1s suff1c1ent. 
1. Holder, R.F., 'Austral1a', 1n Cr1ck, W.F., op.c1t , p.68 
2. The State Bank of Pak1stan Act, 1956, Sect1on (17(4) (a) and (c), 
and 17(2) (a) and (b). 
3. The State Bank of Pak1stan Act, 1956, Sect1on 18(1) (b). 
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TABLE 4-9 Scheduled Banks' Borrow~ngs from 
The State Bank. 
(Rs. ~n m~ll~on) 
Weekly Weekly Weekly Sanct~oned Rat~o of (1) 
Average M~n~mum Max~mum L~m~t to Bank Cred~t 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1954-55 73 4 172 N.A. 8.0 
1956-57 105 27 214 N.A. 9.5 
1958-59 83 10 228 762 6.2 
1959-60 79 7 212 N.A. 5.1 
1961-62 523 340 776 1,273 19.8 
1963-64 616 219 974 1.,856 14.7 
1964-65 1.,268 652 1.,746 2.,298 21.8 
1965-66 1,457 952 1.,777 2,965 22.4 
Source State Bank of Pak~stan - Bank~ng Stat~st~cs (Annual). 
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The scheduled banks' borrow1ngs from the State Bank 
rema1ned small and seasonal 1n character up to 1959-60. The1r 
borrow1ngs tended to 1ncrease dur1ng the busy season to f1nance 
the movement of cash crops, v1z. JUte and cotton. After the 
market1ng of crops, the funds would flow back 1nto the bank1ng 
system and they would reduce the1r 1ndebtedness to the State Bank. 
Th1s 1s ev1dent from the weekly max1mum and m1n~mum f1gures 1n 
table 4-9. S1nce 1959-601 the banks have not only taken 1ncreas1ng 
recourse to the State Bank ass15tance, the1r borrow1ngs to a great 
extent have lost the1r seasonal character. Th1s 18 ev1dent from 
the sharp 1ncrease 1n the weekly average level and the narrow1ng down 
of the d1fference between the weekly max1mum and m1n1mum levels of 
scheduled banks' borrow1ngs The rat1o of funds borrowed from the 
State Bank to total bank cred1t has gone up from 5.1 per cent 1n 
1959-60 to 22.4 per cent 1n 1965-66. Th1s 18 because the average 
annual expans1on of bank cred1t at 27.7 per cent after 1959-60 far 
outstr1pped the average annual 1ncrease of 17.3 per cent 1n bank 
depos1ts. The smoothen1ng of the seasonal var1at1ons 1s largely due 
to the 1ncrease 1n the proport1on of advances to the non-commerc1al 
sectors to the total bank advances from 31 per cent 1n December 1953 
to 60 per cent 1n June 1966 (exclud1ng advances of the Agr1cultural 
Development Bank and the Industr1al Development Bank). 
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Chapter 5. 
CREDIT POLICY AND CONTROL OF THE MONEY 
SUPPLY. 
In the present chapter we are go~ng to d~scuss the 
control of the money supply by the State Bank ~n the ~nterest of 
monetary stab~l~ty. For th~s purpose the Bank has been entrusted 
w~th a w~de array of cred~t control weapons to control both the 
volume and d~rect~on of bank cred~t. These ~nclude (~) var~at~on 
~n the Bank rate, (~~) open market operat~ons ~n government 
secur~t~es of any matur~ty, c~~~) unl~m~tad var~at~on ~n the legal 
cash reserve rat~o, and (~v) changes ~n the l~qu~d~ty rat~o. The 
Bank can f~x ce~l~ngs on ~ts advance and d~scount fac~l~t~es to the 
banks, f~x the rate of ~nterest on depos~ts and advances of banks 
and 1mpose marg1n requ~rements on advances. It 1s also empowered to 
determ~ne the lend1ng pol~c~es of banks ~n general or of each bank 
~nd~v~dually and they are bound to follow these pol~c~es. The last 
power g~ves the Bank a very effect~ve d~rect control over the volume 
and d~rect~on of bank cred1t. 
Although the State Bank has all these powers, we 
shall argue that by ~ts pol1cy of support to government secur~t1es 
and by enter1ng ~nto agreement w~th the banks to prov~de 
counterf~nance for the1r loans to the government, 1t has lost control 
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on money supply through quant~tat~ve cred~t control measures. The 
Bank takes the v~ew that ~ts quant~tat~ve cred~t control weapons are 
~neffect~ve due to the absence of a well developed short-term money 
market and ~nsens~t~veness of market ~nterest rates, but we shall 
show that the data do not support th~s v~ew and that the Bank can 
have effect~ve control over the money supply through these ~nd~rect 
measures ~f ~t would drop ~ts present pol~c~es of prov~d~ng cheap 
cred~t. More ~mportant, we ~ntend to exam~ne why under the present 
arrangements the Bank's efforts to control the expans~on of bank 
cred~t to the pr~vate sector and money supply through ~ncrease ~n 
the Bank Rate~ seem to have the reverse effect, v~z., accelerate the 
pace of the~r growth. We shall postpone the d~scuss~on of adverse 
~mpl~cat~ons of cheap cred~t pol~cy for the Bank's th~rd ma~n 
ObJect~ve of assur~ng adequate prov~s~on of cred~t for development 
purposes to the next chapter. 
We shall start by def~n~ng the money supply. The 
money supply ~n Pak~stan ~s def~ned to ~nclude (a) currency ~n 
c~rculat~on outs~de the bank~ng system (Cp.), cons~st~ng of the 
State Bank notes and treasury currency, and (b) demand depos~ts of 
the publ~c w~th the scheduled banks (D) and 'other depos~ts' w~th 
the State Bank, exclud~ng Counterpart Funds and other loan accounts 
(Od). We shall call th~s act~ve money supply and ~n notat~ons 
M1 = Cp + Dm, where Dm = D + Od. 
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The off~c~al def~n~t~on of money supply excludes 
t~me depos~ts. In fact, ~n the analys~s of monetary expans~on, the 
expans~onary ~nfluence emanat~ng from the ~ncrease ~n bank cred~t 
to the pr~vate sector ~s offset by the growth of t~me depos~ts. 
Th~s v~ew ~s based on the comparat~vely smaller turnover of t~me 
depos~ts as ~s ev~dent from the data set out ~n table 5-l. Recently, 
the Bank has started e~phasa$lng that, wh~le guag~ng monetary flows 
~n the economy, the cont~nu~ng s1zeable accumulat1on of t~me 
depos1ts should be taken 1nto account. Th1s 1s, f1rstly, because 
they are a very close money subst~tute and presumably add to the 
total l~qu~d~ty of the economy ~n much the same way as money supply 
{as def~ned by the Bank). Secondly, the s~ze and compos~t~on of 
nearHmoney assets have a bear~ng on changes ~n the veloc~ty of money, 
1 wh~ch ~n turn~ affect the level of effect~ve demand. We shall treat 
t~me depos~ts as 1dle money (M2 ), Total money supply thus cons~sts 
of act~ve money balances plus ~dle money, 1.e., Ms ~ M1 + M2 • 
Growth of Money Supply and Its Determ1nants. 
The State Bank analyses the expans~on or contract1on 
of the money supply 1n terms of the 'causat1ve 1 changes of (1) the 
pr1vate sector, (2) the government sector, and (3) the fore1gn sector 
to such expans~on or contract1on. The 1 causat1ve analys1s' of the 
1. Annual Speech of the Governor, State Bank of Pak1stan, 1966, 
p.5, see also Andrus and Mohammed, op.c~t., p.94. 
TABLE 5-l. 
Type of Account 
Current Depos1ts 
Call Depos1ts 
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Turnover of Depos1ts 
(Apr11 - June quarter) 
1962 1963 
9.17 9.78 
9.28 7.39 
Other Depos1t Accounts 4.03 3.99 
Sav1ngs Depos1ts 0.60 0.97 
F1xed Depos1ts 0.59 0.52 
All Depos1ts 5.09 5.34 
1964 1965 ~966 
9.67 10.36 0.20 
7.38 3.53 3.97 
2.67 3.28 3.64 
0.94 0.83 o.81 
0.66 0.45 0.49 
4.76 4.39 4 17 
Source The State Bank of Pak1stan - Stat1st1cs on Scheduled 
Banks 1n Pak1stan (Quarterly). 
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Bank 1s based on the comb1ned balance sheets of the State Bank and 
the scheduled banks 1n the follow1ng form 
Assets. 
F + + B 
+ L + A . . 
(1) 
(2) 
The f1rst 1dent1ty refers to the balance sheet of the State Bank and 
the second to the comb1ned balance sheets of scheduled banks. By 
add1ng (1) and (2) 
C + 0 + D + T = M p d s = ••• (3) 
Accord1ng to def1n1t1on of the money supply used by the Bank 
M1 = F + G + (L - T) + A 
and also. 
A F 4- c. c + ( A.L .. "" T) + A A 
The symbols on the r1ght s1de of the 1dent1t1es stand for the 
follow1ng 1tems 1n the balance sheets 
F = Fore1gn assets 1n the portfol1o of the State Bank. 
= State Bank's 1nvestments 1n government secur1t1es 
and treasury b1lls, advances to the government 
adJusted for government balances and counterpart 
funds w1th the Bank, 1t also 1ncludes treasury 
currency 1n c1rculat1on w1th the publ1c and 1n the 
t1lls of banks, 
B 
L 
A 
G 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
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Scheduled banks' borrow~ngs from the State Bank. 
Cash ~n t~lls plus banks' balances w~th the State 
Bank. 
Scheduled banks' ~nvestments ~n government 
secur~t~es and advances to the government. 
Scheduled banks' advances to the pr~vate sector, b~lls 
purchased and d~scounted and ~nvestment ~n pr~vate 
secur~t~es. 
Net other assets of banks. 
Total def~c~t f~nanc~ng, ~.e. net government 
borrow~ngs from the ent~re bank~ng system, depends on the f~scal pol~cy 
of the government. The Bank ~s obv~ously ~n no pos~t~on to determ~ne 
the actual pattern of government f~scal pol~cy, though ~t can adv~se 
the government ~n a part~cular s~tuat~on. The outstand~ng level of 
fore~gn assets ~n the portfol~o of the Bank - the sole custod~an of 
fore~gn exchange reserves - ~s also the net result of autonomous export 
proceeds and fore~gn a~d and the ~mport pol~c~es of the government. 
The Bank, therefore, assumes the ~mpact of f~scal operat~ons and of 
changes ~n the volume of fore~gn assets on money supply as g~ven. Thus 
the Bank can control money supply only by regulat~ng scheduled banks' 
cla~ms on the pr~vate sector. 
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We have set out the growth of money supply and 1ts 
determ1nants 1n table 5-2. It shows that act1ve money supply 
1ncreased by Rs. 2,783 m1ll1on dur1ng 1950-59. Of the total 1ncrease 
1n act1ve money, the def1c1t 1n government f1nanc1al transact1ons 
was respons1ble for Rs. 2,589 m1ll1on (93 per cent), surplus 1n 
balance of payments for Rs. 23 m1ll1on (1.0 per cent), and the 
scheduled banks' cla1m on the pr1vate sector, adJusted for sh1ft to 
t1me depos1ts, for Rs. 88 m1ll1on (3.2 per cent) The State Bank d1d 
not take any quant1tat1ve cred1t control measures over th1s per1od, 
1n sp1te of a sharp r1se 1n act1ve money dur1ng 1955-58, because 
(a) 94 per cent of the r1se 1n act1ve money was due to autonomous 
factors, (b) the banks were already follow1ng very conservat1ve lend1ng 
pol1c1es and the net 1ncrease 1n cred1t to the pr1vate sector was 
small, and (c) 1t was afra1d that a reduct1on 1n cred1t to the pr1vate 
sector m1ght hamper product1on. 
Dur1ng 1959•67, the act1ve money 1ncreased by a 
larger amount of Rs. 4 1 872 m1ll1on. The s1ngle maJor contr1but1ng 
factor was bank cred1t to the pr1vate sector, wh1ch 1ncreased sharply 
by Rs. 7 1 188 m1ll1on and even after adJustment for accumulat1on of 
Rs. 4,387 m1ll1on 1n 1dle money 1t accounted for 57.4 per cent of the 
1ncrease 1n act1ve money as aga1nst 3.2 per cent 1n the preced1ng 
per1od. The State Bank 1mposed a number of cred1t control measures 
but fa1led to restra1n the growth of bank cred1t 
I 
TABLE 5-2. Causat1ve Analys1s of Money Supply. (M1111on Rs). 
Increase Expans1onary (+) Contract1onary (-) 
1n Act1ve 
(July-June) Money Govt.Sector Pr1vate Sector Fore1gn 
1950-51 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954-55 
1955-56 
1956-57 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961-62 
1962-63 
1963-64 
1964-65 
1965 ... 66 
1966-67 
( t> Ml) ..:..Gl+ .o.G2= Sector 
Gross AdJustment b.Q ( AL) for T1me ( AF) 
Depos1ts ~ 
( AM2 ) 
396 ... 152 + 59 - 77 + 437 
130 + 574 + 230 + 34 - 670 
57 + 620 - 101 - 61 ... 398 
273 + 266 + 130 
-
129 ... 13 
271 + 351 
-
50 ... 86 + 71 
629 ... 266 + 99 
- 45 + 830 
466 + 408 + 237 
-
5 ... 217 
366 + 729 + 42 
-
131 
-
266 
194 + 59 
-
5 
-
53 + 249 
302 
-
90 + 358 - 193 + 216 
29 + 83 + 416 
-
282 
-
90 
222 + 39 + 690 
-
279 
-
86 
847 + 205 + 793 - 428 + 272 
1029 + 735 + 914 - 497 - 197 
681 + 224 + 1715 - 796 ... 335 
1222 + 1385 + 367 
-
811 + 287 
540 + 1225 + 1935 - 1101 - 672 
Source 1) State Bank of Pak1stan - Reports on Currency and F1nance (Annual). 
2) Informat1on suppl1ed by the State Bank. 
Other 
Factors 
AA 
+ 129 
... 38 
-
3 
+ 1a 
-
15 
+ 11 
+ 43 
-
8 
- 56 
+ 11 
-
98 
-
142 
+ 5 
+ 74 
- 127 
- 6 
-
847 
I 
' 
I 
1-' 
O'l 
1-' 
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The funct1on adopted by the State Bank for the 
analys1s of money supply has many drawbacks. F1rst, 1t lumps 
together the net cla1ms on the government sector of the State Bank 
and of the scheduled banks and treats them as a s1ngle autonomous 
factor. Th1s only reveals how far f1scal pol1cy, wh1ch determ1nes 
the aggregate def1c1t f1nanc1ng, was act1ve. It does not reveal 
anyth1ng about monetary pol1cy, wh1ch 1s concerned w1th the 
d1str1but1on of government debt between the State Bank and the 
scheduled banks Th1s would be Just1f1ed 1f (1) the government 
had complete control over the d1str1but1on of government debt 
between the State Bank and the scheduled banks, that proport1on 
rema1ned always stable, and the banks were not able to 1ncrease the1r 
reserves by borrow1ng from the State Bank aga1nst the secur1ty of 
a part of the1r hold1ngs of government debt, or (11) 1f the State 
Bank pursued an absolutely pass1ve monetary pol1cy and left the 
determ1nat1on of the money supply to the f1scal and commerc1al 
pol1c1es of the government and the commerc1al banks and the1r 
borrowers, who determ1ne demand for bank cred1t. 
Secondly the State Bank's analys1s 1s based on 
the bank1ng theory developed 1n the Un1ted K1ngdom and the Un1ted 
States and on the assumpt1ons wh1ch are related to the 1nst1tut1onal 
sett1ng 1n those countr1es. Under th1s theory, the change 1n the 
monetary l1ab1l1t1es of the central bank leads to proport1onate 
change 1n bank reserves wh1ch, 1n turn, leads to a secondary 
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expans1on or contract1on of money supply of an amount 1nd1cated by 
the rat1o of currency 1n c1rculat1on to money supply and the rat1o 
of cash assets to bank depos1ts. These two rat1os are cons1dered 
to be reasonably stable 1n the absence of changes 1n legal reserve 
requ1rements. Thus money supply can expand or contract only 1f 
there 1s an 1ncrease or decl1ne 1n the monetary l1ab1l1t1es of the 
central bank. We shall d1scuss below that the data 1n Pak1stan do 
not support the Bank's v1ew that currency-money rat1o 1s stable, and 
th1s makes the funct1on adopted by the Bank for the analys1s of 
money supply 1nadequate. F1rst we 1ntend to enqu1re 1nto the reasons 
for the 1neffect1veness of quant1tat1ve cred1t control weapons 1n 
the cond1t1ons of Pak1stan. 
The Bank Rate Pol1cy 
The Scope and ObJect1ves of the State Bank's Accomodat1on to Banks 
The Bank 1s empowered to red1scount b1lls of 
exchange drawn for the purpose of (a) commerc1al or trade 
transact1ons and matur1ng w1th1n 90 days, (b) f1nanc1ng seasonal 
agr1cultural operat1ons and market1ng of crops w1th matur1ty of up 
to 15 months, (c) hold1ng or trad1ng 1n government secur1t1es and 
matur1ng w1th1n 90 days, and (d) f1nanc1ng the development of 
agr1culture and 1ndustry and matur1ng w1th1n 5 years. The Bank 
also makes advances, repayable on demand or for a f1xed per1od not 
exceed1ng 90 days, aga1nst the secur1ty of (a) government and other 
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approved secur~t~es, (b) b~lls of exchange el~g~ble for red~scount 
by the Bank, and (c) prom~ssory notes of the banks supported by 
government guarantee or documents of t~tles relat~ng to goods 
pledged w~th them by the~r customers ~n l~eu of overdrafts and cash 
cred~ts. F~nally, ~t prov~des counterf~nance to the banks. 
The ma~n obJect~ves of allow~ng the banks access 
to the State Bank cred~t on such a w~de scale are (a) to ~mpart 
elast~c~ty to the cred~t structure by enabl~ng the banks to meet 
the seasonal demand for bank cred~t, and (b) to enable the banks to 
expand cred~t to meet the grow~ng cred~t requ~rements of the 
develop~ng economy. The Bank's concern for the promot~on of cred~t 
fac~l~t~es ~s ev~dent from the extent of accommodat~on ~t has 
prov~ded to the banks. The outstand~ng level of scheduled banks' 
borrow~ngs has ~ncreased from Rs. ll m~ll~on ~n June 1960 to 
Rs 1688 m~ll~on ~n June 1965 At th~s level, the State Bank 
accommodat~on const~tuted 28 per cent of the scheduled banks' cla~ms 
on the pr~vate sector. These obJect~ves make the Bank more a Bank 
of accommodat~on than a mach~nery of control and regulat~on of bank 
cred1t. For th1s purpose, the Bank has been empowered to change 
the Bank rate and to f1x ce1l1ng on 1ts accommodat~on to 
banks. 
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The Exper~ence of Bank Rate Pol~cy ~n Pak~stan. 
The Bank rate was ra~sed for the f~rst t~me ~n 
January 1959 from 3 per cent to 4 per cent to lend support to the 
new f~scal pol~cy a~med at curb~ng excess demand. It ~s ev~dent 
from table 5-31 that ~n the follow~ng three years bank cred~t 
~ncreased at an accelerated pace and became the pr~mary 
expans~onary ~nfluence on money supply. Scheduled banks' borrow~ngs 
from the State Bank also rose to unprecedented h~gh levels. 
In August 1963 the State Bank ~ntroduced a Quota 
System ~n respect of ~ts advances to the scheduled banks aga~nst 
government secur~t~es ~n order to restra~n the expans~on of bank 
cred~t to the pr~vate sector. Under th~s arrangement 1 each bank was 
ass~gned a 'quota' every quarter equal to half of ~ts statutory 
reserves w~th the State Bank ~n the preced~ng quarter. Borrow~ng 
w~th~n th~s quota was charged ~nterest at the Bank rate and borrow~ngs 
beyond th~s l~m~t were charged progress~vely h~gher rates rang~ng 
from 0.5 per cent to 2 per cent above the Bank rate, as follows•-
~) Borrow~ngs up to the l~m~t of the quota 
~~) Borrow~ngs ~n excess of the l~m~t under 
(~) but l~m~ted to 100 per cent of the 
quota 
4 per cent 
(~.e. Bank rate). 
4! per cent 
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~~~) Borrow~ngs ~n excess of the aggregate 
of (~) and <~~) above but l~m~ted to 
200 per cent of the quota 
~v) Borrow~ngs ~n excess of the aggregate 
of (~), <~~) and <~~~) above but l~m~ted 
to 200 per cent of the quota 
v) Borrow~ngs ~n excess of the aggregate 
of (~), c~~), c~~~> and c~v) above 
5 per cent 
5! per cent 
6 per cent 
The reasons for the ~mpos~t~on of Quota System 
~nstead of a stra~ght r~se ~n the Bank rate were (a) to ra~se the 
marg~nal cost of cred~t expans~on to the banks w~thout s~gn~f~cantly 
affect~ng the average cost and thus to ~nfluence only further 
expans~on of bank cred~t w~thout restr~ct~ng cred~t to the ex~st~ng 
users, (b) to protect the secur~t~es market wh~ch ~s adversely 
affected by a stra~ght r~se ~n the Bank rate, and (c) to encourage 
depos~t mob~l~sat~on by l~nk~ng the Quota w~th the statutory 
reserves. We may ment~on that at the same t~me banks' borrow~ng 
aga~nst el~g~ble b~lls was also restr~cted to the max~mum amounts 
ava~led of by the banks dur~ng 1962-63. 
In sp~te of these measures, the borrow~ngs of the 
banks more than doubled from Rs. 386 m~ll~on ~n June 1963 to Rs. 783 
m~ll~on ~n June 1964, and bank cred~t to the pr~vate sector 
reg~stered a r~se of Rs. 917 m~ll~on ~n 1963-64 compared to Rs. 793 
m~ll~on ~n the preced~ng year. 
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In v1ew of further steep1ng up of cred1t creat1on 1n 
the pr1vate sector, the State Bank, among other measures, made the 
Quota system more str1ngent 1n January 1965 1 f1rstly by reduc1ng the 
amount of quota from 50 per cent to 25 per cent of the average 
statutory reserves 1n the prev1ous quarter, and secondly by mak1ng 
1t appl1cable to all types of borrow1ngs of banks from the State Bank. 
The borrow1ngs of banks more than doubled from Rs. 783 m1ll1on 1n 
June 1964 to Rs. 1,688 m1ll1on 1n June 1965 and bank cred1t 1ncreased 
by Rs. 1 1 715 m1ll1on, or about 40 per cent, over th1s per1od. 
In June 1965 the Bank rate was ra1sed from 4 per cent 
to 5 per cent. The quota system was mod1f1ed and the new slabs were 
as follows 
1) Borrow1ngs up to 350 per cent of the 
quota 
11) Borrow1ngs 1n excess of the l1m1t under 
(1) but l1m1ted to 100 per cent of the 
quota 
111) Borrow1ngs 1n excess of the aggregate 
of (1) and (11) above 
5 per cent 
(1.e. New Bank Rate) 
5~ per cent 
6 per cent 
The borrow1ngs of banks decl1ned by Rs.609 m1ll1on dur1ng 1965-66. The 
fall 1n banks' 1ndebtedness to the State Bank was partly due to a 
reduct1on 1n the legal reserve requ1rements from 7! per cent to 5 per 
cent 1n the f1rst quarter of the f1scal year The funds released were 
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used to ret~re the~r debt to the Bank ~nstead of ~ncreas~ng the~r 
cla~ms on the pr~vate sector. The rate of cred~t expans~on had 
slowed down due to temporary d~srupt~on of trade and ~nvestment 
act~v~ty follow~ng armed confl~ct w~th Ind~a ~n September 1965. As 
the s~tuat~on returned to normalcy, the borrow~ngs of banks reached 
an all t~me h~gh of Rs. 1,784 m~ll~on ~n June 1967 and bank cred~t 
reg~stered a record r~se of Rs. 1~35 m~ll~on dur~ng 1966-67. 
The quest~on to wh~ch we must now address ourselves 
~s why, ~n the present cond~t~ons of Pak~stan, Bank Rate seems to be 
~neffect~ve ~n controll~ng bank cred~t. 
Let us assume that the Bank rate pol~cy ~s the only 
~nstrument of cred~t control ava~lable to the State Bank. Secondly, 
we assume that ~n each year there was a pr~ma fac~e case for 
hold~ng the amount of bank cred~t at the prev~ous year's level. 
We have set out the growth of bank cred~t to the 
pr~vate sector and the sources of add~t~onal reserves ~n table 5-3. 
It shows that banks can f~nance the expans~on of bank cred~t ~n f~ve 
d~fferent ways. The effect of an ~ncrease ~n the Bank rate on the 
cost of reserves needed to f~nance the expans~on of bank cred~t ~s 
d~fferent for each source of add~t~onal reserves. Thus the 
effect~veness of Bank rate changes ~n regulat~ng bank cred~t depends 
on the source of f~nance on wh~ch the banks draw for add~t~onal 
reserves. 
TABLE 5-3. Scheduled Banks' Cla~ms on the Pr~vate Sector and Sources of ~ts F~nance. 
Year (End~ng Changes ~n Sources of F~nance last Fr~day 
mj! June). 
1950 ... 51 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954-55 
1955-56 
1956-57 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
196Q-61 
1961-62 
1962-63 
1963-64 
1964-65 
1965-66 
1966-67 
Source 
Scheduled 
Banks 1 Cla~ms Change ~n Cash Reserve Change ~n Cla~ms 
on the Borrow~ngs Rat~o on the Govt. 
Pr~vate Sector from the Cb X 100 Sector 
{A L) State Bank r = D+T ( A G2 ) (A B) 
+ 59 16.4 
+ 230 + 132 12.4 
... 101 
-
124 12.8 
+ 130 + 6 ll.4 + 84 
-
50 
-
4 13.2 + 201 
+ 99 + 18 15.7 + 26 
+ 237 + 68 9.5 - 13 
+ 42 - 54 10.3 + 234 
-
5 
-
29 12.3 + 196 
+ 358 + 1 8.3 + 64 
+ 416 + 327 8.3 + 250 
+ 690 + 65 8.2 - 24 
+ 793 
-
17 8 3 + 91 
+ 914 + 397 8.9 + 340 
+ 1715 + 905 10 8 + 228 
+ 367 
-
609 8 4 + 185 
+ 1935 + 705 10.9 + 84 
~) State Bank. Annual Reports on Currency and F~nance. 
~~) Informat~on suppl~ed by the State Bank. 
(M~ll1on Rs). 
c;e x 100 
c.= 
Ml + M2 
58.4 
62.1 
60 1 
58 8 
58.4 
59.0 
61.1 
59.5 
57.4 
55.8 
53.8 
50.5 
46.1 
44.5 
41.4 
41.8 
35.8 
Autonomous 
Change ~n 
Reserve Money 
AC - AB = AG + ~ 1 
+ 342 
-
12 
+ 146 
+ 189 I 
+ 246 
+ 486 
+ 204 
+ 314 
+ 121 
+ 95 
- 270 
- ll 
+ 364 
+ 250 
- 384 
+ 1443 
- 548 
F 
f-' 
O'l 
(0 
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(a) Excess Reserves• The excess reserves were one of the maJor 
sources of f1nance for the expans1on of bank cred1t up to 1960. 
Bank cred1t reg1stered s1zeable 1ncreases dur1ng 1951-52, 1956-57 
and 1959-60. The banks reduced the1r reserve rat1os from 16.4 
per cent 1n June 1951 to 12.4 per cent 1n June 1952, from 15.7 per 
cent 1n June 1956 to 9.5 per cent 1n June 1957, and from 12.3 per 
cent 1n June 1959 to 8.3 per cent 1n June 1960. The expans1on of 
bank cred1t to the extent of absorpt1on of excess reserves cannot 
be 1nfluenced by an 1ncrease 1n the Bank rate. Th1s shows that 
up to 1960 the large amounts of excess reserves w1th the banks 
reduced the effect1veness of an 1ncrease 1n the Bank rate to control 
the expans1on of bank cred1t. 
The bank cred1t decl1ned 1n 1952-53 and 1954-55. 
What was the scope for prevent1ng the contract1on of bank cred1t 
by reduc1ng the Bank rate. The decl1ne 1n the Bank rate 1s an 
1nducement to the banks to expand cred1t by mak1ng the accommodat1on 
at the central bank cheaper. Th1s 1nducement would work only 1f 
the contract1on of bank cred1t were due to shortage of reserves at 
a reasonable rate. The decl1ne 1n bank cred1t 1n the above ment1oned 
years was not due to lack of reserves. Rather the banks were 
accumulat1ng excess reserves. In these c1rcumstances, the decl1ne 1n 
the Bank rate would not have prevented fall 1n bank cred1t 
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The excess reserves of the banks have been 
completely w1ped out 1n recent years. S1nce 1960, the banks are 
operat1ng on m1n1mum and stable cash reserves. Th1s has removed 
at least one obstacle to the effect1veness of the Bank rate to 
control cred1t creat1on of banks 
(b) Autonomous Increase 1n Reserve Money 
The r1se 1n the monetary l1ab1l1t1es of the State 
Bank due to autonomous factors, v1z. surplus 1n the balance of 
payments and def1c1t 1n the f1scal operat1ons of the government (G
1
), 
leads to 1ncrease 1n the cash reserves of the banks and 
consequently 1n the1r ab1l1ty to lend more and v1ce versa. The 
autonomous 1ncrease 1n reserve money at a t1me when the State Bank 
des1res expans1on of bank cred1t Wlll re1nforce 1ts pol1cy measure 
and the decl1ne 1n the reserve money due to autonomous factors w1ll 
re1nforce 1ts measures to control the expans1on of bank cred1t. On 
the other hand, the expans1on of reserve money dur1ng restr1ct1ve 
cred1t pol1cy of the Bank and the decl1ne 1n reserve money dur1ng the 
expans1onary cred1t pol1cy would make 1ts measures 1neffect1ve 
The autonomous 1ncrease 1n the monetary llab111t1es 
of the Bank was the maJor source of reserves and expans1on of bank 
cred1t up to 1959. The scheduled banks' net 1ndebtedness to the 
Bank, except 1n the busy season, was generally n1l. The 1ncrease 1n 
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Bank rate could not have succeeded 1n restra1n1ng the growth of bank 
cred1t over th1s per1od. S1nce 1959, th1s factor 1s also not 
work1ng aga1nst Bank rate pol1cy. Dur1ng 1959-65, the autonomous 
1ncrease 1n reserve money was respons1ble for only Rs. 63 m1ll1on (or 
l per cent) out of total expans1on of Rs. 5p85 m1ll1on 1n bank 
cred1t. In fact, dur1ng 1963-65, when the Quota system was 1n force, 
th1s factor exerted a net contract1onary 1nfluence of Rs. 284 m1ll1on. 
(c) Scheduled banks' borrow1ngs from the State Bank 
The State Bank has to a large extent lost control 
over scheduled banks' borrow1ngs from 1t and consequently on the1r 
cred1t creat1on through Bank rate pol1cy by enter1ng 1nto agreement 
w1th them to prov1de 'counterfLnance'. The amount of counterf1nance 
depends on the level of government borrow1ngs from the banks, 
wh1ch the Bank 1s unable to 1nfluence. Moreover, up to January 1965, 
when the quota system was extended to cover all types of borrow1ngs 
of banks, the Bank was even obl1ged to prov1de th1s counterf1nance 
at a concess1onal rate of 1nterest. It 1s pert1nent to po1nt out 
that s1nce 1960 the counterf1nance has generally accounted for a 
substant1al part of total borrow1ngs of banks and 1ts outstand1ng 
level has gone up from Rs. 264 m1ll1on 1n June 1961 to Rs. 606 
m1ll1on 1n June 1965. 
Secondly, the State Bank has been under pressure 1n 
recent years to extend f1nance l1berally to certa1n banks aga1nst 
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the1r demand prom1ssory notes, guaranteed by the central 
government, to meet the cred1t requ1rements of certa1n spec1f1c 
sectors, such as agr1culture. The Bank's advances to the 
Agr1cultural Development Bank and co-operat1ve banks have gone up 
from Rs. 107 m1ll1on 1n 1960-61 to Rs. 420 m1ll1on 1n 1965-66. 
The Bank makes these advances at concess1onal rates of 1nterest. 
The Governor of the Bank recently protested aga1nst the pressure 
on the Bank to enlarge 1ts ass1stance to the banks for development 
purposes and underl1ned the dangers of excess1ve 1nvolvement of 
the central bank 1n d1rect f1nanc1ng and reduc1ng 1t to the 
l pos1t1on of lender of f1rst resort 
(d) Sh1ft1ng of government debt to the State Bank or borrow1ngs 
aga1nst the1r collateral. 
The second real 1mped1ment to the effect1veness of 
r1se 1n the Bank rate to restra1n the expans1on of bank cred1t 
rema1ns the comm1tment of the State Bank to peg the pr1ces of 
government secur1t1es at low 1nterest rates. After the State Bank, 
the banks are the largest holders of government secur1t1es. It, no 
doubt, makes them very suscept1ble to the 'lock1ng 1n' effect of the 
r1se 1n Bank rate 1n case the Bank does not support the pr1ces of 
government secur1t1es. 
1. Annual Speech of the Governor, State Bank of Pak1stan, 1966, 
pp.lQ-ll. 
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Secondly, the fall ~n secur~ty pr~ces would decrease the~r lend~ng 
capac~ty. But ~n the State Bank's op~n~on th~s short-term advantage 
~s outwe~ghed by the long-term cons~derat~ons for the development of 
secur~t~es market because the decl~ne ~n the~r value, follow~ng the 
r~se ~n Bank rate, may have h~ghly unsettl~ng effects on ~t. In the 
absence of support, the banks w~ll no longer cons~der secur~t~es as 
l~qu~d assets for ~nvestment and w~ll be unw~ll~ng to subscr~be to 
the new ~ssues. It may force the government to place them w~th the 
State Bank and that w~ll be relat~vely more ~nflat~onary Such a 
s~tuat~on ~s l~kely to do great damage to the growth of ~nvestment ~n 
government secur~t~es. On the other hand, ~f the Bank supports the 
pr~ces of government secur~t~es, the banks w~ll unload them at ~t and 
extend cred~t to the pr~vate sector where the y~eld ~s much h~gher 
Th~s defeats the purpose of r~se ~n the Bank rate. The magn~tude of 
th~s source of f~nance depends on the secur~t~es ~n the~r portfol~os ~n 
excess of l~qu~d~ty requ~rements. 
Open Market Operat~ons 
Open market operat~ons have hardly been used as an 
~nstrument of cred~t pol~cy ~n Pak~stan. However, the Bank has 
been conduct~ng open market operat1ons for other purposes to t~de 
the banks over seasonal monetary str~ngency, to enable them to ~nvest 
the~r funds ~n the slack season, to ass~st the government ~n 
borrow~ng at cheap rates, and to ma~nta~n orderly cond~t~ons ~n the 
secur~t~es market. The Bank has not been able to use open market 
operat~ons as cred~t control weapon because the g~lt-edged market ~s 
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st~ll not suff~c~ently broad-based to allow purchases or sales of 
secur~t~es ~n reasonable amounts, ~n order to affect the cash 
reserves of banks, w~thout ser~ous fluctuat~ons ~n secur~ty pr~ces, 
<~~) the Bank has found from exper~ence that even ~f ~t ~s able to 
sell secur~t~es, the banks tend to replen~sh the~r cash balances by 
red~scount~ng b~lls or tak~ng advances from ~t. 
The secur~ty market has rema~ned narrow partly 
because the economy ~s underdeveloped. But the ma~n factor 
respons~ble for the cont~nued narrowness of the market seems to be 
the cheap cred~t pol~cy of the government. The y~elds on government 
secur~t~es are too low to compensate most non-bank potent~al 
~nvestors for the r~sk of be~ng unable to sell the secur~t~es when 
they w~sh. The result ~s that almost all of those newly ~ssued 
secur~t~es wh~ch are offered to the publ~c by the State Bank are 
purchased by the scheduled banks. The banks, as we d~scussed ~n 
chapter 4, are ~nterested to buy these secur~t~es because among the 
assets wh~ch they are requ~red to hold for l~qu~d~ty purposes, 
government secur~t~es are the only ~nterest•bear~ng asset. Secondly, 
they can use these secur~t~es as collateral for advances from the 
Bank. The Bank ~s ready to honour these secur~t~es as collateral 
because ~n ~ts op~n~on the fall ~n the~r pr~ces would adversely 
affect the growth of secur~ty market. Th~s, however, means that, 
w~thout d~rect ~ntervent~on by the Bank, the quant~ty of scheduled 
banks' borrow~ngs from ~t ~s determ~ned not by the Bank but by the 
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demands of the scheduled banks and the1r hold1ngs of government 
secur1t1es 1n excess of l1qu1d1ty requ1rements. 
Cash Reserve Requ1rements. 
In a develop1ng country, where the government tends 
to resort to planned def1c1t f1nanc1ng or 1s compelled by 
c1rcumstances to do so, 1t seems 1mperat1ve to arm the central bank 
w1th the power to change the reserve rat1o of banks. The def1c1t 
f1nanc1ng operat1ons, 1.e. government borrow1ngs from the central 
bank, are l1kely to put substant1al resources at the d1sposal of 
banks, wh1ch they can use for further cred1t creat1on. The r1se 1n 
Bank rate 1n these c1rcumstances w1ll not be effect1ve to check the 
expans1on of bank cred1t. S1m1larly, due to l1m1tat1ons noted above, 
the central bank cannot mop up the excess1ve resources of banks by 
recourse to open market operat1ons. The var1able reserve requ1rements 
are cons1dered more effect1ve, the1r 1mpact on each bank 1s 
pred1ctable and 1n proport1on to 1ts depos1ts, the1r use does not 
upset 1nterest rates and thus does not d1sturb the market for 
1 government secur1t1es. 
The 1948 State Bank Order la1d down that the 
scheduled banks would hold 5 per cent of the1r demand l1ab1l1t1es and 
1. Meena1, S.A., op.c1t., p.l57. 
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2 per cent of the~r t~me l~ab~l~t~es w~th the State Bank. In 
case of default, the banks w~ll have to pay ~nterest on the 
balance at the rate of 3 per cent above the Bank rate ~n the 
f~rst week and 5 per cent above the Bank rate thereafter. The 
Bank ~s author~sed to ra~se these requ~rements to any l~m1t or 
completely d1spense w1th them. The above-ment~oned rat1os rema1ned 
unchanged up to July 1963, when the requ~red rat1o for t1me 
l1ab~l1t~es was ra~sed to 5 per cent. The obJect was to restra1n 
the growth of bank cred1t and to avo1d the natural tendency of banks 
to encourage a sh1ft from demand to t1me depos~ts and thus defeat 
the purpose of cred~t pol1cy. Moreover, there was no log1cal 
bas~s for d~st1nct~on between reserve requ~rements for demand and t1me 
l~ab~l1t~es. The concept of reserves as a requ~red m1n1mum of 
l~qu~d~ty to protect depos1tors, and hence h1gher reserve rat1o for 
demand depos1ts w1th greater turnover, has become obsolete because 
the red1scount1ng fac1l1t1es of the commerc1al bank have made all 
sound assets of the commerc1al banks convert1ble 1nto cash. 
The reserve rat1os were ra1sed from 5 to 6i per cent 
on Apr1l 1, 1965, and further to 7! per cent on 1 May 1965. They 
were reduced to 6i per cent 1n August and 5 per cent 1n September, 
1965. Earlier, 1n January, the Quota system was also t1ghtened and 
a number of select1ve cred1t control measures were 1ntroduced. In 
sp1te of all these measures, the bank cred1t to the pr1vate sector 
1ncreased by Rs. 468 m1ll1on dur1ng January-June, 1965, compared to 
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the r~se of Rs. 281 m~ll~on ~n the correspond~ng per~od last year 
At the same t~me scheduled banks' borrow~ngs from the State Bank 
~ncreased by Rs. 312 m~ll~on compared to the r~se of Rs. 274 
m~ll~on dur~ng January-June 1964 
The ~ncrease ~n the reserve rat~o seems to have 
fa~led to restra~n cred~t expans~on for the follow~ng reasons 
(~) the r~se ~n reserve rat~o leads to a proport~onate decl~ne ~n 
the volume of secur~t~es needed to meet the l~qu~d~ty requ~rements. 
The banks can sell these secur~t~es to the central bank. If the 
central bank ~s keen on pegg~ng the pr~ces of secur~t~es, the ~ncrease 
~n reserve requ~rements may s~mply lead to a transfer of secur~t~es 
from the commerc~al banks to the central bank w~thout exert~ng any 
restra~nt on cred~t expans~on. The adJustment ~n the portfol~o of 
commerc~al ba~, ~.e. now a larger proport~on of total 'l~qu~d' 
assets ~n the form of non-earn~ng cash assets, w~ll somewhat add to 
the cost of the banks to ma~nta~n the same level of cred~t. But so 
long as the h~gher cost can be passed on to the borrowers, w~thout 
affect~ng demand for bank cred~t, ~t w~ll affect ne~ther the lend~ng 
capac~ty nor the prof~ts of the banks. In Pak~stan, the banks can 
s~mply borrow from the central bank aga~nst the collateral of these 
secur~t~es. Th~s ~s exactly what they d~d when reserve rat~os were 
ra~sed by the State Bank. The balances of banks w~th the Bank 
~ncreased by Rs. 95 m~ll~on dur~ng the week end~ng Apr~l 2, and by 
Rs. 69 m~ll~on dur~ng the week end~ng May 7, and the~r borrow~ngs from 
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the State Bank 1ncreased by Rs.l09 m1ll1on and Rs.l34 m1ll1on 
respect1vely over these per1ods The advance rates 1ncreased from 
5.49 per cent 1n December, 1964 to 5.67 per cent 1n March, 1965, 
and further to 6.64 per cent 1n June, 1965. 
Secondly, the 1mpact of a g1ven change 1n the 
reserve rat1o on money supply and bank cred1t depends, bes1des the 
extent of multlple cred1t creat1on by banks, on the rat1o of bank 
reserves to total reserve money, 1.e. Cb/C. A g1ven change 1n the 
reserve rat1o has a smaller effect on the money supply 1f the money 
mult1pl1er and the rat1o of bank reserves to total reserves money are 
small. We shall see below that the money mult1pl1er 7 def1ned e1ther 
as 1 I 
c + r (l - c ) 
a a 
actual reserve rat1o, or 
currency-money rat10 (C ) 
a 
gone down to 36 per cent 
where 
M 
c = 
a 
s , was small 
c 
was as h1gh as 60 
1n June, 1967 but, 
Cp 
M 
s 
and '81 Y 1s 
up to 1960, as the 
per cent. The c 
a 
as Professor Porter 
has 
has 
po1nted out, the part1al elast1c1ty of supply of money w1th respect 
to changes 1n reserve rat1o 1s not very large even when Ca 1s fa1rly 
low. "If r = .10 
w1th respect to r 
the (absolute value of the) elast1c1ty of M 
1s .05 when K(1.e. C ) = .67 and only 
a 
17 
when K = 33 The elast1c1ty does r1se rap1dly for further decl1nes 
II l K • Mr. Ahrensdorf has po1nted out that the percentage by wh1ch 
1. Porter, R c., 'The Promot1on of the "Bank1ng Hab1t" and Econom1c 
Development', The Journal of Development Stud1es, July 1966, 
footnote no.36, p.365. 
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average reserve rat1o needs to be ra1sed 1s equal to the rat1o of 
the amount of autonomous 1ncrease 1n reserve money to the ex1st1ng 
1 
amount of bank reserves. The Cb/C was only 0.061 1n June, 1960, 
but 1t has gone up to 0.161 1n June 1 1967. It shows that a small 
change 1n reserve rat1o by the State Bank could not have a more than 
nom1nal effect on the expans1on of money supply and bank cred1t. 
A sharp r1se 1n the reserve rat1o, g1ven the pol1cy of the Bank to 
support secur1ty pr1ces 1 would have s1mply added to the cost of 
loanable funds of the banks, w1thout restra1n1ng the expans1on of 
cred1t and money supply. 
The 1962 Ord1nance requ1res the banks to ma1nta1n 
20 per cent of the1r demand and t1me l1ab1l1t1es 1n the form of cash, 
balances w1th the State Bank and unencumbered approved secur1t1es, 
valued at current market pr1ce The Bank 1s author1sed to change the 
l1qu1d1ty rat1o but 1t has not done th1s so far. The Bank does not 
publ1sh relevant 1nformat1on to est1mate l1qu1d1ty rat1o. The data 
suppl1ed by the Bank on request, and set out 1n table 5-4, shows 
1. Ahrensdorf, J., 'Central Bank Pol1c1es and Inflat1on• A case 
study of four less developed econom1es 1 1949-57 1 1 I.M.F.Staff 
Papers 1 Vol.VII No.2, pp.287-288, see also Madan 1 B.K. 1 'The 
Role of Monetary Pol1cy 1n Econom1c Development 1 1 SEANZA 
Lectures, State Bank Press, Karach1 1 1964, Vol.I, pp.74-75, 
Goode, R., and R.s. Thorn, 1Var1able Reserve Requ1rements 
Aga1nst Commerc1al Bank Depos1ts', I M.F. Staff Papers, 1959-60. 
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follow~ng character~st~cs (~) For reasons d~scussed ~n Chapter 
4, the actual l~qu~d~ty rat~o of banks, as a whole, was more than 
tw~ce the legal requ~rements 1n June 1960 and 1n earl1er per1ods. 
It has gone down s1nce then, but the decl1ne 1s not commensurate 
w1th the sharp r1se 1n the borrow1ngs of banks from the Bank. 
Th1s 1s because a large part of the 1ncrease 1n borrow1ngs was 
aga1nst counterf1nance, wh1ch does not affect l1qu1d1ty rat1o. 
(11) The Pak~stan1 banks generally ma1nta1n h1gher l1qu1d1ty rat1o 
relat1ve to fore1gn banks. Th~ 1s because, of the two largest 
Pak1stan1 banks, Hab1b Bank follows conservat1ve lend1ng pol1c1es 
and hardly borrows from the Sank, and the Nat1onal Bank, though 
most l1beral 1n mak1ng advances, generally prefers to borrow aga1nst 
counterf1nance and government guarantee. (~11) The l1qu1d1ty rat1o 
of fore1gn banks shows the expected seasonal fluctuat1ons. The 
rat1os of Pak1stan1 banks, due to above-ment1oned reasons, are not 
affected by seasonal 1ncrease 1n demand for bank cred1t. (1v) The 
data shows that although for most of the banks the l1qu1d1ty rat1o 
1s st1ll not a constra1nt on the expans1on of cred1t, for some 
fore1gn banks, at least 1n the busy season, th1s requ1rement becomes 
a real constra1nt on the1r operat1on. 
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Total Scheduled Fore~gn Pak~stan~ Pak~stan~ 
Banks Banks Banks Banks ex-
clud~ng 
ADBP and 
IDBP 
June, 1955 48.7 50.4 47.5 47.5 
December, 1955 44.3 36.7 50.7 50.7 
June, 1960 42.8 41.4 43.4 42.9 
December, 1960 33.8 27.7 37.5 37.3 
June, 1966 32.9 31.2 33.2 33.0 
December, 1966 33.1 27.2 34.0 34.0 
Courtesy State Bank of Pak~stan. 
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II 
We shall no'' d1scus~ why the 1ncrease 1n Bank Rate 
by the State Bank to restraln the expan~1on of bank cred1t and 
money supply, on the contrary, appears to have the oppos1te 
effect, 1 e accelerate the rate of the1r growth We shall 
f1rst explaln 1t by an 1llustrat1on and then exam1ne the 
actual operat1on of the bank1ng system 1n Pak1stan. 
Th1s unexpected response of bank cred1t and money 
supply to the r1se 1n Bank rate can be expla1ned 1f we assume 
the follow1ng cona1t1ons and sets of relat1onsh1ps between 
the relevant var1ables Let us assume 
l) that the commerc1al banks feel unable to meet 
any 1ncrease 1n the demand for cred1t ar1s1ng 
from the1r customers' w1sh to 1ncrease the1r 
rate of cap1tal format1on, 
2) that when the Bank rate 1s ra1sed, both 
advance and depos1t rates go up as well, 
3) that a r1se 1n the rate charged for advances 
does not affect the rate of growth 1n the demand 
for bank cred1t because th1s demand 1s very 
1nelast1c 1n respect to 1nterest rates, 
4) that a r1se 1n depos1t rates not only 1nduces 
the puol1c to hold more of the1r assets 1n the 
form of depos1ts but also 1ncreases the1r 
marg1nal propens1ty to save 
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G1ven these cond1t1ons and relat1onsh1ps, the 
1ncrease 1n Bank rate w1ll lead to a r1se 1n both advance and 
depos1t rates. The demand for bank cred1t w1ll rema1n unaffected 
by the 1ncrease 1n advance rates. The sh1ft from currency to 
t1me depos1ts 1n the portfol1o of the publ1c~ follow1ng the r1se 
1n depos1t rates~ w1ll prov1de the banks w1th more cash reserves at 
a g1ven level of total cash base (C), and thus enable the banks to 
prov1de more cred1t. Th1s w1ll lead to a r1se 1n total money supply 
as well as 1n 1ts act1ve component. Let us 1llustrate th1s 1n some 
deta1l w1th a numer1cal example. 
Suppose that the bank1ng system 1n the country 1s 
at Stage I. The legal reserve rat1o 1s 6 per cent and the banks are 
keep1ng 4 per cent of the1r depos1t l1ab1l1t1es as work1ng reserves, 
so that total cash reserve rat1o 1s .10 (D + T), and rema1ns 
unchanged throughout our exerc1se. The legal l1qu1d asset rat1o 1s 
.20 (D + T) and, follow1ng the State Bank, 1s def1ned as 
= .20 (D + T) 
wh1ch also rema1ns unchanged. We shall assume that the central bank 
has placed ce111ng on banks' borrow1ngs aga1nst the collateral of 
government secur1t1es at Rs. 10~ as 1t does not want the money supply 
to exceed the present level, and that there 1s no market for 
secur1t1es outs1de the bank1ng system. 
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Now we suppose that the government 1ns1sts on a 
cash def1c1t of Rs. 10 and spends 1t 1n the form of currency. 
G1ven the currency/money rat1o at 60 per cent, Rs. 4 w1ll flow 
1nto the banks to serve as a bas1s for a secondary expans1on of 
money supply. If there 1s no 1nterference from the central bank, the 
bank1ng system w1ll settle down at Stage II. The central bank, 
however, wants to br1ng down money supply to the level of Stage I 
and for that purpose 1t ra1ses the Bank rate. Th1s leads to r1se 
1n depos1t rates wh1ch, 1n turn, 1nduces sh1ft from currency to 
t1me depos1ts. As a result, the rat1o of bank reserves to total 
~ 
reserve money, 1.e. Cb/C, goes upL0.062 1n Stage II to 0.155 1n 
Stage III, bank cred1t r1ses to more than three and a half t1mes and 
money supply to more than one and a half t1mes. 
As regards the operat1on of the Bank rate 1n 
Pak1stan, we 1ntend to show that. 
1) the ent1re structure of market 1nterest rates, 
contrary to general bel1ef, 1s closely related to the Bank rate, 
prov1ded there 1s no 1nterference by the State Bank, 
11) the demand for advances 1s 1nsens1t1ve to advance 
rates due to h1gh prof1ts 1n trade and 1ndustry and the supply of 
cred1t 1s constra1ned by the shortage of lendable funds. 
111) the sav1ngs and f1xed depos1ts have shown a very 
good response to the r1se 1n depos1t rates, espec1ally after the 
1ncrease 1n Bank rate 1n 1965, and the 1ncrease 1n sav1ngs and f1xed 
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depos1ts has been at the cost of currency 1n c1rculat1on and not 
demand depos1ts, and 
(1v) the decl1ne 1n the rat1o of currency 1n 
c1rculat1on to money supply, or 1n other words the d1str1but1on 
of cash base (reserve money) 1n favour of banks, follow1ng the 
r1se 1n depos1t rates has led to cont1nuous 1ncrease 1n money 
(1) Bank Rate and Market Rates of Interest. 
The State Bank has always ma1nta1ned that the money 
market 1n Pak1stan 1s too underdeveloped to transm1t 1nterest rate 
changes, w1th the result that changes 1n such rates as the Bank can 
d1rectly affect, the Bank rate and /or government secur1t1es rates, 
w1ll not 1nduce changes 1n the y1eld of advances, depos1ts 1 call 
1 
money or 1n rates preva1l1ng 1n the unorgan1sed money market. Non-
scheduled banks and other "1nd1genous bankers" are of suff1c1ently 
l1ttle 1mportance that the1r rates and terms may be neglected. Data 
regard1ng changes 1n the Bank rate and the rates of 1nterest 1n the 
"organ1sed" market, set out 1n table 5-5, does not support 
content1on of the Bank. Follow1ng r1se 1n the Bank rate 1n January 
1959, the rates on advances and call money responded read1ly. The 
1. Meena1 1 S.A., Money and Bank1ng 1n Pak1stan 1 All1es Book 
Corporat1on 1 1966, pp.l50-l51. 
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Illustrat~on. 
A. Commerc~al Bank 
L~ab~l~t~es 
Demand Depos~ts 
T~me Depos~ts 
Borrow~ngs from the 
Central Bank aga~nst 
Govt.Secur~t~es 
Assets 
Cash ~n t~lls plus 
Balances w~th Central 
Bank 
Investments ~n Govt. 
Secur~tJ.es 
Advances 
B. Central Bank 
L~abJ.l~t~es 
Cash assets of 
Commerc~al Banks 
Notes w~th the Publ~c 
Assets 
Govt. Secur~t~es 
Fore~gn Assets 
Advances to Commerc~al 
Banks aga~nst Govt. 
Secur~t~es 
jc. Pubhc 
p. 
Assets 
Central Bank notes 
Demand Depos~ts 
T~me Depos~ts 
L~ab~l~tJ.es 
Advances from Banks 
D 
T 
B 
c 
B 
L 
Stage 
I 
290 
210 
70 
10 
290 
28 
108 
154 
448 
28 
420 
448 
315 
123 
10 
700 
420 
210 
70 
154 
.60 
.30 
.10 
3,500 
.20 
.18 
.02 
Stage 
II 
296 
216 
70 
10 
296 
28.6 
108 
159.4 
458 
28.6 
429.4 
458 
325 
123 
10 
715.4 
429.4 
216 
70 
Stage 
III 
720 
359 
351 
10 
720 
71 
108 
541 
458 
71 
387 
458 
325 
123 
10 
1097 
387 
359 
351 
541 
.353 
.327 
.320 
4,388 
.25 
.17 
.08 
TABLE 5-5. Bank Rate and Market Rates of Interest. 
(Percent Per Annum) 
Bank (1) (2) Depos~t Advance Issue-Y~eld on Central Govt(3 ) 
Rate Call 3-month Rates Rates Secur~t~es w~th matur~t~es up 
Money Treasury on Sav~ng (We~ghted to 
Rate B~ll Rate and F~scal Average) 5 years 6 to 10 Over 10 (Average) Depos~ts 
(We~ghted years years 
Average) 
1958 June 3 o.5o...a.75 o.7o N.A. 4.19 
December 3 2.50-2.75 0.50 N.A. 4.21 3.00 
-
3.50 
1959 June 4 o.25-o.5o 0.67 N.A. 4.96 
December 4 3.75 2.50 N.A. 5.14 3.ao 
-
4.00 
1960 June 4 2.00-2.25 - N.A. 5.15 
December 4 4.50-4.75 
-
2.26 5.28 3.75 
- -
1961 June 4 3.50-3.75 
-
2.27 5.14 
December 4 4.00 ... 2.47 5.26 3.75 - 4.00 
1962 June 4 2.75-3.00 
-
2.54 5.30 
December 4 3.25-3.50 
-
2.58 5.45 3.75 - 4.50 
1963 June 4 2.25-2.50 - 2.59 5.46 
December 4* 4.25-4.50 
-
2.59 5.54 3.75 4.75 
1964 June 4* 3.50 
-
2.68 5.40 
December 4* 4.00-4.25 3.00 2.61 5.49 
-
4.00 5.00 
1965 June 5 7.00-7.25 3.00 2.73 6.64 
December 5 5.oo-5.25 3.00 3.56 6.68 5.00 5.00 
-
1966 June 5 4.00 3.00 3.68 6.84 
December 5 6.oo-6.25 3.00 3.72 6.98 
- -
5.oo 
1967 June 5 7.25 3.00 3.75 7.10 
-------------
Source The State Bank of Pak~stan, ~) Annual Reports on Currency and F~nance, ~~) Annual Reports of the Ba~, 
N.A. 
1). 
2). 
3). 
~~~) Quarterly Stat~st~cs on Scheduled Banks. 
-Not Ava~lable. *=The effect~ve rate was somewhat h~gher due to ~ntroduct~on of the 'quota system'. 
The rates are for the last Fr~day of the correspond~ng month. 
The ~ssue of treasury b~lls was d~scont~nued from ~959 to 1964. 
These are rates on loans ~ssued by the central govt. dur~ng the correspond~ng calendar year. 
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rates on secur1t1es and depos1ts were slugg1sh, but 1t was largely 
the fault of the Bank 1tself for "fa1l1ng to persuade 1tself to lower 
l 
values (of secur1t1es) 1n l1ne w1th the r1se 1n the Bank rate", and 
for perm1tt1ng ol1gopson1st1c collus1on of banks 1n the 
2 determ1nat1on of ce1l1ngs on t1me depos1t rates. However, under 
pressure of demand for bank cred1t and a t1ght l1qu1d1ty pos1t1on, 
the depos1t rates showed a r1s1ng tendency. The 1ssue y1eld on 
government secur1t1es was also ra1sed to br1dge partly the 1ncreas1ng 
gap between advance rates and secur1ty y1elds. The 1ncrease 1n 1ssue 
y1eld was hardly suff1c1ent. In 1958 1 the ~bsue y1eld on loans of up 
to 5 years matur1ty was equal to the Bank rate. It was ra1sed to 3.5 
per cent 1n 1959 and further to 3.75 per cent 1n 1960, but 1t 
rema1ned well below Bank rate up to 1964. The 1ssue y1eld on loans 
of longer matur1ty, wh1ch was 0.5 per cent h1gher than Bank rate 1n 
1958, was ra1sed to the level of Bank rate 1n 1959, and after rema1n1ng 
at that level up to 1961, 1t was gradually ra1sed to 5 per cent 1n 
1964. Follow1ng r1se 1n the Bank rate 1n June 1965, the rates on 
advances, depos1ts and call money responded 1mmed1ately. Thus we can 
assume that the market 1nterest rates are adequately respons1ve to 
r1se 1n the Bank rate. 
l. Meena1 1 S.A., op.c1t., p.l52. 
2. Government of Pak1stan - Report of the Cred1t Comm1ttee 1 1962 1 
pp.B-9, Porter, R.c., L1qu1d1ty and Lend1ng 1 IDE, Karach1 1 
1963, p.45, Meena1 1 S.A., op.c1t., p.223"225. 
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(11) Advance Rates and the Demand for Bank Cred1t. 
We have d1scussed 1n Chapter 4 that up to 1960 1t was 
the demand for bank cred1t from cred1t-worthy borrowers that 
determ1ned 1ts supply. S1nce then, due to factors d1scussed there, 
the demand for bank cred1t has been 1ncreas1ng at an accelerated pace 
and 1n sp1te of large-scale borrow1ngs from the State Bank, the banks 
are feel1ng constra1ned to sat1sfy 1t. The demand for bank cred1t 1s 
1nsens1t1ve to changes 1n advance rates due to h1gh rates of return on 
1nvestment and trade act1v1t1es made poss1ble by bank advances. The 
marg1nal eff1c1ency of cap1tal 1s est1mated to be as h1gh as 30 per 
1 
cent. The 1nsens1t1v1ty of bank cred1t to the present range of 
advance rates 1s ev1dent from table 5-6 and scatter d1agram No. 5-2. 
(111) Depos1t Rates and Sav1n2s and F1xed Depos1ts 
The stat1st1cal est1mates of the relat1onsh1p between 
we1ghted average depos1t rates (1d) and sav1ngs and f1xed depos1ts 
(DSF) set out 1n table 5-7 are 
(a) 
n = 28 
-3809 + 2268 ld 
(477) 
R = 0.93 
(for September 1960 to 
June 1967) 
1. Plann1ng Comm1ss1on 1 Government of Pak1stan1 Second F1vedYear Plan 
(1960-65), p.77, see also Mo1nudd1n Baqa1 1 'Sav1ngs 1n the 
Corporate Sector 1n Pak1stan (1959-63)', F1nance and Industry, 
Supplement on Stock Exchange1 Apr1l 1967, p.32. 
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TABLE 5-6. We~ghted Average Advance Rate and Bank 
Cred~t to the Pr~vate Sector. 
* Per~od Advance Rate Bank Cred~t to the Pr~vate 
p.c. p.a. Sector 
(Rs. ~n m~ll~on). 
June 1958 4.19 1,137 
December 1958 4.21 1,351 
June 1959 4.96 1_,132 
December 1959 5.14 1,509 
June 1960 5.15 1_,490 
December 1960 5.28 1_,958 
June 1961 5.14 1_,906 
December 1961 5.26 2,417 
June 1962 5.30 2,597 
December 1962 5.45 3,212 
June 1963 5.46 3,389 
December 1963 5.54 4,022 
June 1964 5.40 4,303 
December 1964 5.49 5,550 
June 1965 6.64 6,018 
December 1965 6.68 6,488 
June 1966 6.84 6,385 
December 1966 6.98 8,323 
June 1967 7.10 8,321 
* Includes Advances, b~1ls purchased and d~scounted and ~nvestment 
~n pr~vate secur1t1es. 
Courtesy State Bank of Pak1stan. 
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(b) DSF = -7046 + 
n = 20 R = 
(c) DSF = -23479 + 
n = 8 R = 
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3576 1d 
(402) 
080 
7617 1d 
(214) 
0.95 
(for September 1960 to 
June 1965) 
(for September 1965 to 
June 1967) 
where n 1s number of observat1ons, R 1s the correlat1on 
coeff1c1ent and the numbers of parentheses under the coeff1c1ents 
are the1r standard errors. Th1sshows that sav1ng and f1xed depos1ts 
have responded well to the r1se 1n depos1t rates follow1ng the r1se 
1n Bank rate 1n June 1965. 
The second po1nt wh1ch needs to be establ1shed 1s 
the source of growth 1n t1me depos1ts. The banks have all along 
opposed a r1se 1n depos1t rates because 1n the1r op1n1on 1t would 
only lead to a sh1ft from demand to t1me depos1ts. Among others, the 
State Bank also unt1l recently accepted th1s v1ew. The data 1n table 
5-8 suggests that s1nce 1957 the 1ncrease 1n t1me depos1ts has 
been ent1rely at the cost of currency 1n c1rculat1on. 
Rat1o of Currency 1n C1rculat1on to Money Supply and Money Mult1pl1er 
It 1s ev1dent from data presented 1n table 5-8 
that the average rat1o of currency 1n c1rculat1on to money supply d1d 
not show any trend up to 1959. S1nce then 1t has decl1ned stead1ly. 
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TABLE 5-7 • We~ghted Average Rate of Interest on Sav~ngs 
and F~ed Depos~ts. 
Per~od Rate of Interest Amount 
p.c. p.a. (M~ll~on Rs.) 
September 1960 2.13 11097 
December 1960 2.26 11096 
March 1961 2.35 11135 
June 1961 2.27 11157 
September 1961 2.35 1,226 
December 1961 2.47 1,311 
March 1962 2.47 11375 
June 1962 2.54 1,517 
September 1962 2.53 1,674 
December 1962 2.58 1,765 
March 1963 2.58 1,834 
June 1963 2.59 11913 
September 1963 2.54 21051 
December 1963 2.59 2,141 
March 1964 2.47 21277 
June 1964 2.68 21433 
September 1964 2.55 21664 
December 1964 2.61 2,895 
March 1965 2.64 3,111 
June 1965 2.73 3,198 
September 1965 3.49 3,341 
December 1965 3.56 3,572 
March 1966 3.62 3,901 
June 1966 3.68 4,324 
September 1966 3.71 4,554 
December 1966 3.72 4,895 
March 1967 3.75 5,ll9 
June 1967 3.75 5,489 
Source Calculated from quarterly data ~n State Bank Bullet~n 
(Monthly). 
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The equat1on represent1ng publlc hold1ng of cash generally takes 
C =a+ b M , where 'a' 1s any constant. Thus, 1t p s the form 
may be argued that as the money supply 1ncreases over t1me, the 
average rat1o of currency 1n c1rculat1on to money supply may 
decl1ne, w1th the marg1nal rat1o (1.e. A C I 6 M ) rema1n1ng 
p s 
constant. The est1mates of C , however, clearly 1nd1cate that 1t 
m 
has fluctuated very w1dely over th1s per1od 
We have attempted three separate stat1st1cal 
est1mates of the relat1onsh1p between Cp and Ms, v1z. (1) Cp = 
a + bMs 
(2) 9£. = Ms Ca = a + bT , and (3)aCp = AMs 
em = a + bT. The 
numer1ca1 results are 
(1) (a) Cp = 1218 + 0.32 Ms (for the per1od 1949 to 1967) 
R = 0.97 n = 19 
(b) Cp = 58 + Oo58 Ms (for the per1od 1949 to 1959) 
(575) 
R = 0.997 n = 11 
(c) Cp = 2068 + 0.24 Ms (for the per1od 1960 to 1967) 
(184) 
R = 0.974 n = 8 
(2) (a) Ca = 0.646 - 0.012 T (for the per1od 1949 to 1967) 
(0.039) 
R = - 0.87 n = 19 
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(b) Ca = 0.623 - 0.025 T (for ther per1od 1957 to 1967) 
(0.012) 
R -o.99 n = 11 
{3) em = 0.606 - 0.028 T (for the per1od 1949/50 to 1966/67) 
R = -o.30 n = 18 
where n 1s number of observat1ons, R 1s the correlat1on 
coeff1c1ent and the numbers of parentheses under the coeff1c1ents are 
the1r standard errors. We have plotted these results 1n f1gure; ~ 
8Bfi 5-4. Two po1nts clearly emerge from th1s. F1rstly, Ca has 
decl1ned stead1ly s1nce 1957 and, secondly, the assumpt1on that Cm 
1s reasonably constant 1n the short-run 1s not warranted. 
The banks allowed large changes 1n the cash reserve 
rat1o up to 1959. S1nce then, th1s rat1o has become stable at the 
lowest pract1cal level and has var1ed only due to changes 1n legal 
reserve requ1rements. 
We shall now exam1ne the behav1our of the money 
mult1pl1er. The average money mult1pl1er can be expressed e1ther as 
/ 
E = l Ca+r(l-Ca) ' or E = 
Ms 
c 1 
where c 1s the total monetary 
l1ab1l1t1es of the State Bank wh1ch 1nclude cash 1n c1rculat1on w1th 
the publ1c (Cp) and cash 1n t1lls plus balances of banks w1th the 
State Bank (Cb). The est1mates of the 1 average money mult1pl1er from 
these def1n1t1ons show a sl1ght d1screpancy, because 'other depos1ts' 
w1th the State Bank have been treated as depos1t money. We shall adopt 
TABLE 5 ... 8. Rat1o of Currency 1n C1rculat1on to Money Supply, Reserve Rat1o and 
Money Mult1pl1er. 
Cp .o.ep Cb ( 1 ) " 1 Ms E " A Ms 
- = Ca - = Cm - = r E = E = - E = -- A E Ms AMs D+T Ca+r( 1-Ca) C E iC 
Cm+T(l-cm) 
1949 0.606 
1950 0.578 - 0.42 14.9 1.545 1.565 .987 
1951 0.584 0.62 16.4 1.519 1.537 .988 1.383 - 0.028 
1952 0.621 1.93 12.4 1.483 1.499 .989 0.800 - 0.038 
1953 o.60l o.o1 12.8 1.527 1.535 .995 5.363 + o.o36 
1954 0.588 0.47 11.4 1.568 1.576 .995 2.062 + 0.041 
1955 o.584 o.54 13.2 1.554 1.567 .992 1.475 - o.oo9 
1956 0.590 o. 63 15.7 1.510 1.532 .986 1.337 - 0.035 
1957 o.611 o.83 9.5 1.522 1.547 .984 1.732 + o.ol5 
1958 0.595 0.42 10.3 1.559 1.572 .992 1.912 + 0.025 
1959 0.574 0.06 12.3 1.587 1.598 .993 2.684 + 0.026 
1960 0.558 0.35 8.3 1.671 1.683 .993 5.156 + 0.085 
1961 0.538 0.11 8.3 1.724 1.736 .993 5.456 + 0.053 
1962 o.5o5 o.o4 8.2 1.820 1.835 .992 9.277 + o.o99 
1963 0.461 0.20 8.3 1.966 1.977 .994 3.674 + 0.142 
1964 0.445 0.35 8.9 2.015 2 025 .995 2.358 + 0.048 
1965 0.414 0.20 10.8 2.087 2.100 .994 2.834 + 0.075 
1966 0.418 0.44 8.4 2.129 2.143 .993 2.437 + 0.043 
1967 0.358 - 0.15 10.9 2.32~ -~·340 _ .992 10.452 + O.l9T 
Cb 
D 
T 
= 
= 
= 
Cash 1n t1lls plus balances of banks w1th the State Bak. 
Demand depos1ts~ and 
-T1me depos1ts. Ca = 0.538 em = 0.37 
Standard dev1at1on ( Ca) = 0.078 Standard dev1at1on ( Cm) = 0.48. 
Source Calculated from data 1n Currency and F1nance Reports of the Bank 
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the latter def~n~t~on as ~t ~s stat~st~cally more conven~ent. 
In the same manner, the marg~nal money mult~pl~er 
lj 
(E = 1 A~ Cm+r(l-Cm) ) can be def~ned as ~C The marg~nal mult~pl~er 
has var~ed w~dely over the per~od under study ow~ng to large 
var~at~ons ~n em. The average money mult~pl~er showed small changes 
up to 1959 1 but there was no trend. s~nce 1960 ~t has ~ncreased 
stead~ly due almost ent~rely to a cont~nuous decl~ne ~n Ca, partly 
offset ~n some years by ~ncreases ~n the reserve rat~o follow~ng a r~se 
~n legal reserve requ~rements. 
Now we want to est~mate how far the change ~n money 
supply each year ~s attr~butable to a change ~n (~) the State Bank's 
hold~ngs of government debt and fore~gn assets, c~~) scheduled banks' 
borrow~ngs from the State Bank, and (~~~) the money mult~pl~er We 
have seen above that 
Ms = E C 
where both E and C are var~ables. From the balance sheet of the 
State Bank we know that 
C = F + G1 + B 
where F ~s fore~gn assets ~n the portfol~o of the Bank, a1 , 
follow~ng the pract~ce of the State Bank, ~ncludes government debt and 
other (net) assets of the Bank, and B ~s State Bank's advances to 
the banks ~n the form of loans and red~scounts. From the above two 
equat~ons, we can der~ve the follow~ng equat~on 
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~Ms E (A G + c.. F) 
t-1 1 + Et-l ( AB) + 
The numer~cal results are set out ~n table 5-9. It shows that 
money supply ~ncreased by Rs. 3,335 m~ll~on dur~ng 195D-59. Of 
the total expans~on of money supply over th~s per~od, Rs 3,165 
m~ll~on (or 94.9 per cent) ~s attr~butable to r~se ~n the State 
Bank's hold~ngs of government debt and fore~gn assets. The 
scheduled banks' borrow~ngs from the State Bank accounted for 
Rs. 21 m~ll~on (or 0 6 per cent) and the ~ncrease ~n money 
mult~pl~er for Rs. 150 m~ll~on (or 4.5 per cent) The pace of 
monetary expans~on accelerated after 1959 and money supply ~ncreased 
by Rs. 9,259 m~ll~on dur~ng 1959-67. The factors respons~ble for 
expans~on of money supply over th~s per~od ~n order of ~mportance 
are· (1) the ~ncrease 1n money mult1pl~er 1 Rs. 3 1 856 m~ll1on (or 41.6 
per cent), (11) Schedule banks' borrow1ngs from the State Bank, 
Rs. 3 1 484 m1ll1on (or 37.6 per cent), and (1~~) ~ncrease 1n the 
State Bank's hold1ngs of government debt and fore1gn assets, 
Rs. 1 1 919 m1ll1on (or 20.7 per cent). Out of 8 years 1n the latter 
per1od 1 the expans~onary effect of A E exceeded the expans1onary 
role of A C 1n four years. 
The analys1s of growth of money supply presented above 
shows that the State Bank's analys~s and presentat1on of changes ~n 
money supply ~n terms of consol1dated balance sheets of the monetary 
TABLE 5-9. 
(July-June) 
1950-51 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954-55 
1955-56 
1956-57 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961-62 
1962-63 
1963-64 
1964-65 
1965-66 
1966-67 
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Determ1nants of Change 1n 
Money Supply. 
Determ1nants 
AMS Et-l (AG+ AF) 
+ 473 + 535 
+ 96 
-
18 
+ 118 + 219 
+ 402 + 290 
+ 357 + 388 
+ 674 + 762 
+471 + 313 
+ 497 + 486 
+ 247 + 190 
+ 495 + 152 
+311 
-
454 
+ 501 .. 19 
+1275 + 668 
+1526 + 494 
+1477 ... 778 
+2033 + 3030 
+1641 - 1174 
(Rs. 1n m1ll1on). 
of change 1n Ms 
Et-l ( A B) oEt (Ct) 
- -
62 
+ 202 
-
89 
-
186 + 85 
+ 9 + 104 
-
6 
-
25 
+ 28 
- 115 
+ 104 + 54 
-
84 + 96 
-
46 + 102 
+ 2 + 341 
+ 550 + 216 
+ 113 + 409 
-
31 + 635 
+ 785 + 246 
+ 1833 + 423 
- 1279 + 279 
+ 1511 +1307 
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system preclude an 1dent1f1cat1on of quant1tat1vely qu1te 
1mportant monetary changes that are due to behav1our var1ables. 
The expl1c1t 1n~orpo1aLion of the currency-money rat1o, money 
mult1pl1er and other relat1onsh1ps d1scussed above 1nto the 
framework of monetary analys1s and the1r cont1nued observat1on 
would g1ve the Bank more 1ns1ght 1nto the operat1on of the monetary 
system. 
- 20 1 -
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Chapter 6. 
CENTRAL BANKING AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT. 
The th1rd ma1n obJect1ve of the State Bank 1s to 
ass1st 1n the fuller ut1l1sat1on of the country's product1ve 
resources Accord1ng to the class1cal standards of central bank1ng 
th1s obJect1ve 1s unconvent1onal. But 1n l1ne w1th the cons1derable 
1 
emphas1s 1n the post-war per1od on econom1c growth, many wr1ters 
on central bank1ng argue that the central bank 1n a develop1ng 
economy should not v1ew 1tself only as a stab1l1sat1on agency, but 
also as a promoter w1th1n 1ts own f1eld, of econom1c development The 
ObJect of the present chapter 1s to exam1ne the contr1but1on of the 
State Bank to econom1c development, wh1ch can be conven1ently 
d1scussed under the follow1ng top1cs (1) the prov1s1on of f1nance 
for development d1rectly or 1nd1rectly, (11) the creat1on of a 
su1table network of f1nanc1al 1nst1tut1ons, and (111) encourag1ng the 
1 (a) Sayers, R.S., Central Bank1ng After Bagehot, Oxford Un1vers1ty 
Press, 1958, pp.ll5~123. 
(b) Un1ted Nat1ons, Domest1c F1nanc1ng and Econom1c Development, 
1950, pp.67-70. 
(c) Newlyn and Rowan, Money and Bank1ng 1n Br1t1sh Colon1al Afr1ca, 
pp 272-292 
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flow of bank cred1t to product1ve uses and check1ng 1ts flow to 
1nessent1al uses 
I 
Money Supply and Econom1c Growth. 
In the process of econom1c growth as real 1ncomes 
grow, the demand for money 1ncreases The 1ncrease 1n the demand 
for money 1s l1kely to be greater than 1n proport1on to the 1ncrease 
1n product1on, 1f the prov1s1on 1s made for the extens1on of the 
monet1zed sector and some 1ncrease 1n the pr1ce level cons1stent w1th 
monetary stab1l1ty. If the money supply does not expand to meet th1s 
demand adequately, 1t w1ll lead to deflat1on and 1mpede econom1c 
growth. The central bank by perm1tt1ng the expans1on of money supply 
to sat1sfy the des1re of the publ1c to 1ncrease the1r cash balances 
contr1butes to econom1c growth w1th pr1ce stab1l1ty. The 1ncrease 1n 
the cash balances of the publ1c represents sav1ngs matched by real 
resources that go 1nto 1nvestment. If the expans1on of money supply 1s 
the result of the accumulat1on of fore1gn exchange, the 1nvestment 1s 
represented by the fore1gn exchange To the extent that the expans1on 
of the money supply takes place through government borrow1ng both 
from the central bank and the commerc1al banks, 1t makes ava1lable to 
the government the resources represented by such sav1ng. To the extent 
that the expans1on of the money supply takes place through bus1ness 
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borrow1ng from the scheduled banks, 1t makes ava1lable to the pr1vate 
1 
sector the resources represented by such sav1ng. The allocat1on of 
the bank cred1t among d1fferent borrowers affects the d1rect1on of 
1nvestment ar1s1ng from these sav1ngs. 
The 1ncrease 1n money supply 1n excess of the r1se 1n 
des1red cash balances at a g1ven pr1ce level 1s l1kely to lead to 
1nflat1on, wh1ch m1ght affect adversely the process of econom1c growth 
Th1s means that the central bank should not only be 1n a pos1t1on to 
control the expans1on of money supply but also be able to assess the 
requ1rements of the publ1c for cash balances We have d1scussed the 
State Bank's control over money supply 1n the preced1ng chapter Here 
we shall d1scuss the behav1our of the demand for money from the publ1c. 
The demand for money 1n Pak1stan 1s predom1nantly of 
two types the 'transact1on demand' for money correspond1ng to 1ts 
funct1on of means of payment, and the 'precaut1onary' or 'asset demand' 
for money correspond1ng to 1ts funct1on of store of value The 
precaut1onary demand for money 1s very 1mportant 1n Pak1stan because 
most of the people l1ve suff1c1ently near the marg1n of subs1stence 
that they must make careful prov1s1on for emergency l1qu1d1ty needs. 
Secondly, the unrel1ab1l1ty of the markets for convers1on of assets to 
money, makes 1t des1rable to hold the bulk of precaut1onary balances 
1. I.M.F., Econom1c Development w1th Stab1l1ty- A Report to 
the Government of Ind1a 1 1953, pp 41-43 
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l 1n the form of money In developed countr1es there are subst1tute 
l1qu1d assets, such as treasury b1lls, etc , and the1r pr1ces (and 
y1elds) can ser1ously affect the des1red money balances (or veloc1ty 
of money). They are consp1cuous by the1r absence 1n the portfol1o of 
non-bank publ1c 1n Pak1stan The transact1ons demand for money, g1ven 
the hab1ts of payments and 1ndustr1al 1ntegrat1on, 1s cons1dered a 
funct1on of the level of 1ncome, wh1le the precaut1onary demand for 
money 1s regarded a funct1on of the rate of 1nterest. 
Any attempt to class~fy total hold1ngs of money 1nto 
transact1ons and precaut1onary balances w1ll be arb1trary to a certa1n 
extent. We can, however, qu1te reasonably assume that all t1me 
depos1ts (or 1dle money balances) are precaut1onary balances and that 
the act1ve money 1s largely composed of transact1ons balances The 
act1ve money certa1nly conta1ns an element of precaut1onary balances, 
but 1t 1s 1mposs1ble to quant1fy that. For the purpose of analys1s 
we shall assume that the act1ve money represents transact1ons 
balances and the t1me depos1ts represent precaut1onary balances 
We have set out the data regard1ng average cash balances 
1n table 6-l. It 1s ev1dent from column l that up to 1958 the State 
Bank could 1ncrease 1ts monetary l1ab1l1t1es at a relat1vely h1gher 
rate than the growth of real 1ncome due to the des1re of the publ1c to 
1. Porter, R.C., 'Income Veloc1ty and Pak1stan's Second Plan', The 
Pak1stan Development Rev1ew, Summer 1961, Karach1, pp.24-25 
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hold an 1ncreas1ng proport1on of the1r 1ncome 1n the form of 
currency. The stat1st1cal est1mate of the rat1o of currency 1n 
c1rculat1on w1th the publ1c to G.N.P. at current factor cost for the 
per1od 1950-58 1s 
~ 
y kc = .0864 + .0054 T, where T 1s f1nanc1al year. 
The scope for the State Bank's contr1but1on to sav1ngs 
w1th pr1ce stab1l1ty has decl1ned s1nce 1958, f1rstly because the 
publ1c wants to hold a larger proport1on of the1r l1qu1d assets 1n 
the form of 1nterest-bear1ng depos1ts Secondly, the ab1l1ty of the 
commerc1al banks to expand money on the bas1s of a g1ven volume of 
reserve money 1s 1ncreas1ng. Th1s, however, reduces but does not 
el1m1nate the need for further 1ncrease 1n the State Bank's monetary 
The reason 1s that tho ab1l1ty of the commerc1al banks 
to expand money on the bas1s of a g1ven volume of reserve money 1s 
l1m1ted Th1s 1s so because the banks have to ma1nta1n a certa1n rat1o 
of cash aga1nst the1r depos1t l1ab1l1t1es and, secondly, 1t 1s 
unl1kely that all money w1ll be held 1n the form of depos1ts. The 
stat1st1cal est1mate of currency - G.N P. rat1o for the per1od 
1958-1966 lS 
Cp 
y = kc .1208 - .0027 T, where T 1s f1nanc1al year 
TABLE 6-l 
June Cp Dm 
y y 
1950 083 051 
1951 .092 .053 
1952 .103 .051 
1953 .100 .052 
1954 llO .057 
1955 .ll7 .059 
1956 .121 .061 
1957 .123 .057 
1958 .127 .061 
1959 .121 .064 
1960 .114 .062 
1961 .107 .057 
1962 .101 .060 
1963 .102 .on 
1964 .106 .077 
1965 .103 .078 
1966 .106 .074 
-------
Source Append1x Table No 5. 
Average Cash Balances 
Ml M2 
y- y 
134 010 
.145 .013 
.154 .Oll 
.152 .014 
.167 .020 
.176 .024 
.182 .023 
180 .021 
.188 .025 
.185 .025 
.176 .029 
.164 .034 
.161 .040 
.173 .048 
.183 .056 
.181 .068 
.179 .074 
MD 
y 
144 
.157 
165 
166 
.187 
.200 
.205 
.201 
.213 
.211 
.204 
.198 
202 
.221 
.239 
.249 
253 
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The rat~o of demand depos~ts (1nclud1ng other 
depos~ts w1th the State Bank) to nat1onal 1ncome, wh1ch had gone up 
from 0.051 1n 1950 to 0.061 1n 1958 1 stood h1gher at 0.074 1n 1966. 
Th1s 1 however, partly offset the decl1ne 1n the rat1o of currency to 
nat1onal 1ncome so that the rat~o of act1ve money to nat1onal 1ncome 
decl1ned over the latter per1od as aga1nst r1se 1n the former per1od. 
Th1s decl1ne can partly be expla1ned by the fact that the element of 
precaut1onary balances 1n the act1ve money has decl1ned s1nce 1959 
due to t1me depos1ts follow1ng the r1se 1n depos1t rates. It 1s also 
l1kely that the transact1ons demand for money 1s 1nterest-elast1c and 
as a result the 1ncrease 1n transact1ons demand for money has been 
less than proport1onate to the growth rate of 1ncome. 
The rat~o of t1me depos1ts to nat1onal 1ncome 1ncreased 
from 0.010 1n 1950 to 0.025 1n 1958 and further to 0.074 1n 1966. The 
stat1st1cal est1mate of rat1o of t1me depos1ts to G.N.P. 1s 
= ~2 = 0.010 + 0.002 T (for 1950-58) 
= ~2 = 0.0176 + 0.0066 T (for 1958 to 1966) 
Th1s shows that the rat1o has 1ncreased at a far h1gher rate 1n the 
latter per1od compared to the earl1er per1od. The 1ncrease 1n the 
asset demand for money more than offset the decl~ne 1n demand for 
act1ve money, so that the rat1o of total money supply to nat1onal 1ncome 
rose 1n the latter per1od too. Thus, the bank1ng system as a whole was 
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able to contr1bute to nat1onal sav1ngs, though at a decl1n1ng rate. 
II 
Stud1es conducted by the State Bank shortly after 1ts 
establ1shment prov1ded conclus1ve ev1dence that 1n all sectors of the 
economy the amounts of cred1t made ava1lable fall much short of 
1 
requ1rements. Cred1t was cons1dered 'one of the gravest bottlenecks', 
and expans1on of cred1t fac1l1t1es became 1mportant obJect1ve of 
pol1cy. Even dur1ng the per1ods of 1nflat1onary pressures, the State 
Bank advocated a pol1cy of select1ve cred1t expans1on because 1t 
bel1eved that the very shortage of cred1t fac1l1t1es was aggravat1ng 
2 
1nflat1onary forces by hamper1ng product1on. The State Bank encouraged 
the growth of commerc1al banks to meet the cred1t requ1rements of 
commerce and the work1ng cap1tal requ1rements of 1ndustry. Spec1al1sed 
f1nanc1al inst1tut1ons were set up to prov1de f1nance to agr1culture 
and med1um and long-term cred1t to 1ndustry. The ObJect of th1s sect1on 
1s to d1scuss the role of these 1nst1tut1ons to el1m1nate or reduce 
the shortage 1n the supply of cred1t to agr1culture and 1ndustry. lft~ 
reduc1ng the shortage of cred1t, the Bank allows the rate of growth to 
be h1gher than 1t would otherw1se be. 
1. Annual Speech of Governor, State Bank of Pak1stan, 1951, p.l5. 
2. op c1t , p.l5. See also Annual Speech of Governor, S.B.P 1954, 
p 8. 
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Agr1cultural Cred1t. 
The Agr1cultural Development F1nance Corporat1on 
(ADFC) was establ1shed 1n 1952 w1th a cap1tal of Rs.50 m1ll1on, 
subscr1bed ent1rely by the central government. Its only other source 
of funds was borrow1ngs from the State Bank and the government. It 
was author1sed to grant loans, both 1n cash and k1nd, for the purpose 
of seasonal agr1cultural operat1ons 1 1.e. purchase of seeds, 
fert1l1zers, etc., and for the development of agr1culture, such as 
purchase of mechan1sed equapment and the 1mprovement of land. Up to 
June 1960,the total loans d1sbursed by the Corporat1on amounted to 
Rs.51.6 m1ll1on. The rate of 1nterest charged by the Corporat1on up 
to 1959 was 4 per cent for cooperat1ve soc1et1es and 5 per cent for 
1nd1v1duals In 1959, the rate for cooperat1ve soc1et1es was also 
ra1sed to 5 per cent and 1n November 1960, 1t was further ra1sed to 6 
1 per cent for both types of borrowers. By the end of June 1960,the 
Corporat1on had 1ncurred total loss of Rs. 3.1 m1ll1on. 
In 1959 another 1nst1tut1on, namely the Agr1cultural 
Bank, was establ1shed w1th a pa1d-up cap1tal of Rs. 32.5 m1ll1on, of 
wh1ch the central government contr1buted Rs. 22.5 m1ll1on and the 
prov1nc1al governments Rs. 10 m1ll1on. The funct1ons of the Bank were 
1. State Bank of Pak1stan, Agr1cultural Cred1t 1n Pak1stan, 1962, 
p.89. 
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almost s1m1lar to those of the Corporat1on so a terr1tor1al d1v1s1on 
of JUX1sd1ct1on was made between the two 1nst1tut1ons. Up to June 
1960 1 the Bank d1sbursed loans amount1ng to Rs. 21.1 m1ll1on and 
1ncurred a loss of Rs. 1.4 m1ll1on. The 1nterest rate pol1cy of the 
Bank was more complex. The 1nterest charged to 1nd1v1duals up to 
1959 was 6 per cent on loans for a per1od of 15 months, and 5 per cent 
on loans of longer matur1ty. The rates charged to cooperat1ve 
soc1et1es and cooperat1ve banks var1ed between 3! and 6 per cent. In 
195~a un1form rate of 5 per cent was 1ntroduced for all types of 
borrowers and for all matur1t1es of loans 
up to 15 months was ra1sed to 6 per cent. 
In 1960, the rate on loans 
S1nce both Agr1cultural Bank and the Corporat1on were 
perform1ng s1m1lar funct1ons and both of them were f1nanced by the 
government, they were merged 1n 1961 1nto Agr1cultural Development Bank 
to fac1l1tate the formulat1on of un1form rules and pol1cy 1n the sphere 
of agr1cultural cred1t and to reduce adm1n1strat1ve expend1ture. The ADB 
1s author1sed to extend short-term cred1t for a per1od of 18 months 
for seasonal agr1cultural operat1ons and market1ng of crops, med1um-term 
advances for a per1od of up to 5 years for the purpose of purchasing 
agr1cultural 1mplements, da1ry-farm1ng, poultry-farm1ng, cottage 
1ndustr1es, etc., and long-term cred1t for the development of 
agr1culture, construct1on of warehouses, 1nstallat1on of tubewells, etc. 
The advances are made aga1nst the hypothecat1on of crops, the secur1ty 
of land and other 1mmovable property, and 1n the case of smaller loans 
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aga1nst personal sur1ty. In 1966, the Bank had a network of 124 
branches. 
The yearly d1sbursements of advances by the Bank 
1ncreased from Rs. 69 l m1ll1on 1n 1960-61 to Rs. 87.5 m1ll1on 1n 
the follow1ng year but decl1ned to Rs. 76.9 m1ll1on 1n 1964-65. 
They aga1n rose to Rs. 109.5 m1ll1on 1n 1965-66 follow1ng the 
allocat1on of a fore1gn currency loan to the Bank. The outstand1ng 
level of advances 1ncreased from Rs. 97 m1ll1on 1n June, 1961 to Rs. 
360 m1ll1on 1n June, 1966. The average s1ze of the loan comes to about 
Rs. 600 1n East Pak1stan and Rs. 7 1 000 1n West Pak1stan. Th1s 1s 
because the land hold1ngs 1n East Pak1stan are small and the demand 1s 
generally for short-term loans for seasonal requ1rements. In West 
Pak1stan the hold1ngs are larger and there 1s substant1al demand for 
med1um and long-term loans for development purposes. In accordance 
w1th the emphas1s on the mechan1zat1on of agr1culture 1n the Th1rd 
l Plan, the bank 1s now requ1red to concentrate on long-term cred1t. 
The d1str1but1on of advances by matur1ty shows a sharp sh1ft from 
short and med1um-term advances to long-term advances s1nce July 1965, 
the beg1nn1ng of the Th1rd Plan per1od. 
The ma1n sources of funds for the bank are (a) cap1tal. 
The author1sed cap1tal of the bank 1s Rs. 200 m1ll1on, but up to June, 
1. Government of Pak1stan 1 Plann1ng Comm1SS1on, Th1rd F1ve-Year Plan 
(1965-1970), p.423. 
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PerJ.od Short-term MedJ.um-term Long-term 
(July-June) Advances Advances Advances 
(J.n Percentage) 
1960-61 24.4 5.15 24.1 
1961-62 46.1 25.0 28.9 
1963-64 31.3 36.3 32 4 
1964-65 33.5 38.5 28.6 
1965-66 25.0 28.1 46.9 
July '66 15.2 22.5 62.3 Dec. '67 
1966, only Rs. 100 m1ll1on were subscr1bed - Rs. 90 
m1ll1on by the central government and Rs. 10 m1ll10n by the 
prov1nc1al governments. (b) It 1s author1sed to accept depos1ts but 
due to compet1t1on from commerc1al banks J.ts depos1ts 1n June, 1966 
amounted to Rs. 1~.7 m1ll1on only. (c) It can ra1se funds by 1ssu1ng 
and sell1ng bonds and debentures. In 1965-66 J.t J.ssued debentures 
worth Rs. 5 mJ.llJ.on carry1ng 6 per cent J.nterest WJ.th 10 year matur1ty 
and government guarantee. (d) The government had got an J.nterest-free 
credJ.t of Rs. 128.5 mJ.llJ.on from IDA, wh1ch J.t has re-lent to the bank 
at 4 per cent J.nterest. (e) The ma1n source of funds for the bank 1s 
borrow1ngs from the State Bank, whJ.ch have gone up from Rs. 3 m1ll1on 
1n 1961 to Rs. 222 mJ.llJ.on 1n 1966. In fact, over the four years 
end1ng June, 1965 borrowJ.ngs from the State Bank accounted for 90 per 
cent of the expans1on of bank's advances 
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Up to June 1965, the State Bank was lend1ng to the 
Bank at the concess1onal rate of 3! per cent, 1.e. 0.5 per cent 
below the Bank rate, on the cond1t1on that the benef1t of the low 
rate 1s passed on to the ult1mate borrower In June 1965, the rate 
was ra1sed to 4! per cent follow1ng the r1se 1n the Bank rate, but 
shortly afterwards the rate was restored to the or1g1nal level of 
l 3 5 per cent to prov1de rel1ef to the ult1mate borrower. Thus the 
r1se 1n Bank rate had no effect on rates charged by the 
Agr1cultural Development Bank wh1ch rema1ned unchanged at 7 per 
cent on loans for per1od up to 5 years and 6 per cent on loans for 
longer per1ods. 
The contr1but1on of the Agr1cultural Development Bank 
to econom1c development 1n the com1ng years w1ll depend on careful 
exam1nat1on and d1agnos1s of three problems, v1z. 1ncrease 1n and 
sources of loanable funds at the d1sposal of the bank, 1nterest rate 
pol1cy and the arrangements for the parallel 1ncrease 1n the supply of 
phys1cal 1nputs to 1ncrease agr1cultural product1v1ty For the State 
Bank only f1rst two problems are d1rectly relevant. The th1rd problem 
1s relevant only 1n th1s sense, that the prov1s1on of cred1t does not 
proceed far 1n excess of ava1lab1l1t1es of 1mproved seeds, fert1l1zers, 
bullocks and modern 1mplements, etc., and thus s1mply lead to the 
1. State Bank of Pak1stan - Annual Report, 1965-66, p.51. 
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~nflat~onary pressures ~n the countrys~de. 
The ma~n problem confront~ng the ADB ~s the supply of 
loanable funds. Equ~ty cap~tal was supposed to be the ma~n source 
of funds but 1n sp~te of sharp r~se 1n ~ts outstand~ng advances, the 
government has not ra~sed ~ts contr~but~on to the equ~ty cap1tal of 
the bank s~nce 1961. The bank could ma~nta~n ~ts annual d~sbursements 
up to 1965 partly from repayments but the funds are l~kely to become 
less revolv1ng under ~ts new emphas1s on long-term advances Th~s 
means that to ma~nta~n the same level of d~sbursements the bank w~ll 
have to seek relat~vely larger suppl~es of fresh funds. So far the 
State Bank has suppl~ed the bulk of funds, but ~t w~ll be extremely 
dangerous to pers~st ~n press1ng the State Bank for a cont~nued 
enlarged ass1stance The ~nd~scr~m1nate resort to the money creat1ng 
powers of the State Bank even for product~ve purposes, after a certa1n 
l~m~t, ~s bound to lead to 1nflat~on. Th~s ~s because a mere creat~on 
of cred~t does not generate real resources. The resources must be 
s~multaneously released through genu~ne sav1ngs. The net result would 
be the same ~f the government allocates funds to the equ~ty cap~tal of 
the bank by borrow~ng from the State Bank. Th~s shows that the supply 
of loanable funds may become the most ~mportant l~m~tat~on on the 
expans~on of the act~v~t1es of the bank, unless an appropr~ate ~nterest 
rate pol~cy ~s pursued. 
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The ~nterest rate pol~cy of the ADFC and ABP was 
l exam~ned ~n deta~l by the Cred~t Enqu~ry Comm~ss~on ~n 1959. It 
was argued by the w~tnesses g~v~ng ev~dence to the Comm~ss~on that 
the rate of ~nterest at 5 per cent charged by these ~nst~tut~ons was 
too h~gh because (a) they were ra~s~ng the~r funds free of ~nterest 
from the government and were ask~ng for an unreasonable spread ~n 
charg~ng 5 per cent, and (b) the product~v~ty of cap~tal appl~ed ~n 
agr~culture was low and the product~on was subJect to the vagar~es of 
the season. The Comm~ss~on, on the other hand, r~ghtly recommended a 
r~se ~n the ~nterest rates to 7 per cent 'g~ven the current level of 
the Bank rate'. They argued that "~nterest ~sa pr~ce for loanable 
funds. It emerges from the ~nteract~on of demand as determ~ned by 
the product~v~ty of cap~tal ~nd of supply as determ~ned by the 
populat~on's ab~l~ty and w~ll~ngness to save. In establ~sh~ng an 
appropr~ate rate, cons~derat~on must be g~ven not only to the 
product~v~ty factor but also to the h~gher cost at wh~ch genu~ne 
sav~ngs are forthcom~ng ~n a poor country. The equ~l~br~um rate so 
determ~ned relates to lend~ng at m~n~mum r~sk. A r~sk prem~um must 
be added to the bas~c rate. S~nce the r~sks ~nherent ~n agr~cultural 
cred~t are great, ~t follows that the effect~ve lend~ng rate must be 
h~gh enough to meet the borrow~ng cost of the f~nanc~ng ~nst~tut~on, ~ts 
1. Government of Pak~stan, Report of the Cred~t Enqu~ry Comm~ss~on, 
Karach~, 1959, pp.73-76, 154-55. 
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establ~shment costs and an added element for creat1on of reserves 
aga~nst bad debts. Unless th~s ~s done, the agr~cultural cred~t 
~nst~tut~ons w~ll need subs~d~es to meet the~r current runn~ng 
expenses and to cover the~r losses and w~ll rema~n ever dependent 
for the~r work~ng cap~tal on budgetary appropr~at~ons or ~nflat~onary 
borrow~ng from the State Bank". 1 The F.A.o. had recommended rates 
2 
as h~gh as 13 to 15 per cent. 
We have seen above that the rate charged by the ADB 
rema~ned unaffected by the r~se 1n the Bank rate ~n 1965 0 Recently 
there ~s demand from the ADB and some other quarters that the State 
3 Bank should prov~de ~nterest-free f~nance to the bank. It ~s argued 
that w1th the open1ng of new off~ces the establ~shment cost 1s 
1ncreas1ng, and secondly there 1s grow1ng need for suff1c1ent reserves 
4 for bad debts as the recovery rate 1S on the decl1ne. 
To our knowledge, there has been no study of the 
product~v1ty of the ~nst1tut1onal f1nance prov1ded to the agr1cultural 
sector. But accord1ng to two stud1es ~n another context the 
1. Report of the Cred~t Enqu~ry Comm1ss~on, op.c~t , pp 74-75. 
2 op.c~t., p.75. 
3. Meena1 1 S.A., Money and Bank~ng ~n Pak~tan, op.c~t., p.ll4, See 
also Econom~c Adv~sor, Government Pak~stan, F~nanc~al Inst~tut1ons. 
4. Government of Pak~stan, Pak~stan Econom~c Survey for 1965-66, p.l37, 
and 1966-67 1 p.l52. 
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1nstallat1on of tubewells 1s h1ghly product1ve and they repay the1r 
1 
cost 1n a per1od of two years. Inc1dentally 1 a large part of the 
cred1t requ1red for development purposes 1n the agr1cultural sector 
1s for 1nstallat1on o± tubewells. The recent IDA cred1t allocated 
to the bank 1s be1ng used for th1s purpose If the product1v1ty of 
the cap1tal 1s as h1gh there 1s no reason why the bank should not 
ra1se 1ts advance rates. The r1se 1n advance rates w1ll enable the 
bank to offer better terms to attract resources from the market. The 
enlarged supply of loanable funds w1ll enable the bank to 1ncrease 1ts 
flow of cred1t to the agr1cultural1st In sp1te of r1se 1n the 
advance rates, the cost of cred1t to the farmers 1n general would be 
reduced as the bank w1ll be able to meet cred1t needs on a larger 
scale d1spens1ng w1th the need for them to tap personal sources wh1ch 
are known to lend on extort1onate terms 
Industr1al F1nance. 
In the 1mmed1ate post-1ndependence per1od 1 there were 
no 1nst1tut1ons to extend med1um and long-term cred1t to the 1ndustr1al 
sector. In order to f1ll th1s gap 1n the cred1t structure, the Pak1stan 
Industr1al F1nance Corporat1on (PIFCO) was establ1shed 1n 1949 to grant 
loans, subscr1be to ~e debentureS and underwr1te the 1ssue of shares, 
1. Ghulam Mohammed, 'Development of Irr1gated Agr1culture 1n East 
Pak1stan', Pak1stan Development Rev1ew, Autumn 1966, p.365, 
Robert Dorfman, Roger Rev1lle and Harold Thomas, 'Waterlogg1ng and 
Sal1n1ty 1n the Indus Pla1n', P D.R. Autumn 1965, pp.342-343 
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bonds and debentures of 1ndustr1al concern. It was, however~ debarred 
from contr1but1ng d1rectly to the equ1ty cap1tal of the 1ndustr1al 
compan1es. The OOrporat1on had a pa1d-up cap1tal of Rs.20 m1ll1on, of 
wh1ch 51 percent was contr1buted by the government. It was allowed to 
supplement 1ts resources by accept1ng depos1ts and by 1ssu1ng bonds 
and debentures. However, 1ts total l1ab1l1t1es 1n respect of borrow1ng, 
guarantees and underwr1t1ng agreements were to rema1n w1th1n the l1m1t 
of 5 t1mes 1ts cap1tal and reserves 
Total ass1stance prov1ded by the Corporat1on 1n var1ous 
forms up to June, 1960 amounted to Rs.l47 m1ll1on, of wh1ch Rs.47 
m1ll1on were outstand1ng. The s1ze d1str1but1on of outstand1ng loans 
1n 1959 was as follows 
S1ze of Loan No. of Amount Percent of 
Loans (m1ll1on Rs) Total 
Up to Rs 0 2 m1ll1on 27 23 l 4 0 
Above Rs 0.2 m1ll10n and 
up to Rs. 0.5 m1ll10n 32 105.6 18.6 
Above Rs. 0.5 m1ll10n and 
up to Rs. 1.0 m1ll1on 20 147.9 25.9 
Above Rs. l m1ll1on and 
up to Rs. 2 m1ll1on 12 177 0 31.0 
Above Rs. 2 m1ll1on and 
up to Rs. 3 m1ll1on 4 117 .o 20.5 
Total 95 570.6 100.0 
Source Report of the Cred1t Enqu1ry Comm1ss1on. 
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The 1nst1tut1on suffered from certa1n 1nherent weakness. 
It could not f1nance establ1shment of new 1ndustr1es or grant loans 
aga1nst prospect1ve assets. Its f1nance was therefore of l1m1ted use 
for development and could 1n any case be used only by 1ndustr1es already 
1n the f1eld Moreover, 1t could prov1de loans only 1n local currency 
wh1ch could not be used effect1vely for development 1n the absence of 
fore1gn exchange component necessary for 1mport1ng cap1tal goods. 
Tak1ng note of th1s lacuna 1n the 1nst1tut1onal 
framework for 1ndustr1al f1nance, the State Bank sponsored a scheme 
for the establ1shment of an 1nst1tut1on on the pattern of 1ndustr1al 
l development banks set up 1n many parts of the world The new 
1nst1tut1on, namely the Pak1stan Industr1al Cred1t and Investment 
Corporatlon(PICIC) was set up 1n 1957 to prov1de med1um and long-term 
f1nance, both 1n local and fore1gn currenc1es, to large-scale 1ndustr1al 
enterpr1ses. The m1n1mum lend1ng l1m1t for a proJect 1s Rs. 1.5 
m1ll1on for fore1gn currency loans and Rs. 2.5 m1ll1on for local 
currency loans. The m1n1mum lend1ng l1m1t for fore1gn currency loans 
has been reduced recently to Rs. 1.0 m1ll1on 1n case of new proJects 1n 
East Pak1stan and to Rs. 0.25 m1ll1on for balanc1ng and modern1sat1on 
of med1um-s1zed un1ts. It 1s also author1sed to part1c1pate d1rectly 
1n the equ1ty cap1tal and prov1de underwrit1ng fac1l1t1es. In the case 
1. W1ll1am D1amond, Development Banks, The Johns Hopk1ns Press, 
Balt1more, 1957. 
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of large proJects, 1t can make arrangements w1th the f1nanc1al 
1nst1tut1ons abroad for J01nt f1nanc1ng. In fact the overr1d1ng 
obJect1ve of the corporat1on 1s to attract fore1gn cap1tal, both 
pr1vate and off1c1al 
The rupee resources of the Corporat1on, cons1st1ng of 
cap1tal, reserves and long-term loans from the government and the 
u.s AID, amounted toRs. 167.5 m1ll1on 1n December, 1966. The 
breakup shows that the Corporat1on has a pa1d-up cap1tal of Rs. 40 
m1ll1on, of wh1ch 60 percent 1s contr1buted by the Pak1stan1 pr~vate 
1nvestors and 40 percent by the Internat1onal F1nance Corporat1on and 
fore1gn pr1vate 1nterests. It has rece1ved three long-term loans from 
the government- Rs.30 m1ll1on 1n 1957, Rs.30 m1ll1on 1n 1961 and 
Rs.lO m1ll1on 1n 1965. The f1rst loan 1s 1nterest-free, the second 
and th1rd loans carry 4 percent and 5.5 percent 1nterest respect1vely. 
The u.s. AID has sanct1oned a rupee loan of Rs.30 m1ll1on 1n 1966 
from the Counterpart Funds at 5.5 percent 1nterest. These loans are 
treated as equ1ty for the purpose of debt-equ1ty rat1o. In fore1gn 
currenc1es, 1t has rece1ved l1nes of cred1t equ1valent to Rs. 955 
m1ll1on of wh1ch cred1ts from IBRD account for Rs. 518 m1ll1on 
The loan operat1ons of the PICIC are set out 1n table 
6-2. Total loans sanct1oned by the Corporat1on s1nce 1ncept1on up to 
end-1966 amounted to Rs. 1,186 m1ll1on, of wh1ch Rs. 1,148 m1ll1on were 
1n fore1gn currenc1es and Rs. 38 m1ll1on 1n local currency Loans 
d1sbursed over th1s per1od amounted to Rs 650 m1ll1on, or about 55 
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percent of the amount sanct1oned. Its outstand1ng equ1ty 1nvestments 
amounted to Rs. 41 m1ll1on. In add1t1on, 1ts arranged f1nance from 
abroad for ll of 1ts larger proJects totall1ng Rs.237 m1ll1on and 
sponsored 20 J01nt ventures w1th the fore1gn 1nterests wh1ch resulted 
1n the 1nflow of fore1gn cap1tal equ1valent to Rs l 58 m1ll1on. 
Both PIFCO and PICIC were cater1ng to the long-term 
cred1t requ1rements of large 1ndustr1al enterpr1ses. The med1um and 
small-scale 1ndustr1es had no access to the 1nst1tut1onal f1nance -
2 
both short-term and long-term, and were starved of cred1t. In order 
to f1ll th1s gap, PIFCO was reorgan1sed 1nto Industr1al Development 
Bank (IDBP) to prov1de long-term cred1t to small and med1um-scale 
1ndustr1es It was cons1dered that the commerc1al banks w1ll take 
care of the short-term cred1t requ1rements of these 1ndustr1es The 
IDB prov1des loans both 1n local and fore1gn currenc1es. It lends 
aga1nst ex1st1ng as well as prospect1ve assets. The fore1gn currency 
resources of the Bank cons1st of the allocat1on made by the government 
from loans negot1ated w1th fore1gn countr1es and 1nternat1onal agenc1es. 
Its rupee resources, as at the end of June 1966, are set out below 
Pa1d up Cap1tal 
Reserves 
30 
23 
Loans from Govt. 62 
Borrow1ngs from State Bank 122 
Depos1ts 67 
Total 304 
(M1ll1on Rs.) 
1. PICIC - N1nth Annual Report for the year end1ng December, 1966, p.8. 
2 Andrus and Mohammed, op.c1t., p.l8l. 
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The IDBP sanct~oned loans amount~ng to Rs. 1,126 
m~ll~on s~nce ~ncept~on up to June~ 1966, of wh~ch 69 percent were 
fore~gn currency loans 0 In add~t~on, ~t adm~n~stered guarantees on 
behalf of government for loans amount~ng to Rs. 363 m~ll~on. To 
f~nance small ~ndustr~es, the Bank has work~ng arrangements w~th 
the small Industr~es Corporat~on ~n East and West Pak~stan, who sponsor 
loan appl~cat~ons to the Bank and share the r~sks w~th ~t. 
The PICIC and IDB have played a useful role ~n 
foster~ng pr~vate ~nvestment wh~ch 1 s~nce 19601 has exceeded the Plan 
1 
target. PICIC has helped ~n the ~ndustr~al cap~tal format~on to a 
far greater extent than ~s ~nd~cated by ~ts loan operat~ons. Th~s ~s 
because PICIC normally suppl~es only the fore~gn exchange cost of the 
proJect and the rupee resources have to be ra~sed by the ~nvestor. It 
~s est~mated that one rupee of PICIC ass~stance mob~l~sed Rs. 1.16 of 
2 pr~vate funds. The lend~ng pol~c~es of the !DB seem to be more 
flex~ble as the prospect~ve ~nvestor ~s expected to arrange 30 to 40 
percent of the cost of the proJect. It ~s pert~nent to po~nt out that 
the~r operat~ons have expanded due to the dec~s~on to channel fore~gn 
ass~stance arranged by the government to the pr~vate sector through 
them and to keep them well-suppl~ed w~th local funds by advances from 
the government and the State Bank 
l. Plann~ng Cornm~ss~on~ Govt.of Pak~stan, F~nal Evaluat~on of the Second 
F~ve-Year Plan, 1966, pp.lO, 15. 
2. Ahmad Sa~d, 'Ten Years of PICIC', Investment and Market~ng, November, 
~~ p.loo. 
TABLE 6-2 * Loans and Equ1ty Investments of PICIC and IDBP Loans 
(Rs.1n m1ll1on) 
P I C I C I D B P 
Loans Loans Loans 1 Equ1 ty Loans Sanct1oned 
Sanct1oned D1sbursed Outstand1ng Investments Local 
Outstand1ng Currency 
1958 36 5 5 N A. 
1959 46 18 22 N.A. 
1960 60 44 63 N.A. 
1961 102 34 88 N.A. 
1962 133 53 133 14 56 
1963 145 123 235 18 56 
1964 253 106 298 27 83 
1965 158 141 402 35 105 
1966 253 126 473 41 45 
Total 1,186 650 345 
- - --- -- -
* The f1gures for the IDB are for the f1scal year (July-June). 
Source 1) Annual Reports of PICIC and PICIC at Work, 1965, pp 10, 14. 
11) Annual Reports of IDBP. 
Fore1gn 
Currency 
113 
124 
261 
131 
152 
781 
Outstand1ng Loans 
Local Fore1gn 
Currency Currency 
100@ 130@ 
132 175 
167 297 
194 245 
218 332 
~ 
~ 
,j::. 
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Both PICIC and IDB, l~ke ADB d~scussed above, have 
conf~ned themselves to channell~ng funds placed at the~r d~sposal 
by the government. They have not got ~nto the f~eld of mob~l~s~ng 
resources themselves. Nor have they establ~shed l~nks w~th the 
bank~ng system wh~ch ~n recent years has become the largest mob~l~ser 
of sav~ngs. At present unless the government ~s ~n a pos~t~on to 
pump more money through these ~nst~tut~ons, the~r operat~ons may be 
severely curta~led. The~r fore~gn currency loans may not suffer ~f 
the government ~s able to contract fore~gn loans and cont~nue to 
allocate a part of these loans to them. The IDB, however, would need 
more regular flow of rupee f~nance to supplement ~ts fore~gn exchange 
resources, ~f ~t has to cont~nue to serve as an ~nst~tut~on cater~ng 
to the requ~rements of small and med~um-scale ~ndustr~es rather than 
dupl~cate the efforts of PICIC. 
The ma~n reason why PICIC and IDB have rema~ned s~mply 
purveyors of cred~t and have fa~led to serve as ~nstruments of cap~tal 
l accumulat~on seems to be the~r low ~nterest pol~cy Both PICIC and 
IDB charge ~nterest at the rate of 7 5 percent on fore~gn currency 
loans. On rupee loans PICIC charges 6.5 percent and IDB 7 to 8 percent 
depend~ng on the s~ze of the loan. These rates have rema~ned unchanged 
s~nce 1959. They were relat~vely h~gh compared to the advance rates of 
1. Plann~ng Comm~ss~on, The Second Plan, op.c~t., p.77. 
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commerc1al banks 1n the earl1er per1od. Due to cont1nuous r1se 1n 
advance rates of commerc1al banks over the last few years, the loan 
operat1ons of these 1nst1tut1ons have become relat1vely cheap. 
Allow1ng for the operat1onal cost, 1t 1s therefore 1mposs1ble for 
them to borrow from the market at rates wh1ch they can offer. It 
suggests that these 1nst1tut1ons w1ll have to adJust the1r 1nterest 
rate pol1cy, 1f they want to become v1able 1nst1tut1ons and get 
1ntegrated 1nto the money market. 
The low 1nterest rate pol1cy 1s Just1f1ed, f1rstly 1 on 
the ground that there w111 be an 1nsuff1c1ent demand for the1r funds 
from the pr1vate sector 1f they were to charge rates of 1nterest h1gh 
enough to cover the1r adm1n1strat1ve costs, to prov1de for bad debts 
1 
and to reflect the 'true' cost of cap1ta1. Th1s argument assumes that 
the product1v1ty of cap1tal 1s low, wh11e stud1es by the Plann1ng 
Comm1ss1on and others have shown that the product1v1ty of cap1tal, 
2 
espec1ally 1n the large-scale 1ndustry, 1s very h1gh. We have seen 1n 
chapter 5 that 1nsp1te of r1se 1n the average advance rates from 4.2 
percent to about 7.4 percent, the pressure of demand for cred1t on the 
commerc1al banks 1s 1ncreas1ng. Secondly, the Cred1t Comm1ttee 1n the1r 
report have argued that the r1se 1n 1nterest rates w1ll adversely affect 
3 
the emergence of m1ddle class entrepreneur. It 1s suff1c1ent to po1nt 
1. Andrus and Mohammed, op.c1t , p.l84 
2. Plann1ng Comm1ss1on, Second Plan, op.c1t., p.77, and Baqa1, op.c1t. 
p. 
3. Govt.of Pak1stan, Report of the Cred1t Comm1ttee, 1962, p.7 
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out that the Comm~ttee later ~n the~r report adm~t "that the element 
1 
of ~nterest ~s hardly a maJor obstacle ~n the way of the small man". 
III 
Cred~t Pol~cy for Development 
In th~s sect~on, we shall d~scuss the allocat~on of 
cred~t by the commerc~al banks. F~rst, we shall analyse the~r lend~ng 
operat~ons and convent~ons. Then we shall d1scuss whether the1r 
pol1c1es are ~n harmony w~th the needs of the economy or they need to 
refash~on the~r outlook and funct~ons ~f they are to become effect~ve 
partners ~n the process of econom1c growth and what part the State Bank 
can play ~n 1t. 
The class~f1cat1on of bank cred~t by econom~c growth 
shows that ~n December, 1954 about 77 percent was comm~tted for 
commerce and another 13.1 percent for 'manufactur~ng'. W1th the 
growth of the ~ndustr~a1 sector, the banks have d1rected 1ncreas~ng 
amounts for meet~ng work~ng cap~ta1 needs and the 'manufactur~ng' sector 
accounted for 36.8 percent of the total bank cred~t ~n June, 1966 The 
share of commerce has correspond~ngly decl~ned to about 42 percent. The 
proport~on of bank cred~t cla~med by these two sectors has decl1ned from 
90 3 percent ~n December, 1954 to 82.5 percent 1n June, 1960 and further 
1. op.c1t., p.l6. 
- 228 -
to 78.9 percent ~n June, 1968. The maJor benef~c~ary has been the 
'serv~ces' sector, wh~ch ~ncludes hotel ~ndustry, recreat~on serv~ces, 
etc Th~s, however, conceals certa~n ~mbalances ~n the d~str~but~on 
of growth ~n bank cred~t Of the total ~ncrease of Rs.4,456 m~ll~on 
~n bank cred~t dur~ng 1960-66, commerce cla~med 40.2 percent, 
'manufactur~ng' 37.4 percent and 'serv~ces' 7.6 percent. The share of 
all other sectors, such as agr~culture, construct~on, m~n~ng and publ~c 
ut~l1ty serv1ces, etc. comes to less than 15 percent of the total 
1ncrease ~n bank cred1t. The bulk of the cred~t prov1ded to the 
1 1ndustr1al sector has been used largely by a small number of people. 
The relat1ve share of each sector ~s set out ~n table 6-3 
The class~f~cat~on of advances by secur1t~es pledged, 
set out ~n table 6-4 , shows that banks 1n Pak~stan generally 1ns~st 
on secur~ng the~r loans. The proport1on of unsecured advances and 
advances secured by guarantee, however, seems to have gone up from 
6.4 percent 1n June, 1960 to 11.2 percent 1n June, 1966. The most 
favoured secur~ty st1ll rema1ns 'merchand1se', though ~ts share has 
decreased from 71.4 percent 1n December, 1957 to 55.4 percent ~n 
June, 1966. The breakup of 'merchand~se' ~nto exports, 1mports, and 
'other commod1t1es', reveals that the decl~ne has occurred ent1rely 1n 
respect of advances aga1nst export commod1t~es. The breakup of 
'merchand~se' 1nto 'agr~cultural' and 'other commod~t1es' shows that 
1 Govt.of Pak1stan, Th1rd-Plan- op.c1t , p.l21, see also 
'Concentrat1on of Bank Cred1t' below. 
TABLE 6-3 
- 229 -
1 Class~f~cat~on of Bank Cred~t by 
Econom~c Groups. 
(Rs. ~n m~ll~on) 
December 1954 June 1960 June 
Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount 
of of 
Total Total 
l) Agr~culture 10 1.04 50 3.10 153 
2) M~n~ng and Quarry- 3 0.31 15 0.93 24 
~ng 
3) Manufactur~ng 126 13.05 566 35.07 2,233 
a) Food,Beverage & 
Tobacco Manufa- 11 1.14 45 2.79 245 
ctures 
b) Text~les 68 7.05 206 12.76 963 
c) Chem~cals and 
Chem~cal Products 1 0.10 14 0.87 105 
d) Bas~c Metal, 
Mach~nery and 
Transport Equ~p. 6 0.62 89 5.51 325 
e) Others 40 4.14 212 13.14 595 
4) Construct~on 24 2.49 15 0.93 128 
5) E1ectr~c~ty 1 Gas, 
Water and San~tary 
Serv~ces 4 0.41 7 0.43 27 
6) Commerce 745 77.20 766 47.46 2,559 
7) Transport,Storage & 
Commun~cat~on 12 1.24 15 0.93 156 
8) Serv~oes 17 1.76 78 4.83 416 
9) Others 24 2.49 103 6.38 375 
All Econom~c Groups 965 100.00 1.614 100.00 6.070 
l) Excludes advances of A D.B P. and I.D.B.P. 
Source• The State Bank- Bank1ng Stat1st~cs (Annual). 
1966 
Percent 
of 
Total 
2.52 
0.40 
36.78 
4.04 
15.86 
1.73 
5.35 
9.80 
2.11 
0.44 
42.15 
2.57 
6.85 
6.18 
100.00 
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TABLE 6-4 Class1f1cat1on of Bank Advances by 
Secur1t1es Pledged. 
(M1ll1on Rs •) 
December 1957 June 1960 June 1966 
Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent 
of of of 
Total Total Total 
1) Prec1ous Metals 14 1.3 23 1.6 47 o.8 
2) Stock Exchange 65 6.1 139 9.6 477 8.3 Secur1t1es 
a) Govt.Secur1t1es 10 0.9 52 3.6 8~ 1.5 
b) Others 55 5.2 87 6.0 392 6.8 
3) Merchand1se 755 71.3 951 65.8 3,175 55.4 
1) a) Exports 487 46.0 353 24.4 1,153 20.1 
b) Imports 148 14.0 283 19.6 998 17.4 
c) Other 
Merchand1se 120 11.3 314 21.7 1,024 17.9 
11) a) Agr1cultural 
Commod1t1es 473 44 7 431 29.8 1,271 22.2 
b) Others 282 26.6 520 36.0 1,904 33.2 
14> Mach1nery and Other 
F1xed Assets 43 4.1 35 2.4 197 3.4 
15> Real Estate 20 1.9 37 2.6 304 5.3 
~) F1nanc~al 
Obl1gat1ons 29 2.7 54 3.7 286 5.0 
~) Others 133 12.6 207 14.3 1,243 21.7 
Total 1,059 100.0 1,445 100.0 5,729 100.0 
I 
Source The State Bank of Pak1stan - Bank1ng Stat1et1cs (Annual). 
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the decl~ne has occurred ent~rely ~n advances aga~nst agr~cultural 
commod~t~es. The predom~nance of 'merchand~se' as secur~ty ~s ~n 
l~ne w~th the bulk of advances made to commerce and ~ndustr~al 
sector. The advances to the ~ndustr~al sector are also made generally 
aga~nst stocks of goods-~n-process and unsold f~n~shed products. 
Th~s seems to expla~n the ~ncrease ~n relat~ve ~mportance of 'non-
agr~cultural merchand~se' as secur~ty. The r~se ~n advances aga~nst 
real estate may be related to the ~ncreased loans to hotel ~ndustry. 
The predom1nance of bank advances comm1tted to commerce 
and work1ng cap1tal of 1ndustry and of 'merchand1se' as secur1ty lS 
attr1butable to the fact that the portfol1o pol1c1es of Pak1stan1 banks 
are based on the commerc1al loan theory of bank1ng wh1ch asserts that 
the banks should conf1ne the1r lend~ng operat1ons to the f~nanc1ng of 
short-term, self-l~qu~dat1ng 'real' transact~ons The acceptance of 
th~s orthodox v1ew, both by the commerc1al banks and the monetary 
author1t~es, 1s bas1cally a h1stor1cal acc~dent The modern bank1ng 
was ~ntroduced 1n pre-Part~t1on Ind1a by the Br~t1sh bankers who, ~n 
add1t1on to the~r trad1t~onal standards of 'sound bank1ng', were 
1nterested only ~n f1nanc~ng the fore~gn trade of dependent countr~es 
As regards the preference of Br~t~sh commerc~al banks for short-term 
lend~ng, ~t needs to be recogn~sed that th~s was the outcome of certa~n 
l h~stor~c and econom~c factors pecul~ar to that country In Germany 
1 Report of the Comm~ttee on F~nance and Industry, Her MaJesty's 
Stat~onary Off~ce, London, 1930, pp.161-174. 
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and France, where cap~tal was scarce and d~ffused, and the 
entrepreneur~al talent too was ~n def~c~ent supply, the bank~ng 
system developed trad~t~ons of 'm~xed' bank~ng, forg~ng close l~nks 
w~th ~ndustry and ~n consequence became a powerful lever of 
l ~ndustr~al~sat~on. In the Un~ted States, the commerc~al banks 
regard 3-year loans for equ~pment as cons~stent w~th sound bank~ng 
2 pract1ce. Th1s shows that there ~s no un~que pattern of 'h~gh bank~ng 
standards'. In fact, each bank~ng system has to adapt ~tself to the 
econom1c env1ronment ~n wh~ch ~t ~s operat1ng and only then ~t can 
become effect1ve partner ~n the process of growth. 
Th1s orthodox funct1on of commerc~al banks 1n Pak~stan 
1s defended on the ground that s1nce the~r depos~ts are payable on 
demand or at short not~ce, the1r assets should also be correspond~ngly 
short-term. Moreover, ~t ~s argued that the loan agreements are 
largely based on ~he Judgement of branch managers dnd they can 
reasonably be expected to assess the capac~ty of a borrower to repay 
1n a short t~me, though they could have no assurance ~n est~mat~ng 
3 long-term prof~tab~l~ty. It 1s further argued that the commerc1al 
banks by prov~d~ng work1ng cap~tal enable the ~ndustr~al~sts to use the~r 
1. Madan, B.K., 'Role of Commerc1al Banks ~n Develop~ng Countr1es and 
Measures for Improv~ng the Adequacy of Bank1ng Fac~l~t~es', ~n 
SEANZA Lectures, Vol.I, (ed) State Bank of Pak~stan, 1964, pp.l49-153. 
2. I.M.F., Econom1c Development w1th Stab1l~ty- A Report to the Govt. 
of Ind1a, 1953, pp.46-48. 
3. Report of the Comm1ttee on the Work1ng of the Monetary System, Her 
MaJesty's Stat1onary Off1ce, London, 1959, para 136. 
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own resources for 1nvestment. Dr Marquez bel1eves that the 
concentrat1on of bank cred1t 1n commerce does not matter so long as 
1t 1s not used to bu1ld up excess1ve 1nventor1es. In h1s op1n1on, 
the cred1t for d1str1but1on 1s as 1mportant as cred1t for product1on 
and cred1t for work1ng balances 1s as long-term as cred1t for f1xed 
cap1tal and, from the po1nt of v1ew of econom1c development, 1t does 
1 
not matter whether banks f1nance the one or the other. Though 1t 1s 
recogn1sed that there 1s substant1al truth 1n these arguments, wr1ters 
2 
on central bank1ng nevertheless argue that the commerc1al banks 1n an 
under-developed country l1ke Pak1stan can g1ve more med1um and long-
term cred1t 1n order to f1nance f1xed 1nvestment 1n agr1culture and 
1ndustry. 
The follow1ng factors suggest that a moderate proport1on 
of loans 1n med1um and long-dated matur1t1es would not const1tute a 
threat to the l1qu1d1ty of the commerc1al banks. F1rst, the pattern and 
compos1t1on of the1r depos1ts has s1gn1f1cantly changed 1n the last 
decade. The grow1ng sh1ft to t1me depos1ts should enable banks to take 
a more pos1t1ve v1ew of term lend1ng. Secondly, although all loans are 
formally repayable on demand, a s1gn1f1cant proport1on of these are 
renewed from year to year. Recently, a rough approx1mat1on was attempted 
1. Marquez, Jav1er, 'F1nanc1al Inst1tut1ons and Econom1c Development', 1n 
H.S.Ellls and H.C.Walllch (ed) Econom1c Development For Lat1n Amer1ca, 
Macm1llan, London, 1966, pp.l79-182. 
2. Sayers, R.s., Central Bank1ng After Begehot, Oxford Un1vers1ty Press, 
pp.l21-122, u.N.Econom1c Development and Plann1ng 1n As1a and the Far 
East, November 1956, p.413. 
TABLE 6-5 
June, 1955 
December, 1955 
June, 1957 
December, 1957 
June, 1959 
December, 1959 
June, 1964 
December, 1964 
June, 1965 
December, 1965 
June, 1966 
December, 1966 
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l Class1f1cat1on of Bank Cred1t by 
Matur1ty (M1lhon Rs). 
Short-Term Cred1t Long-Term Cred1t Total Bank 
Cred1t 
Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Perc en 
of Total of Total 
658 74.4 226 25.6 884 100.0 
903 79.9 227 20.1 1,130 100.0 
894 80.7 214 19.3 1,108 100.0 
1,053 84.2 198 15.8 1,251 100.0 
1,031 80.0 257 20.0 1,288 100.0 
1,309 80.8 312 19.2 1,621 100.0 
3,437 77.5 995 22.5 4,432 100.0 
4,390 77.7 1,262 22 3 5,652 100 0 
4,607 76.5 1,415 23 5 6,022 100.0 
4,904 76.6 1,502 23.4 6,406 100.0 
4,677 72.2 1,797 27.8 6,474 100.0 
5,743 73.5 2,070 26.5 7,813 100.0 
1. Excludes advances by IDBP and ADBP, and 1ncludes 1nvestments 
of banks 1n pr1vate secur1t1es. 
t 
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by the Work~ng Group appo~nted by the M~n~stry of F~nance on Cred~t 
1 
and F~nance on the bas~s of certa~n assumpt~ons. The class~f~cat~on 
of bank cred~t by matur1ty on the bas~s of these assumpt~ons ~s set 
out ~n table 6-5. It shows that about one-fourth of bank cred~t ~s, 
~n actual pract~ce, for long-term purposes It would, therefore, 
make no rad~cal departure from ex~st~ng pract~ce ~f commerc~al banks 
formally start g~v~ng med~um and long-term cred~t for product~on 
purposes. That would enable the borrowers to plan ahead the~r 
~nvestment, product~on and repayment schedules. 
Moreover, the l~qu~d~ty of bank assets does not 
necessar~ly depend on the~r 'marketab~l~ty' or the~r 'self-l~qu~dat~ng' 
character. It rather depends on the~r 'sh1ftab~l~ty' to the central 
2 bank and thus lead~ng to the creat~on of add~t~onal reserve money. 
The State Bank can dev~se an ~nst~tut~onal arrangement wh~ch, through 
ref~nance fac~l~t~es can el~m1nate or allev~ate the ~ll~qu~d~ty of such 
loans. In Ind~a, a Ref~nance Corporat~on has been establ~shed to 
prov~de relend~ng fac~l~t~es aga~nst loans g~ven by the banks to 
3 ~ndustr~al concerns for the purpose of ~ncreased product~on. The State 
Bank can also encourage banks to prov~de more development f~nance by 
1. Courtesy State Bank of Pak~stan. 
2. Dacey, W.M., The Br~t~sh Bank~ng Mechan~sm, Hutch~nson Un~vers~ty 
L~brary, London, 1964, pp.85-88. 
3. Guptn, G.P., The Reserve Bank of Ind~a and Monetary Management, 
As~a Publ~sh~ng House, 1962, pp.334-335, 372. 
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1ncreas1ng the1r 1nvestments 1n 1ndustr1al secur1t1es, by 
part1c1pat1ng 1n the equ1ty and debentures of the spec1al1sed 
f1nanc1al 1nst1tut1ons and by part1c1pat1ng w1th the spec1al1sed 
1nst1tut1ons for JOlnt ventures. Th1s would, by forg1ng a l1nk 
between commerc1al banks and spec1al1sed 1nst1tut1ons, mark a step 
towards 1ntegrat1on of the short-term money market w1th long-term 
cap1tal market. Th1s w1ll 1 however, not be poss1ble so long as the 
spec1al1sed 1nst1tut1ons pers1st 1n the1r cheap cred1t pol1cy. 
Another problem wh1ch requ1res close attent1on, 1s the 
concentrat1on of bank cred1t 1n few hands. It 1s ev1dent from table 
no 6-6, that both PICIC and IDB are cater1ng ma1nly to the cred1t 
requ1rements of large-scale 1ndustry. The concentrat1on of commerc1al 
bank cred1t was f1rst po1nted out by the Cred1t Enqu1ry Comm1ss1on, 
wh1ch observed that at the end of March, 1959, 63 percent of bank 
advances were locked up 1n only 222 accounts 1nvolv1ng Rs. l m1ll1on 
and above. At the other end, advances up to Rs.25 1 000 to small 
borrowers accounted for only 5.6 percent of total bank advances. The 
proport1on rose to only 13 percent even 1f advances up to Rs. 0.1 
m1ll1on were 1ncluded. They also po1nted out that before Part1t1on, 
the small 1ndustr1al1st and bus1nessman was able to obta1n f1nance from 
money-lenders and 1nd1genous bankers, largely 1n the form of d1scount1ng 
of 'hund1s'. The 1nd1genous bankers 1n turn were able to red1scount 
'hund1s' w1th the commerc1al banks. W1th the m1grat1on of 1nd1genous 
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bankers after Part1t1on, the small bus1ness has lost th1s source of 
l f1nance. 
There appear to be three ma1n sets of reasons 
account1ng for the concentrat1on of bank cred1t. F1rstly, the bas1c 
factor seems to be the 1ndustr1al and commerc1al pol1c1es of the 
government. In the 1ndustr1al f1eld 1 the government encouraged the 
d1str1but1on of 1ncome 1n favour of a small class of entrepreneurs. 
Th1s 1s because 1n v1ew of low level of per cap1ta 1ncome and sav1ng 
potent1al and the 1nadequacy of f1nanc1al 1nst1tut1ons to mob1l1se 
sav1ngs, rap1d 1ndustr1al1sat1on was cons1dered poss1ble only through 
2 
re1nvestment of corporate prof1ts. These 1ndustr1al1sts also became 
1mporters as 1mport l1cences were 1ssued to them as 1ndustr1al 
consumers. F1nally, they were encouraged to part1c1pate 1n the export 
trade through export 1ncent1ve schemes. It 1s obv1ous that bank cred1t 
must follow the overall pattern of government pol1cy. If the 1mport 
l1cences and sanct1ons to set up new 1ndustr1al un1ts cont1nue to go to 
a handful of fam1ly groups, 1t would be unreal1st1c to expect that the 
banks would refuse cred1t to them and d1rect the flow of cred1t to the 
small man who may have l1ttle product1ve use to make of such funds 1n 
the absence of l1cences and sanct1ons. Recently, the government has 
1. Govt.of Pak1stan 
Chapter XV. 
Report of the Cred1t Enqu1ry Comm1Ss1on, 1959, 
2. Govt.of Pak1stan (Plann1ng Comm1ss1on), Th1rd F1ve-Year Plan (1965-70), 
p.ll7. 
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1 dec~ded to ~nduct new comers ~nto ~ndustry and trade. It has come 
to real~se that each fam~ly group of entrepreneurs ~s engaged ~n 
such a broad spectrum of ~ndustr~al, commerc~al and trad~ng act~v~t~es 
that ~t may ~nclude the manufacture of cotton text~les, chem~cals, 
consumers goods, agr~cultural produce, commerc~al trad~ng, bank~ng, 
~nsurance, sh~pp~ng l~nes and sale agenc~es for fore~gn manufactures. 
As a result, the management ~s ~neff~c~ent, product~v~ty ~s low and 
2 
overall contr~but~on to the economy ~s poor. In sp~te of h~gh cost 
of product~on due to poor management, the prof~ts are qu~te h~gh 
ow~ng to protect~ve tarr~fs and sheltered domest~c market. The new 
entrants ~nto the ~ndustr~al and commerc~al f~elds are f~nd~ng ~t 
d~ff~cult to obta~n cred~t from the banks and some of them sell the~r 
3 l~cences to the establ~shed part~es. 
The second factor ~s the reluctance of the banks to 
extend cred~t to the small and m~ddle level entrepreneur. Th~s 1s 
because they f~nd ~t d~ff~cult to establ~sh the 'cred~t-worth~ness' of 
these borrowers, the cost per rupee for adm~n~ster~ng small loans ~s 
h~gh and ~n the case of default the expend~ture on legal proceed~ngs 
for recovery ~s out of proport1on to the sums ~nvolved. 
1. Th~rd Plan, op.c~t., p.ll8, see also Annual Speech of the Governor, 
State Bank of Pak1stan, 1966, p.l4. 
2. Th1rd Plan, op.c~t., p.447. 
3. Govt.of Pak~stan, Report on the Cred1t Comm~ttee, 1962, pp.l4-17, 
Annual Speech of the Governor, State Bank of Pak~stan, 1966, pp.l4-15. 
TABLE 6-6 S1ze D1str1but1on of Loans of PICIC and IDBP. 
P I C I C I D B P 
(Cumulat1ve as on December 31,1964) (Cumulat1ve as on March 31~ 1967) 
No. of Amount Percent No. of Amount Percent 
ProJects (M1ll1on of ProJects (M1ll1on of 
Rs). Total Rs ) Total 
Up to Rs 0.5 m1ll1on 126 40 5.1 2,442 289 22.3 
Over Rs. 0.5 m1ll1on 
to Rs. 1 m1ll1on 84 65 8.4 299 214 16 5 
Over Rs. l m1ll1on 195 670 86.5 245 793 61.2 
Total 405 775 100.0 2,986 1,296 100.0 
Source 1) PICIC - PICIC at Work, 1965, p.l5. 
2) Govt. of Pak1stan, Econom1c Survey- 1966-67, p.l48. 
1.\:) 
w 
(.0 
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Th~rdly 1 the small entrepreneur ~s unable to offer 
su~table secur~ty, he has no regular bus~ness w~th the banks to ga~n 
the~r conf~dence and understand~ng, and he 1s not used to ma1nta~n1ng 
elaborate f1nanc1al statements of h1s bus~ness. On the other hand, 
the banks f1nd advances to large part1es not only prof1table 1 but 
they are also very careful not to lose them to other banks. 
The Cred1t Comm1sS10n (1959} and the Cred1t Comm1ttee 
(1962} made a number of recommendat1ons to br1ng about a w1der 
d1sposal of bank cred1t. These 1ncluded a) the sett1ng up of a 
Peoples F1nance Corporat1on, b) appo1ntment of guarantee brokers and 
the establ1shment of d1scount houses, and (c) to earmark a certa1n 
percentage of bank depos~ts for mak1ng advances to small borrowers. 
The ~dea of establ1sh1ng a F~nance Corporat1on, dependent for 1ts 
f~nanc1al resources on government budgetary appropr1at1ons, was reJected 
on Lhe gruund that 1t would not be able to command suff1c1ent resources 
or spread 1ts network w1dely. The other two recommendat1ons, for the 
reasons d1scussed below, were also not accepted by the government. The 
State Bank was asked to use 1ts moral pursuat~on w~th the banks to 
encourage them to lend more to the small part1es. 
The State Bank, unarmed w1th any spec1al powers to coerce 
the banks, has sought to br1ng about the des1red change 1n the 
d1str1but1on of bank cred1t by us1ng 1ts 1nfluence w1th the banks. In 
add1t1on, the Bank took pos1t~ve measures, such as, the exempt1on of 
advances up to Rs.50JOOO from marg~n requ1rements ~mposed on certa1n 
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categor~es of bank advances ~n 1960 and 1964 Secondly, under the 
Quota System ~ntroduced ~n 1963, ~t was prov~ded that ~n add~t~on to 
the quota the banks could borrow at the Bank rate amounts equal to 
the~r advances of Rs 25,000 or below, subJect to the cond~t~on that 
the benef~t of the bas~c rate, ~.e., the Bank rate, was passed on to 
the small borrowers. S~nce January, 1964, the Nat~onal Bank of 
Pak~stan has ~ntroduced a Peoples Cred~t Scheme to prov~de cred~t to 
the small traders and ~ndustr~al~sts. The lower and upper l~m~ts for 
loans under th~s scheme are Rs. 250 and Rs. 50 1 000 tespect~vely. In 
the f~rst year, ~t sanct~oned loans amount~ng to Rs. 222 m~ll~on. In 
the subsequent two years, loans under th~s scheme have decl~ned 
drast~cally. It seems the early enthus~asm of the Nat~onal Bank has 
gradually subs~ded. It m~ght be partly due to the fact that at the 
end of 1966 about 60 percent of the outstand~ng advances were overdue 
for more than one year. 
There has been some progress towards w~dard~spersal of 
bank cred~t. The rat~o of advances up to Rs. 25,000 to total bank 
cred~t has gone up from 4.7 percent ~n December, 1957 to 11.0 percent 
~n June, 1966. The ~mprovement ~s part~cularly s~gn~f~cant as at the 
latter date the rat~o ~s related to a much larger total f~gure. At 
the other end, the rat~o of advances ~nvolv~ng more than Rs. 1. m~ll~on 
per account has decl~ned from 60.2 percent to 51.9 percent over th~s 
per~od. But th~s ~mprovement ~n the supply of cred~t to the small man 
seems to be ~nadequate to meet the grow~ng demand for cred~t, and ~t ~s 
TABLE 6-7 Loans and Recover1es Under the People's Cred1t Scheme. 
1964 1965 1966 
No.of Amount No. of Amount No. of 
A/Cs A/Cs A/Cs 
1. Loans 
1) Up to Rs.lo,ooo 17,649 95 4,557 29 3_,354 
11) Above Rs.lO,OOO 
and up to Rs. 4,003 79 1,274 19 491 
25,000 
111) Above Rs.25 1000 1,189 48 141 6 198 
TOTAL 22,841 222 5,972 54 
2. Recover1es 
1) Overdue for more 
than one year 
-
20 
11) Overdue less than 
one year 76 57 
111) Amount real1sed 74 65 
3. Total Outstand1ng on 
31.12.1966 
Source Govt of Pak1stan- Econom1c Survey- 1966-67, pp.l40-14l. 
(Rs. 1n m1ll1on). 
Progress1ve total up 
to 31.12.1966. 
Amount No. of Amount 
A/Cs 
19 25,560 143 
13 5,768 111 
7 1,528 61 
39 32,856 315 
58 N.A. 
19 N.A. 
78 217 
98 
I 
! 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
t..:> 
,j:o 
t..:> 
I 
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felt that th~s process needs to be further accelerated. 
Both Cred~t Comm~ss~on and cred~t Comm~ttee had 
recommended that a certa1n percentage of bank depos1ts should be 
earmarked for loans to the small part1es. The Bank does not support 
th1s v1ew on the ground that~ apart from pract1cal d1ff1cult~es of 
~mplementat1on and the r1sk of c1rcumvent~on, 1t would lead to 
reg1mentat1on of banks' act1v1t1es. The Bank 1s also opposed to the 
suggest1on of plac1ng a ce~l1ng on advances to the 1nd~v~dual 
1 part1es, because 1t m1ght lead to waste of scarce resources. It 
po~nts out that the small man was more bereft of cred1t fac1l1t~es 
1n 'f~ft1es, when the banks were loaded w1th surplus loanable funds, 
than 1n the 's1xt1es, when the banks are fac1ng 1ncreas1ng pressure 
on the1r resources So, 1t argues, that the den1al of cred1t to the 
b~g part1es would 1n no way ensure larger supply of cred1t to the small 
man. There are real d1ff1cult1es, such as h1gher cost and r~sk 1n the 
way of expans1on of bank cred1t to the small man wh~ch ne~ to be 
removed f1rst. It 1s, however, hard to understand that the Bank has not 
only done prec1ous l~ttle to remove these d~ff1cult1es, but also 1t has 
2 
all along 1ns1sted on cheap cred1t to the small borrowers. 
1. Mohammed Uza1r, 'Recent Trends and Problems 1n Bank1ng', DAWN (Da1ly 
Paper), Sept.l5, 1968, Hasn1e, S.A., 'R1s1ng Dangers 1n Bank1ng' 
Supplement to DAWN, March 24, 1967, p.III. 
2. Governor, State Bank of Pak1stan, Annual Speeches, 1961, p.l2, 
1962, p.2o. 
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The establ~shment of the Peoples F~nance Corporat1on 
on the l1nes of the Small Bus~ness Adm1n1strat1on of the u.s.A. and 
the Peoples F1nance Corporat1on 1n Japan, w1th powers not only to 
prov1de d1rect ass1stance, but also to guarantee the loans of the 
scheduled banks m1ght partly reduce the r1sk element. In Ind1a, a 
cred1t guarantee scheme 1s ~n operat1on s1nce July, 1960 to encourage 
the banks to enlarge the1r cred1t to the small-scale 1ndustr1es. 
Under th~s scheme, the government has assumed a maJor port1on of the 
r1sk by shar1ng the bulk of the losses 1ncurred by the banks. The 
scheme 1s adm1n1stered by the Reserve Bank on behalf of the 
1 government. Even after the establ1shment of such an 1nst1tut~on 
cred1t to the small man w1ll not be at par w1th that to the b1g part1es. 
Unless the d1fference 1n the pr1ce of cred1t, based on the r~sk and 
cost elements, 1s allowed, the ava~lab111ty of cred1t to the small man 
w1ll rema1n l1m1ted. 
In recent years, the advance rates have started r1s1ng 
follow~ng the r~se 1n depos1t rates wh1ch, 1n turn, 1s due to 
d~rect1~ts ~ssued by the State Bank. The general upward movement of 
advance rates ~s l1kely to knock out demand for cred1t for certa~n 
unproduct1ve, marg1nal or undes1rable 1nvestments. It would 
d1scourage undue accumulat1on of 1nventor1es and m1ght ease the pressure 
1. Gupta, G.P., The Reserve Bank of Ind1a and Monetary Management, 
As1a Publ1sh1ng House, London, 1962, pp.335-337. 
TABLE 6-8 Class1f1cat1on of Bank Advances by S1ze of Account. 
December,. 1957 
No.of Amount 
A/Cs 
Advances up to 
Rs. 25,000 26,104 57 
Advances from 
Rs.25~000 to Rs. 
1 Lae 1,803 90 
Advances from 
Rs.l lac to Rs. 903 204 
5 lac 
Advances from Rs. 
5 lac to Rs. 10 179 128 
lac 
Advances from Rs. 
10 lac to Rs. 50 lac 184 386 
Advances above Rs.50 
lac 33 338 
TOTAL 129,206 1,203 
1. Excludes advances of IDBP and ADBP • 
* Lae = 100 ,ooo 
Percent 
of 
Total 
4.7 
7.5 
17.0 
10.6 
32.1 
28.1 
100.0 
(Rs. 1n m1ll1on) 
December, 1961 June,. 1966 
No.of Amount Percent No.of Amount !Percent 
A/Cs of A/Cs of 
Total Total 
63,195 175 8.0 155,964 631 ll.O 
4,752 228 10.4 ll, 749 700 12.2 
1,833 363 16.6 4,726 940 16.4 
278 237 10.8 695 483 8.4 
305 581 26.5 540 1,119 19.5 
41 619 27.7 134 1,856 32 4 
70,404 2,196 100.0 173,808 5,729 100.0 
Sources Govt.of Pak1stan -Report of the Cred1t 
Comm1ttee 1 1962, p.l2. The State Bank 
of Pak1stan - Stat1st1cs on the Scheduled 
Banks (Quarterly), June~ 1966. 
I 
I 
I 
~ 
~ 
C:1l 
I 
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of demand for cred~t from large part~es. The large part~es are 
generally accomodated by the banks at concess~onal rates of ~nterest. 
It ~s ev~dent from table 6-9 that ~n June, 1964, 19.1 percent of total 
bank cred~t was at or below Bank rate. The rat~o has decl~ned to 
6.9 percent ~n June, 1966. The State Bank should f~x m~n~mum 
advance rates l~ke the Reserve Bank of Ind~a wh~ch has set the 
m~n~mum l~~t for advance rates at 2 percent above the Bank rate. 
Th~s step ~s l~kely to d~scourage excess~ve demand for bank cred~t from 
the b~g part~esl 
- 247-
TABLE 6-9 * Class1f1cat1on of Scheduled Banks' Advances 
by Interest Rates. 
(Rs 1n lacs) 
June 
Rate of Interest 1958 1959 1960 1962 1964 1966 
oo.oo 150 279 296 406 678 956 
0.25-3.00 1,766 59 180 140 226 349 
3.25-4.00 3,175 2,235 2,161 3,793 7,277 451 
4.25-5.00 4,001 3,419 3,857 7,051 9,523 2,562 
5.25-6.00 1,083 4,084 6,571 9,400 13,751 16,036 
6.25-7.00 221 752 988 4,442 10,279 14,872 
7 25 and above 194 175 396 693 1,686 27,960 
Total 10,590 11,003 14,449 25,925 43,420 63,166 
(Percentage) 
oo.oo 1.4 2.5 2.1 L6 1.6 1.5 
0.25-3.00 16.7 0.5 1.2 0.5 0.5 0.6 
3.25-4.00 30.0 20 3 15.0 14.6 16.8 0.7 
4.25=5.00 37.8 31.1 26.7 27.2 21.9 4.1 
5.25-6.00 10.2 37.1 45.5 36.3 31.7 25.4 
6.25-7.00 2.1 6.8 6.8 17.1 23.7 23.5 
7.25 and above 1.8 1.6 2 7 2 7 3.9 44 2 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source The State Bank of Pak1stan - Bank1ng Stat1st1cs of Pak1stan, 
1965-66. 
* Includes advances by the IDBP and ADBP 
N B. - The Bank rate was ra1sed from 3 percent to 4 percent 1n 
January, 1959 and further to 5 percent 1n June, 1965. 
; 
\ 
APPENDIX TABLE NO:l. Consolidated Balance Sheet of the State Bank of Pakistan (Rs. in million) 
1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 19 )5 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
1 .. Notes in Circulation 1682 1714 1924 2094 2081 2240 24 L7 2835 3202 3373 3411 3566 3609 3645 3953 4444 4817 5746 5618 
2. Balances of Banks(a) 217 149 189 109 146 164 1 ~4 275 161 209 262 194 196 230 306' 384 584 491 759 
3,. 'Other Deposits'(b) 35 37 40 38 21 20 30 7.3 88 46 44 44 45 50 50. 54 64 92 132 
Total (1)+(2)+(3) 1934 1900 2153 2241 2248 2424 26 u 3183 3451 3628 3717 3804 3850 3925 4309 4882 5465 6329 6509 
4 .. Government Deposits 820 560 797 444 377 199 1r2 178 72 180 182 124 70 259 167. 311 276 241 221 
5 .. Counterpart Funds and Loan 
A/C(c) 
- -
... ., ... ... r 155 601 637 664 822 1086 873 1057 785 . 977 779 729 
6., Other Special Deposits(d) 
- -
3 3 3 4 8 26 5 5 5 12 72 66 66 7 83 310 332 
7o Capital,Reserves and Rural I 
Credit Fund 60 60 60 60 60 60 ~0 60 60 60 60 72 82 97 112 127 143 163 253 
8. Other Liabilities 34 29 59 42 74 55 ~8 87 
-
142 127 145 159 175 225 2221 224 310 363 353 
Liabilities = Assets 2849 2549 3072 2790 2763 2742 29 ~8 3689 4331 4637 4772 4993 5335 5446 5931 6334 7254 8184 8396 
-
Foreign Assets 2514 1747 2184 1514 1116 1103 11 r4 2004 1787 1521 1770 1986 1896 1810 2082 1885 1550 1837 1165 
Iii, 
GovtoSecurities and Treasury 
Bills 324 614 814 1028 1423 1432 15 r9 1494 2341 2867 2801 2733 2967 2968 3216 3358 3661 4794 5009 
Loans and Advances to Govt. 1 ... 2 2 103 75 )4 ... ... llO 87 125 15 96 561 132 140 242 129 
Advances to Banks(e) 
-
.... 
-
132 24 31 ~5 30 94 42 19 43 347 445 440 816 1739 1126 1826 
Other Assets 10 188 71 ll3 97 102 ~6 161 109 97 96 105 110 126 136 143 163 185 266 
' 
a) Includes balances of non-scheduled banks .. Source: State Bank of Pakistan - Reports on Curr,ency and 
b) That part of 'other deposits' reported by the Bank which form part of money supplyo Finance and information supplied by the Bank. 
c) and d) They are reported under 'other deposits' in the balance sheet of the Bank. 
e) Includes advances to non-scheduled banks. 
A tr·) .. t 
APPENDIX TABLE N0:2 Reserve Money (C) (Rs. in million) 
Composition of Reserve Money Tre ~sury Total Reserve Reserve Money Held by cb June 
- -(Last Friday) Monetary Liabilities of the State Bank cur. ~ency Money ' --c 
Notes in Scheduled Banks •· Total Public Scheduled 
Circulation Balances* Cp Banks cl;> 
I 
1950 1714 132 1846 ~5 1871 1692 179 0.096 
1951 1924 173 2097 ll6 2213 1987 226 0.102 
1952 2094 103 2197 136 2333 2172 161 o.o69 
1953 2081 133 2214 lU 2355 2173 182 0.077 
1954 2240 143 2383 137 2550 2363 187 0.,073 
1955 2417 188 2605 137 2792 2556 236 o.o85 
1956 2835 264 3099 
' 
B7. 3296 2982 314 0.095 
1957 3202 142 3344 2a4 3568 3373 195 o.o55 
1958 3373 194 3567 251 3828 3582 246 0.064 
1959 3411 253 3664 256 3920 3598 322 0.082 
1960 3566 180 \1 3746 270 4016 3772 244 0.,061 
1961 3609 184 3793 2go 4073 3806 267 o.o66 
1962 3645 207 3852 275 4127 3825 302 0.073 
1963 3953 262 4215 259 4474 4082 392 0.088 
1964 4444 360 4804 3L7 5121 4612 509 1.099 
1965 4817 574 5391 2 51 5642 4902 740 0.131 
1966 5746 476 6222 2 54 6476 5802 674 0.104 
1967 5618 720 6338 i 2 95. 6633 5562 1071 
I 
0.161 
-
* As reported .in the combined balance sheets of scheduled banks.; ! Source: State Bank of Pakistan - Reports on purrency and 
Finance (Annual). ! 
' 
' 
I 
'J-'t'?.c 
APPENDIX TABLE NO: 3 The Causative Analysis of ch ~nges in Reserve Money 
(Rs. in millions) 
1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953-54 1954 ... 55 ~955 .. 56 1956-57 1957-58 1958-59 1959-60 1960-61 1961-62 I 1962r6.: 1963-64 1964-65 1965 ... 66 1966-67 1---·---
--Notes in Circulation +210 + 170 
-
13 + 159 +177 + 418 + 367 +171 + 38 + 155 + 43 + 36 + 308 + 491 + 373 + 929 
- 128 
* Balance of Banks + 40 
-
80 + 37 + 18 + 30 + 81 - 114 + 48 + 53 - 68 + 2 + 34 + 76 + 78 + 200 - 93 + 268 
Treasury Currency + 91 + 20 + 5 + 26 + 20 + 10 + 27 + 37 ... 5 + 14 + 10 ... 5 
-
il6 + 58 
-
66 + 3 + 41 
Total Reserve Money + 341 + 110 + 29 + 203 + 227 + 509 + 280 +256 + 86 + 101 + 55 + 65 + 3p8 + 627. + 507 + 839 + 181 
Foreign Assets (F) + 437 .. 670 
- 398 .. 13 + 71 + 830: ... 217 - 266 + 249 + 216 
-
90 
-
86 +2h - 197. - 335 + 287 
- 672 
Govt.Debt and Other ~8 Assets (net) (Gl) - 94 + 646 + 520 + 208 + 170 - 282 + 448 + 532 - 142 ... 140 - 157 + 58 + + 453 - 70 +1193 + 192 
I Borrowings of Banks (B) 
-
+ 132 
- 108 + 7 
-
6 + 5 + 64 
-
52 
-
23 + 24 + 304 + 98 
-
5 + 376 + 923 
- 613 + 700 
' 
-
~ku:e_of a1 
Govt.Securities and 
Treasury Bills + 200 + 214 + 395 + 9 ',5 + 147 
-
85 + 847 + 526 ... 66 
-
68 + 234 + 1 + 248 + 142 + 303 +1133 + 215 
Govt.Borrowings + 2 
- + 101 - 28 
-
21 
- 54 
-
+ 110 ... 23 + 38 
- 110 + -81 - 40 + 76 + 8 + 1()2 
- 113 
'' ~t GovtoDepolilits - 237 + 353 + 67 + 178 + 27 il - 6 + 106 - 108 - 2 + 58 + 154 + 189 + eii> 144 + 35 + 35 + 20 Counterpart Fund, Loan ' A/Cs, Other special - 3 ... - 3; - 4 - 173 - 425 - 36 - 27 - 165 - 324 + 219 - + 331 - 268 - 29 + 28 Deposits 
i 
I Capital Reserve Fund 
- -
... 
-
... 
- - - - -
12 
-
10 ... 15 
- ;J.5 - 15 
-
16 
- 20 - 90 
Other Assets (Net) - 147 + 59 
-
48 + 24 + 1 + 26 - 107 + 3 ... 19 
-
5 
-
11 ... 34 + p + 5 ... 66 
-
31 + 91 
Treasury Currency + 91 + 20 + 5 + 26 +20 + 10 + 27 + 37 
-
5 + 14 + 10 ... 5 
- t6 + 58 - 66 + 3 + 41 
-
' ! 
.>; 
* As reported in the Balance Sheets of the State Bank of Pakistano I includes balances of non-scheduled banks as well. ,. 
).4"1- ,( 
II 
APPENDIX TABLE NO: 4 Determinants of._M ~ey Supply. (Rs. in million) 
I 
t i 
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955
1f 
\ 
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 I 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
Currency in Circulation .I I 
25561 
I 
(Cp) 1692 1987 2172 2173 2363 2982 3373 3582 3598 3772 3806 3825 4082 4612 4902 5802 5562 
i 
Deposit Money (Dm) 1037 1138 1083 1139 1222 1300 i 1504 1578 1735 1914 2041 2036 2240 : 2830 3328 3719 4041 4822 
I 
Active Money Supply i 
(M1j= Cp + Dm) 2729 3125 3255 3312 3585 3856 i 4485 4951 5317 5511 5813 5842 6064 I 6911 7940 8621 9843 10383 I 
Idle Money (Time Deposits) 
(M2) 200 277 243 304 433 519 564 569 700 753 946 1228 1507 . 1935 2432 3228 4039 5140 
Money Supply I 
(MS = Ml + M2) 2929 3402 3498 3616 4018 I 43751 5049 5520 6017 6264 6759 7070 7571 . 8846 10372 11849 13882 15523 
I 
Scheduled Banks' Claims on I 
the Private Sector (L) 491 550 780 679 809 7591 858 1095 1137 1132 1490 1906 2596 3389 4303 6018 6385 8320 
Scheduled Banks' Claims on I 
* * * 8521 the Govt.Sector (Gl) 481 514 462 567 651 878 865 1099 1295 1359 1609 1585 1676 2016 2244 . 2429 2513 
State Banks' Claims on the \1 
Govt.Sector (G2) 153 -32 594 1109 1291 1441! 1149 1570 2065 1928 1774 1607 1670 1784 2179 2175 3375 4516 I 
I 
Foreign Assets Held by the 
State Bank (F) 1747 2184 1514 1116 1103 1174 i 2004 1787 1521 1770 1986 1896 1810 2082 1885 1550 1837 1165 
! 
Other Factors (A) 57 186 148 145 164 14S I 160 203 195 139 150 52 -90 -85 -11 -138 -144 -991 
i 
I 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan - Reports on Currency and Finance 
and information supplied by the Banko 
APPENDIX TABLE NO 5 G.N.P. 1 MONEY SUPPLY AND ITS COMPONENTS 
Demand 
Per1od G.N.P. Currency Depos1ts T1me Money 
(end-June} (At 1n + Depos1ts Supply 
current c1rcu1- Other 
factor at1on Depos1ts 
cost} W1th 
S.B.P. 
1950 201316 11692 1103 7 200 21929 
1951 211620 11987 11138 277 31402 
1952 211151 21172 11085 243 31498 
1953 211816 21 173 11139 304 31616 
1954 211491 21363 11222 433 41018 
1955 21,902 2, 556 11300 519 4, 3 75 
1956 241625 2,982 11504 564 51049 
1957 271496 313 73 11578 569 51520 
1958 281211 31 582 11 73 5 700 61017 
1959 291 731 31 598 11914 753 61264 
1960 331112 31772 21041 946 61 759 
1961 3 51 63 5 31806 21036 11228 71070 
1962 3 71 563 31825 21240 11507 7,571 
1963 391963 41082 21830 1193 5 81846 
1964 431409 41612 31328 21432 1013 72 
1965 471610 41902 31719 31228 111849 
1966 541936 51802 41041 41039 131882 
* The f1gures are averages of two f1nanc1al years 
Source (1} State Bank of Pak1stan - Reports on 
Currency and F1nance 
(11} Government of Pak1stan 1 Econom1c 
Surveys 
Nat1onaJ 
Income 
Deflato1 
81 5 
85 2 
82 1 
80 9 
77 2 
78 6 
85 9 
94 6 
94 3 
96 6 
102 6 
104 6 
105 3 
105.8 
108 1 
113.3 
124 6 
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